State v. Scruggs

• Decision Date: 05 September 2006
• Docket Number: No. 17587.,17587.
• Citation: 905 A.2d 24,279 Conn. 698
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Judith SCRUGGS.

Page 24

905 A.2d 24

279 Conn. 698

STATE of Connecticut v. Judith SCRUGGS.

No. 17587.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued April 18, 2006.

Decided September 5, 2006.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

G. Douglas Nash, New Haven, for the appellant (defendant).

Leon F. Dalbec, Jr., senior assistant state's attorney, with whom were James Dinnan, senior assistant state's attorney, and, on the brief, Michael Dearington, state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

BORDEN, PALMER, VERTEFEUILLE, SULLIVAN and LAVERY, Js.

SULLIVAN, J.

The defendant, Judith Scruggs, was convicted after a jury trial on one charge of risk of injury to a child in violation of General Statutes § 53-21(a)(1).¹ After the jury rendered its verdict, the defendant filed a motion for judgment of acquittal. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that the jury reasonably could have found that, by maintaining a cluttered and unclean residence, the defendant wilfully had caused her son, Daniel Scruggs (Daniel), to be placed in a situation that was likely to injure his mental health. The defendant claims on appeal² that § 53-21(a)(1) is unconstitutionally vague as applied to her conduct and that the trial court improperly concluded that there was sufficient evidence to sustain her conviction. We conclude that § 53-21(a)(1) is unconstitutionally vague as applied to the defendant's conduct. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. In late 2001, the defendant was a single parent living in a three bedroom apartment with her two children, Kara Morris (Kara) and Daniel. Kara was seventeen and Daniel was twelve. The defendant worked approximately sixty hours a week at two jobs— one as a full-time employee of the school that Daniel attended, the other as a part-time employee at Wal-Mart. Daniel was bullied relentlessly at school and, from September through December, 2001, was absent on many days. He frequently exhibited poor hygiene and occasionally defecated in his pants. At home, he slept in his bedroom closet, where he kept knives and a homemade spear to protect himself. The state department of children and families (department) was aware of Daniel's problems, and had been working with the defendant to have him placed in a different school. At some point in late 2001, the department conducted an inspection of the defendant's apartment in connection with its investigation of Daniel's situation. On December 27, 2001, the department closed its file on Daniel. In the early morning hours of January 2, 2002, Daniel hanged himself in his bedroom closet. During the investigation into Daniel's death, Officer Michael Boothroyd and Detective Gary Brandl of the Meriden police department, Pamela Kudla, a crisis intervention specialist called in by the police to assist Daniel's family, and Ronald Chase, an investigator for the state medical examiner's office, entered the defendant's apartment. They observed that it was extremely cluttered and that it had an unpleasant odor.

Thereafter, the state filed a four count information in which it charged that the defendant: (1) "willfully or unlawfully caused or permitted a child under the age of sixteen years to be placed in such a situation that the life or limb of such a child was endangered . . . [by] providing a home living environment that was unhealthy and unsafe" in violation of § 53-21(a)(1); (2) "willfully or unlawfully caused or permitted a child under the age of sixteen years to be placed in such a situation that the health of such child was likely to be injured . . . [by] providing a home environment that was unhealthy and unsafe" in violation of § 53-21(a)(1); (3) "willfully or unlawfully caused or permitted a child under the age of sixteen years to be placed in such a situation that the health of such child was likely to be injured . . . [by] failing to provide proper medical or psychological care for such child" in violation of § 53-21(a)(1); and (4) "negligently deprived another person of proper physical care" in violation of General Statutes § 53-20.

At the close of the state's case, the defendant filed a motion for judgment of acquittal. The trial court granted the motion as to the first count because "[t]here [was] no evidence . . . to allow a jury to find as to any of the conditions charged in the home living environment that the defendant wilfully caused or permitted a situation that created a risk of physical injury to a [child]." The court denied the defendant's motion, however, as to counts two through four. The state then filed a substitute information in which it charged that the defendant: (1) "willfully or unlawfully caused or permitted a child under the age of sixteen years to be placed in such a situation that the health of such child was likely to be injured . . . [by] providing a home living environment that was unhealthy and unsafe" in violation of § 53-21(a)(1); (2) "willfully or unlawfully caused or permitted a child under the age of sixteen years to be placed in such a situation that the health of such child was likely to be injured . . . [by] failing to provide proper medical or psychological care for such child" in violation of § 53-21(a)(1); and (3) "negligently deprived another person of proper physical care" in violation of § 53-20. At the close of the evidence, the defendant renewed her motion for judgment of acquittal as to the remaining counts of the information, and the court reserved its decision until after the verdict.

The jury found the defendant guilty under the first count of the substitute information only. The defendant then filed a postverdict motion for judgment of acquittal. Addressing that motion and the previously deferred motion for judgment of acquittal, the trial court found that although there was no evidence to support a finding that the defendant's conduct was likely to cause injury to a child's physical health, the jury reasonably could have found that the conditions in the defendant's apartment were likely to cause injury to a child's mental health. The court then denied the motion for judgment of acquittal, relying on this court's decision in State v. Payne, 240 Conn. 766, 770, 776, 695 A.2d 525 (1997), overruled in part on other grounds, 269 Conn. 481, 490, 849 A.2d 760 (2004), which held that the risk of injury statute prohibits conduct that creates a situation that poses a risk to a child's mental health.

In its memorandum of decision denying the motion for judgment of acquittal on the first count, the trial court found the following facts. "The jury heard testimony from several officials who went to the defendant's home on January 2, 2002, after receiving reports of a suicide there. Police testified that they found the dead body of the defendant's twelve year old son, Daniel, lying on the floor of a walk-in closet in his bedroom. The defendant and her seventeen year old daughter, Kara . . . told the police that Daniel had hung himself. Somewhere in the closet near the body, police found three long kitchen-type knives and a sharp implement affixed to a pole in a spear-like device, but there was no evidence that any of these objects played a role in causing the death.

"The evidence, viewed most favorably to sustaining the verdict, would have reasonably permitted the jury to find that Daniel lived in a home with a foul and offensive odor. Four of the state's witnesses who went there on January 2 described the odor in various terms, as follows. . . . Boothroyd testified that `a definite' and `a bit of offensive' odor `permeated throughout the whole home.' . . . Brandl described the odor as `very noticeable,' `as if . . . you . . . stuck your head in a dirty clothes hamper . . . plus an odor of garbage' and said that although he noticed the odor upon entering the apartment, it was even stronger in the back of the house. . . . Kudla . . . testified that the home had a `very foul' and `really bad' odor, especially as one went farther inside. Although . . . Chase . . . described the odor as only `slightly offensive' and said he became accustomed to it after being in the premises and various defense witnesses denied that the apartment smelled bad, the jury was not required to believe witnesses denying the existence of any odor or minimizing its pungency.

"The state's witnesses also described the apartment as very messy and cluttered. Boothroyd said the apartment was `extremely messy and dirty, very cluttered' and had a `chaotic atmosphere.' He said that `it wasn't an easy place to walk through . . . . [Y]ou had to watch your step everywhere you went and [make] sure that you stayed on your feet' because of clothing and other articles piled everywhere on the floors throughout the house. He further testified that he saw dust accumulated on the top of various items. Brandl also said that the clutter made the apartment hard to walk through, with only an eighteen inch path between piles of debris from the front door to the kitchen. He said he could not even see the floor surface in Daniel's bedroom because of debris on the floor, some piled as high as the bed. When Brandl walked into the bedroom, he had to step on clothing and heard items cracking and breaking underneath. The police had to clear a path in the bedroom for the medical examiner's investigator to walk to the closet where Daniel's dead body lay. Kudla also testified that the home was very cluttered. She said that articles were piled on the floors throughout the house and that it was hard to maneuver or walk without stepping on those items. She said that in the bathroom one had to walk on clothing and other articles on the floor to get to the toilet. Chase also described the house as `extremely cluttered.'

"The jury could have found this testimony about the cluttered condition of the apartment from the state's witnesses during the prosecution's case-in-chief to be credible and persuasive. In addition, the jury saw...