State v. Scrotsky

• Decision Date: 29 June 1962
• Docket Number: No. A--121,A--121
• Citation: 182 A.2d 868,38 N.J. 14
• Parties: The STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Andrew SCROTSKY, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Page 14

38 N.J. 14

182 A.2d 868

The STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Andrew SCROTSKY, Defendant-Appellant.

No. A--121.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Argued May 21, 1962.

Decided June 29, 1962.

Dino D. Bliablias, Assistant Prosecutor, for plaintiff-respondent (Brendan T. Byrne, County Prosecutor of Essex County, attorney).

Robert G. O'Brien, Newark, for defendant-appellant.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

FRANCIS, J.

Defendant was convicted of unlawful entry in violation of N.J.S.A. 2A:94--1, and of larceny under N.J.S.A. 2A:119--2. A State Prison sentence of 2--7 years was imposed for the former offense, and one of 2--3 years for the latter. The sentences were made concurrent. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions and we granted certification.

Two grounds for reversal are raised. One contends the evidence adduced to support the charges was so untrustworthy that it could not reasonably support defendant's conviction. The other (which was not advanced in the Appellate Division) alleges that the searches of defendant's home and the seizure therein of the evidence upon which he was convicted were illegal because the police officers had no search warrant, and no justifiable excuse was shown for the failure to obtain one.

As to the first ground, we agree with the Appellate Division that there was a sharp and irreconcilable conflict in the proof submitted by the State and defense as to Scrotsky's guilt. Resolution of the problem of credibility was for the trier of the facts, and might have been decided for or against defendant. The trial court, who sat without a jury and who saw and heard the witnesses, concluded that guilt had been shown beyond a reasonable doubt. We cannot say that his determination was contrary to the weight of the evidence.

The second ground of attack on the conviction cannot be dismissed summarily. The offenses in question were committed on August 23, 1959. Trial and conviction occurred on December 3, 1959, and sentence was imposed on January 28, 1960. Defendant's brief on his Pro se appeal to the Appellate Division was filed on May 31, 1961. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081, was decided June 19, 1961. There, the United States Supreme Court held the rule which excludes in Federal criminal trials evidence obtained by means of illegal search and seizure was binding on state courts as well in such cases. Under the circumstances, even though the Appellate Division affirmance of Scrotsky's conviction did not occur until October 2, 1961, we think he should not be penalized for failing to raise the search and seizure issue until certification was granted by us and counsel appointed to represent him.

The matter which presents itself is whether the Mapp rule should be applied to the searches and seizures which in this case antedated the Supreme Court opinion. That problem was dealt with very recently in State v. Smith, 37 N.J. 481, 181 A.2d 761. There, it was held that in cases where the search and seizure were made prior to Mapp but which were tried thereafter, even though specific objection was not made to the admission of proof seized without a warrant, if the circumstances attending the search were explored or sufficiently developed at the trial to justify questioning the seizure on a timely appeal from conviction, this court would accept the issue for determination. In such instances, however, it may be necessary at times to remand the record to the trial court for supplementary proof so that the facts may be fully exposed in the light of Mapp. It may be in a given case that the State, relying on the former long standing nonexclusionary rule, refrained from introducing all of the informative evidence in its possession as to the legality of the search and seizure. It may be also, that, even though the defendant put sufficient proof in the record at trial, either designedly or incidentally, to permit the character of the police action to be raised on appeal, within the intendment of State v. Smith, it will appear (by affidavit or otherwise) that additional pertinent facts are available bearing strongly on the issue. In such cases to achieve complete justice, the discretion of the appellate tribunal may be exercised by directing a remand for full exploration of the search and seizure, and for a finding thereon by the trial court. See State v. Valentin, 36 N.J. 41, 174 A.2d 737 (1961).

It has been stipulated on this appeal that on the occasions of the searches and seizures of the evidence which resulted in defendant's conviction, the State had no search warrant. That fact, however, cannot be said to be dispositive on the present record.

The alleged unlawful entry and theft from the apartment of the complaining witness, Lucille Seymore, took place on Sunday, August 23, 1959, at 66 Oriental Street, Newark, New Jersey. She owns the building...