State v. Seaton

Decision Date29 June 2021
Docket NumberWD 83787
Citation628 S.W.3d 424
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals
Parties STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Robert F. SEATON, Appellant.

Karen L. Kramer, Jefferson City, MO, for respondent.

Damien De Loyola, Kansas City, MO, for appellant.

Before Division Four: Cynthia L. Martin, Chief Judge, Presiding, Lisa White Hardwick, Judge and Thomas N. Chapman, Judge

Cynthia L. Martin, Judge

Robert F. Seaton ("Seaton") appeals from a judgment denying his Rule 29.151 amended motion for postconviction relief following an evidentiary hearing. Seaton contends that the motion court clearly erred in denying his amended motion because trial counsel was ineffective by failing to object to admission of a portion of Seaton's video interview where Seaton invoked his right to remain silent, resulting in prejudice. Finding no error, we affirm.

Factual Background and Procedural History

Seaton was convicted after a jury trial of one count of statutory rape in the first degree, two counts of statutory sodomy in the first degree, and one count of child molestation in the first degree. His conviction was affirmed in a per curiam order. State v. Seaton , 495 S.W.3d 832 (Mo. App. W.D. 2016). On direct appeal, Seaton claimed that the trial court plainly erred in failing to grant a mistrial after the State committed a Doyle2 violation by playing a portion of the video of Seaton's interview with a police detective where Seaton invoked his right to remain silent after first having waived that right. In an unpublished memorandum opinion explaining the reasons for affirming Seaton's conviction,3 we found no plain error because the portion of the video about which Seaton complained:

[did] not show that [Seaton] failed to answer a direct charge of guilt or that he refused to answer a question requiring an admission or denial of guilt. Instead, this testimony shows [Seaton's] agitation as to conversation about the victim's mother. Because the conversation did not even address the victim of the alleged criminal acts, the video does not necessarily create an inference of [Seaton's] guilt.

Seaton timely filed a pro se Rule 29.15 motion for postconviction relief. Appointed counsel timely filed an amended motion ("Motion"). The Motion alleged that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to the State's admission of the portion of Seaton's video interview where Seaton invoked his right to remain silent, creating the inference that Seaton was guilty of the crimes for which he was on trial. The Motion alleged that Seaton was prejudiced by trial counsel's ineffective assistance because, had counsel objected, the objection would have been sustained, and it is reasonably likely that the result of Seaton's trial would have been different.

At the evidentiary hearing on the Motion, Seaton admitted a DVD of the video interview, and a transcript from the underlying criminal case in which the video interview had been transcribed. Seaton did not testify, but called trial counsel to testify as his only witness. Trial counsel testified as follows:

Postconviction Counsel: ... [H]ow would you describe the case against [Seaton]? ....
Trial Counsel: It was going to be what I would call a "he-said, she-said" situation. The two young girls but no physical evidence and just their testimony against [Seaton's] testimony.
Postconviction Counsel: And so how strong did you feel the evidence was against [Seaton]?
Trial Counsel: I didn't believe it was that strong.
Postconviction Counsel: And what was your defense in the case?
Trial Counsel: Basically, that he didn't do it. This was a situation where the younger of the two sisters made this story up for a particular reason that we brought out in trial.
....
Postconviction Counsel: And [Seaton] testified in his own defense; correct?
Trial Counsel: Yes, he did.
Postconviction Counsel: How important was [Seaton's] credibility to your defense in the case?
Trial Counsel: I thought it was crucial.
Postconviction Counsel: And sort of just as a general matter, as a criminal defense attorney, do you have concerns just generally about a jury learning that your client refused to speak with police?
Trial Counsel: Yes.
Postconviction Counsel: And what are your concerns there?
Trial Counsel: That they -- That he would have something to hide.
Postconviction Counsel: And now, as part of your preparation for trial, did you review [Seaton's] interrogation?
Trial Counsel: Yes, I did.
Postconviction Counsel: And did you anticipate the State was going to play that at trial?
Trial Counsel: Yes, I did.
....
Postconviction Counsel: And in watching the interrogation, do you recall [Seaton] invoking the right to remain silent and to an attorney that ceased the interrogation?
Trial Counsel: Yes.
....
Postconviction Counsel: Now, do you recall ever considering objecting to [Seaton's] invocation of, you know, his right to remain silent and right to an attorney, to that being presented to the jury?
Trial Counsel: I don't recall.
Postconviction Counsel: And so do you recall having any sort of strategic reason for not objecting to that?
Trial Counsel: Since I don't recall whether or not I wanted to object, no; but I felt like there were times--with credibility being an issue, being able to show the jury that [Seaton] was completely cooperative with the police, and that only at the time that he became frustrated with their lack of indicating to him why he was there, did he ask for an attorney.
Postconviction Counsel: And, I mean, would you consider that--as a criminal defense attorney--would you consider that a big issue coming in that your client invoked [sic] right to an attorney, right to remain silent, in an interrogation?
Trial Counsel: I think it would depend on the totality of the interrogation.

On cross-examination, trial counsel testified as follows:

State's Counsel: ... [Y]ou had watched the video prior to the day of trial; had you not?
Trial Counsel: Yes, I had.
State's Counsel: And were you concerned with the content of the video at all?
Trial Counsel: No. I believe that the video showed my client being cooperative. My client didn't have anything--in the video, it showed that he had nothing to hide. He was explaining to the police what he thought he was there for, which was a car accident that had occurred.
State's Counsel: And is it fair to say that you also wanted the jury to see the video, given your opinion of what that video did for him?
Trial Counsel: Absolutely.

The motion court entered its findings of fact and conclusions of law and judgment on April 14, 2020 ("Judgment"). The motion court found that trial counsel was familiar with the content of the videotaped interview, and did not object to the jury hearing the interview "because he did not want to draw undue attention to the point and because he felt that [Seaton's] cooperation, attitude and demeanor as portrayed in the video might actually be beneficial with the jury." The motion court found that "trial counsel had a clear and reasonable trial strategy in not objecting to the video presented by the State." The motion court found that "[t]rial counsel's decision was informed with respect to the content of the video and based in part on his evaluation of how that video might be received by the jury." The motion court thus found that "trial counsel's performance at trial was reasonable trial strategy and professional, his decision made in the careful exercise of reasonable professional judgment."

The motion court also found that "the evidence against [Seaton] was substantial, and [Seaton] makes no claim to the contrary, but merely speculates as to the possibility that a single objection at that point in the trial might have resulted in an entirely different verdict." The motion court thus concluded that Seaton "failed to demonstrate prejudice caused by counsel's alleged errors and has failed to establish that there was a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different, but for counsel's alleged error."

The motion court denied Seaton's Motion. Seaton filed this timely appeal.

Standard of Review

Our review of the denial of a Rule 29.15 motion is limited to determining whether the motion court's findings of fact and conclusions of law are clearly erroneous. Rule 29.15(k). "A judgment is clearly erroneous when, in light of the entire record, the court is left with the definite and firm impression that a mistake has been made." Davis v. State , 486 S.W.3d 898, 905 (Mo. banc 2016) (quoting Swallow v. State , 398 S.W.3d 1, 3 (Mo. banc 2013) ). "The motion court's findings are presumed correct." Id. (citing Johnson v. State , 406 S.W.3d 892, 898 (Mo. banc 2013) ).

Analysis

In a single point on appeal, Seaton argues that the motion court committed clear error by denying the Motion because trial counsel was ineffective by failing to object to the portion of Seaton's video interview where he invoked his rights "in that strategic decisions must be reasonable," and "prejudice results in a close case where the improper evidence undercuts the defense."

"To be entitled to post-conviction relief for ineffective assistance of counsel, a movant must show by a preponderance of the evidence that his or her trial counsel failed to meet the Strickland test in order to prove his or her claims." Davis , 486 S.W.3d at 905-06 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) ). "Under Strickland, Movant must demonstrate that: (1) his trial counsel failed to exercise the level of skill and diligence that a reasonably competent trial counsel would in a similar situation, and (2) he was prejudiced by that failure." Id. at 906 (citing Strickland , 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052 ).

"Movant must overcome the strong presumption that trial counsel's conduct was reasonable and effective." Id. (citing Johnson , 406 S.W.3d at 899 ). "To overcome this presumption, a movant must identify ‘specific acts or omissions of counsel that, in light of all the...

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  • Tucker v. State
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • September 22, 2021
    ..."is subject to a ‘strong presumption that trial counsel's conduct was reasonable and effective.’ ". State v. Seaton , No. WD83787, 628 S.W.3d 424, 432 (Mo. App. June 29, 2021) (quoting Davis v. State , 486 S.W.3d 898, 906 (Mo. banc 2016) ).2. Counsel believed the nature of the forensic inte......

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