State v. Seaton
| Decision Date | 29 June 2021 |
| Docket Number | WD 83787 |
| Citation | 628 S.W.3d 424 |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
| Parties | STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Robert F. SEATON, Appellant. |
Karen L. Kramer, Jefferson City, MO, for respondent.
Damien De Loyola, Kansas City, MO, for appellant.
Before Division Four: Cynthia L. Martin, Chief Judge, Presiding, Lisa White Hardwick, Judge and Thomas N. Chapman, Judge
Robert F. Seaton ("Seaton") appeals from a judgment denying his Rule 29.151 amended motion for postconviction relief following an evidentiary hearing. Seaton contends that the motion court clearly erred in denying his amended motion because trial counsel was ineffective by failing to object to admission of a portion of Seaton's video interview where Seaton invoked his right to remain silent, resulting in prejudice. Finding no error, we affirm.
Seaton was convicted after a jury trial of one count of statutory rape in the first degree, two counts of statutory sodomy in the first degree, and one count of child molestation in the first degree. His conviction was affirmed in a per curiam order. State v. Seaton , 495 S.W.3d 832 (Mo. App. W.D. 2016). On direct appeal, Seaton claimed that the trial court plainly erred in failing to grant a mistrial after the State committed a Doyle2 violation by playing a portion of the video of Seaton's interview with a police detective where Seaton invoked his right to remain silent after first having waived that right. In an unpublished memorandum opinion explaining the reasons for affirming Seaton's conviction,3 we found no plain error because the portion of the video about which Seaton complained:
[did] not show that [Seaton] failed to answer a direct charge of guilt or that he refused to answer a question requiring an admission or denial of guilt. Instead, this testimony shows [Seaton's] agitation as to conversation about the victim's mother. Because the conversation did not even address the victim of the alleged criminal acts, the video does not necessarily create an inference of [Seaton's] guilt.
Seaton timely filed a pro se Rule 29.15 motion for postconviction relief. Appointed counsel timely filed an amended motion ("Motion"). The Motion alleged that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to the State's admission of the portion of Seaton's video interview where Seaton invoked his right to remain silent, creating the inference that Seaton was guilty of the crimes for which he was on trial. The Motion alleged that Seaton was prejudiced by trial counsel's ineffective assistance because, had counsel objected, the objection would have been sustained, and it is reasonably likely that the result of Seaton's trial would have been different.
At the evidentiary hearing on the Motion, Seaton admitted a DVD of the video interview, and a transcript from the underlying criminal case in which the video interview had been transcribed. Seaton did not testify, but called trial counsel to testify as his only witness. Trial counsel testified as follows:
On cross-examination, trial counsel testified as follows:
The motion court entered its findings of fact and conclusions of law and judgment on April 14, 2020 ("Judgment"). The motion court found that trial counsel was familiar with the content of the videotaped interview, and did not object to the jury hearing the interview "because he did not want to draw undue attention to the point and because he felt that [Seaton's] cooperation, attitude and demeanor as portrayed in the video might actually be beneficial with the jury." The motion court found that "trial counsel had a clear and reasonable trial strategy in not objecting to the video presented by the State." The motion court found that "[t]rial counsel's decision was informed with respect to the content of the video and based in part on his evaluation of how that video might be received by the jury." The motion court thus found that "trial counsel's performance at trial was reasonable trial strategy and professional, his decision made in the careful exercise of reasonable professional judgment."
The motion court also found that "the evidence against [Seaton] was substantial, and [Seaton] makes no claim to the contrary, but merely speculates as to the possibility that a single objection at that point in the trial might have resulted in an entirely different verdict." The motion court thus concluded that Seaton "failed to demonstrate prejudice caused by counsel's alleged errors and has failed to establish that there was a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different, but for counsel's alleged error."
The motion court denied Seaton's Motion. Seaton filed this timely appeal.
Our review of the denial of a Rule 29.15 motion is limited to determining whether the motion court's findings of fact and conclusions of law are clearly erroneous. Rule 29.15(k). "A judgment is clearly erroneous when, in light of the entire record, the court is left with the definite and firm impression that a mistake has been made." Davis v. State , 486 S.W.3d 898, 905 (Mo. banc 2016) (quoting Swallow v. State , 398 S.W.3d 1, 3 (Mo. banc 2013) ). "The motion court's findings are presumed correct." Id. (citing Johnson v. State , 406 S.W.3d 892, 898 (Mo. banc 2013) ).
In a single point on appeal, Seaton argues that the motion court committed clear error by denying the Motion because trial counsel was ineffective by failing to object to the portion of Seaton's video interview where he invoked his rights "in that strategic decisions must be reasonable," and "prejudice results in a close case where the improper evidence undercuts the defense."
"To be entitled to post-conviction relief for ineffective assistance of counsel, a movant must show by a preponderance of the evidence that his or her trial counsel failed to meet the Strickland test in order to prove his or her claims." Davis , 486 S.W.3d at 905-06 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) ). "Under Strickland, Movant must demonstrate that: (1) his trial counsel failed to exercise the level of skill and diligence that a reasonably competent trial counsel would in a similar situation, and (2) he was prejudiced by that failure." Id. at 906 (citing Strickland , 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052 ).
"Movant must overcome the strong presumption that trial counsel's conduct was reasonable and effective." Id. (citing Johnson , 406 S.W.3d at 899 ). "To overcome this presumption, a movant must identify ‘specific acts or omissions of counsel that, in light of all the...
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Tucker v. State
..."is subject to a ‘strong presumption that trial counsel's conduct was reasonable and effective.’ ". State v. Seaton , No. WD83787, 628 S.W.3d 424, 432 (Mo. App. June 29, 2021) (quoting Davis v. State , 486 S.W.3d 898, 906 (Mo. banc 2016) ).2. Counsel believed the nature of the forensic inte......