State v. Scurlock
| Decision Date | 01 May 1979 |
| Citation | 593 P.2d 1159,286 Or. 277 |
| Parties | STATE of Oregon, Respondent, v. Ronald E. SCURLOCK, Petitioner. CA 9830; SC 25793. . * |
| Court | Oregon Supreme Court |
David M. Jaqua, Redmond, argued the cause and filed briefs, for petitioner.
W. Benny Won, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salem, argued the cause, for respondent. With him on brief, were Al J. Laue, Sol. Gen., and James A. Redden, Atty. Gen., Salem.
The issue in this case is whether the juvenile court has jurisdiction over a defendant who commits an offense prior to reaching the age of 18 but who is not indicted until after his eighteenth birthday due to intentional delay on the part of the district attorney in seeking the indictment. The trial court held that the juvenile court had exclusive jurisdiction and dismissed the indictment. The State appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed, 35 Or.App. 579, 581 P.2d 986 (1978). We granted review, 285 Or. 1 (1979).
Defendant was involved in an automobile accident on November 11, 1976, three months after his 17th birthday. The driver of the other automobile was seriously injured and her condition did not stabilize for two months. After her condition stabilized, the district attorney waited until after defendant had turned 18 and then sought an indictment against defendant for assault in the first degree, ORS 163.185, the alleged dangerous weapon being the automobile. The State concedes the delay was intentional and solely for the purpose of avoiding a juvenile court remand proceeding under ORS 419.533(1), thus insuring adult criminal treatment for defendant.
ORS 419.476 defines generally the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. Section (1)(a) provides:
ORS 419.573(1) provides that the jurisdiction of the juvenile court attaches at the time the child is taken into custody. 1 ORS 419.531 provides that the court's wardship over the child continues until certain specified events occur. 2
One of the events that may terminate the juvenile court's wardship is the remand of the case by the juvenile court "to the appropriate court handling criminal actions." ORS 419.531(1). The procedures governing remand are specified in ORS 419.533, which provides in part:
The defendant in the present case contends that because he would have been taken into custody prior to his eighteenth birthday were it not for intentional delay by the district attorney, the juvenile court has exclusive jurisdiction of this proceeding. Defendant claims that the Court of Appeals holding to the contrary is inconsistent both with the legislative policy behind the above statutes and with the requirements of the Oregon and United States Constitutions.
Because we agree with defendant that the above statutes require that his case be heard initially by the juvenile court, we need not and do not express any opinion with respect to defendant's constitutional arguments. The State does not violate any of a defendant's constitutional rights if, under this court's interpretation of the controlling statutes, those rights are in fact protected. See State v. Flores, 280 Or. 273, 282, 570 P.2d 965 (1977) (Linde, J., dissenting.)
ORS 419.533 gives the juvenile court the power to remand a child within its jurisdiction to the circuit court for criminal proceedings if the court "determines that retaining jurisdiction will not serve the best interests of the child because the child is not amenable to rehabilitation in facilities or programs available to the court." In enacting this statute, the legislature recognized that there may be situations in which persons between the ages of 16 and 18 should be dealt with through the adult criminal process rather than the juvenile system. The power to determine whether such a situation exists, however, is clearly allocated to the Court, not the district attorney.
Were we to sanction a procedure such as the district attorney employed in the present case, the legislature's decision to give the juvenile court power to determine the appropriateness of retaining jurisdiction in cases such as this could be completely frustrated. The period of limitations for prosecution of a felony is 3 years and for a misdemeanor, 2 years. ORS 131.125. 3 Under the holding of the Court of Appeals, if a juvenile committed a crime any time after his sixteenth birthday, the district attorney could in every instance delay prosecution until after the offender turned 18 and still be within the statutes of limitations. In effect, the initial determination as to whether a 16- or 18-year-old offender is better suited for treatment as a juvenile or an adult would be made by the district attorney, and only if the district attorney decided in favor of juvenile treatment would the juvenile court have an opportunity to consider the matter. 4
This is not a case in which the delay in taking the defendant into custody was justified because there was a good faith investigation in progress. The State concedes that the delay was for the sole purpose of avoiding a remand proceeding under ORS 419.533. Under these circumstances, we hold that the defendant cannot initially be prosecuted as an adult in the circuit court.
We must next consider the appropriate remedy in this case. The trial court allowed the defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment. As the Court of Appeals noted, however, there is no statutory authority for dismissal of an indictment on these facts. Rather, we believe the appropriate remedy is the remand of defendant to juvenile court. ORS 419.478 provides:
"If during the pendency of a proceeding in any court other than a juvenile court it is ascertained that the age of the...
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