State v. Scruggs, 45854
| Decision Date | 23 January 1971 |
| Docket Number | No. 45854,45854 |
| Citation | 206 Kan. 423,479 P.2d 886 |
| Parties | STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Harold Dean SCRUGGS, Appellant. |
| Court | Kansas Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
The record of trial in which appellant was convicted by a jury of the offenses of first degree robbery and larceny of an automobile is examined and it is held: (1) The prosecution's evidence was sufficient to sustain the convictions; (2) a trial court may appropriately instruct a jury initially as to the nature of its duties in the course of its deliberations; (3) a modified 'deadlocked jury' instruction given as a part of the initial charge is approved; and (4) prejudice to appellant from contact between a witness and a juror during the trial was not shown.
Robert M. Brown, Topeka, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellant.
Harland K. Rieger, Asst. County Atty., argued the cause, and Kent Frizzell, Atty. Gen., and Gene M. Olander, County Atty., were with him on the brief for appellee.
HARMAN, Commissioner:
Harold Dean Scruggs was convicted by a jury of the offenses of robbery in the first degree and larceny of an automobile. Consecutive statutory sentences were imposed. Mr. Scruggs now appeals.
The alleged robbery occurred at a Quick Stop food store and the auto larceny at the Jim Clark Motor Company, both in Topeka.
Appellant attacks the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict as to both counts. His principal challenge on the larceny charge is a lack of showing of ownership of the stolen automobile. He relies heavily on the fact no certificate of title for it was produced at trial. The contention borders on the frivolous. We will not detail the evidence except to say ownership of the car in the motor company was shown by the oral testimony of one of its salesmen and its sales manager, as alleged in the information. On Monday morning January 20, 1969, the vehicle was missing from the sales lot where it was supposed to be. Consent to its removal was never given. On the previous Saturday afternoon the particular vehicle had been demonstrated to appellant by a company salesman, and appellant had, under a fictitious name, bargained for its purchase and caused the sales manager to prepare a sales contract for it. Appellant had left with a promise to return when he could make the necessary financial arrangements to complete the transaction. The state's evidence showed appellant was in possession of the car immediately before and following the January 19th robbery, driving it through several states and in Mexico until March 19, 1969, when he was apprehended in it in Lompoc, California. He had changed the license plates several times; however, the automobile was identified by its serial number as the vehicle missing from the motor company. Meanwhile, the company had surrendered its certificate of title for the vehicle to its insurer in order to recover on the loss. Ownership and lack of consent to the taking were definitely shown.
The state's evidence showed the following as to the robbery. On January 19, 1969, at a few minutes before the 11:00 p. m. closing hour two men entered the Quick Shop food store at 3339 Adams where a store employee and her husband were present. One of the two men produced a pistol and announced a 'stickup'. The husband was told to put his hands on the counter and not to move. One of the bandits ripped out the telephone while the other compelled the employee to put the contents of the cash register into a grocery sack. After telling the employee and her husband to lay on the floor for fifteen minutes the bandits fled with the money. The employee and her husband positively identified appellant as one of the culprits. (It appears the other robber was subsequently killed in an attempted robbery in the state of Washington).
Additionally, an accomplice, the wife of the other bandit was granted immunity and testified as a prosecution witness. Her testimony was that on the night in question appellant, while driving the automobile stolen from the Jim Clark company, picked up her husband and herself; their plans were to go either to Canada or California; about 11:00 p. m. appellant drove the car past the Quick Shop store in question and parked it near a church about a block back of the store; appellant and her husband departed toward the store, ostensibly for cigarettes; in a few minutes they returned, running, laughing and talking about the lady being scared and telling her husband not to do anything; the two had a paper sack when they returned; the three immediately drove to Kansas City. The witness also related their subsequent travels in the stolen automobile. Appellant relies on evidence he produced in an effort to impeach this witness; however, evaluation of all the testimony was purely jury work. The prosecution's evidence amply supported the verdict of guilt as to each...
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Winters v. United States
...at a minimum disclosed mixed reservations concerning the Allen charge and has approved use of the ABA instructions, State v. Scruggs, 206 Kan. 423, 479 P.2d 886 (1971); People v. Coleman, 21 Mich.App. 193, 175 N.W.2d 308 (1970); State v. Cranford, 83 N.M. 294, 491 P.2d 511 (1971), cert. den......
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...challenged on appeal in at least two cases. See State v. Troy, 215 Kan. 369, 372, 524 P.2d 1121 (1974); State v. Scruggs, 206 Kan. 423, 425, 479 P.2d 886 (1971). In Troy, the instruction was given after the jury had retired to deliberate and had requested a readback of previous testimony. T......
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State v. Steward, 48010
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