State v. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co.
Decision Date | 25 May 1925 |
Citation | 89 Fla. 419,104 So. 602 |
Parties | STATE ex rel. BUFF et al., State Railroad Com'rs v. SEABOARD AIR LINE RY. CO. et al. |
Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Proceeding by the State on relation of R. Hudson Burr and others, as State Railroad Commissioners, for mandamus to be directed to the Seaboard Air Line Railway Company and another.
On motion of relators for peremptory writ.
Motion denied, with leave to amend alternative writ.
Syllabus by the Court
Motion for peremptory writ is equivalent to demurrer, and involves determination of whether return is sufficient, and successfully resists issuance of writ. In mandamus, the motion for peremptory writ is equivalent to a demurrer, and necessarily involves a determination of whether or not the return is sufficient, and successfully resists the issuance of the writ.
The Transportation Act of 1920 naturally resolves itself into four divisions; they are definitions of terms, termination of federal control of railways, disputes between carriers and their employees and subordinate officials, and amendments to the Interstate Commerce Act (U. S. Comp. St. § 8563 et seq.).
Interstate Commerce Act, Transportation Act of 1920 placed transportation system of country completely under supervisory control of Interstate Commerce Commission. The Interstate Commerce Act was passed for the purpose of regulating commerce throughout the nation, and, as amended by the Transportation Act of 1920, for purposes of interstate commerce placed the transportation system of the country completely under the supervisory control of the Interstate Commerce Commission.
Effect of dictum of Interstate Commerce Commission under Transportation Act of 1920 stated. Under the Transportation Act, the dictum of the Commission is the last word in such matters as through route and rate regulation, just division of joint rates, car and terminal service in the interchange of interstate freight and passengers between railroads construction of new and extension of old lines, purchasing of equipment, safety devices, issuance of securities, safety and adequate facilities, and such others as tend to prompt and continuous service in interstate Commerce.
Authority of Interstate Commerce Commissioners does not extend to spur etc., tracks located within state, or to street, etc electric railways not operated as part of general steam railroad system. The authority of the Commissioners does not extend to spur, industrial, team, switching, or side tracks located wholly within one state or to street, suburban, or interurban electric railways which are not operated as part of a general steam railroad system of transportation.
States may require reasonable freight and passenger service for intrastate business as long as not inconsistent with lawful orders of Interstate Commerce Commission. The Interstate Commerce Commission is vested with extraordinary power in the matter of regulating interstate commerce, but there is still left a clear filed of operation for the states in the matter of requiring just and reasonable freight and passenger service for intrastate business so long as such requirements are not inconsistent with lawful orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission in the interest of interstate commerce.
Federal Transportation Act of 1920 should not be construed to prevent exercise of state's policy power to require adequate local facilities for intrastate passenger traffic. The federal Transportation Act should not be construed to prevent the state from exercising its policy power to require adequate local facilities for intrastate passenger traffic, reasonably necessary for the protection of the health, comfort, and convenience of the passengers.
Transportation Act of 1920 held to vest Interstate Commerce Commission with no authority or duty to require erection or improvement of passenger stations. A careful examination of the Transportation Act of 1920 discloses no authority or duty vested in the Interstate Commerce Commission, either expressly or by clear implication, to require the erection or improvement of passenger stations.
Transportation Act was intended to regulate interstate and foreign commerce and to affect intrastate commerce only as incidental thereto. The Transportation Act shows that what is intended is to regulate interstate and foreign commerce and to affect intrastate commerce only as that may be incidental to the effective regulation and protection of commerce of the other class. It contains many manifestations of a continuing purpose ot refrain from any regulation of intrastate commerce, save such as is involved in the rightful exertion of the power of Congress over interstate and foreign commerce.
Intent of Congress to supersede exercise by states of police power not inferred, unless act of Congress, fairly interpreted, si in actual conflict with law of state. By the Transportation Act there is a vast interpreted, is in actual conflict with law of Commission, and there is also a power reserved to the states. The intent of Congress to supersede the exercise by the states of their policy power will not be inferred, unless the act of Congress, fairly interpreted, is in actual conflict with the law of the state.
All orders of Railroad Commission are held prima facie reasonable and just, except on presentation of evidence on which court may adjudicate legality or order. By the law of this state all orders of the Railroad Commission are held to be prima facie reasonable and just, unless the parties resisting them present evidence on which the court may adjudicate the legality of the order.
Railroad Commissioners may require canopy sheds at joint terminal station. Under Rev. Gen. St. Fla. 1920, § 4618, subds. 5, 12, Acts 1921, c. 8469, and federal Transportation Act of 1920, Railroad Commissioners may, in proper case, require railroad companies to construct sheds along tracks in connection with station for protection, comfort, and convenience of passengers.
No joint duty to erect train sheds for joint station. There being no joint duty to erect train sheds for two railroads maintaining joint station, order of railroad commissioners should impose duty on each railroad separately to erect and maintain shed along its particular road.
James E. Calkins, of Tallahassee, for relators.
J. E. Hall, of Macon, Ga., W. J. Oven, of Tallahassee, and Cooper, Cooper & Osborne, of Jacksonville, for respondents.
This is a proceeding by mandamus on the part of the Railroad Commissioners of Florida to require the Seaboard Air Line Railway and the Georigia Southern & Florida Railway to construct umbrella or canopy sheds along the tracks in connection with their joint terminal station at Lake City for the protection, comfort, and convenience of passengers.
The alternative writ was granted January 23, 1924. It was subsequently amended as to paragraphs 12 and 17, and both respondents entered their return to the amended writ. Demurrers to both orignal and amended answers to the alternative writs were entered on September 23, 1924. Relators moved for peremptory writ, so the cause comes on to be disposed of on this motion.
There being no replication to either return, the motion for peremptory writ is equivalent to a demurrer, and necessarily involves a determination of whether or not the return is sufficient and successfully resists the issuance of the writ. State ex rel. Railroad Com'rs v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 61 Fla. 799, 54 So. 900; State ex rel. Knott v. Haskell, 72 Fla. 244, 72 So. 651; 18 R. C. L. 351.
Respondents also contend that the order of the relator amending the alternative writ is prejudicial and erroneous. It is not made to appear that such contention is well grounded. Our system of practice is extremely liberal as to amendment of pleadings prior to issue made, and in this case the amendment was for the sole purpose of reaching a common understanding between relator and respondent Georgia Southern & Florida Railway as to the exact or more specific location of the umbrella or canopy sheds to be erected along said respondent's road. Stated from another angle, the effect of the amendment was a definite understanding between relators and said last-named respondent as to what was meant by the terms 'main line track' and 'passing track' as used in the alternative writ, and which of said tracks it was sought to erect the canopy sheds along. We are unable to see how such an understanding could prejudicially affect any right involved here.
We come now to the main question involved in this litigation, viz.: Has the Railroad Commission of Florida power to make the order complained of, and to what extent has such power been modified or abridged by the Transportation Act of 1920?
That part of the alternative writ containing the order complained of is as follows:
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