State v. Sebastian

Decision Date09 June 1908
Citation81 Conn. 1,69 A. 1054
CourtConnecticut Supreme Court
PartiesSTATE v. SEBASTIAN.

Appeal from Superior Court, Fairfield County; George W. Wheeler, Judge.

Henry L. Sebastian was convicted of carnally knowing and abusing a female under the age of 16 years, in violation of Gen. St 1902, § 1148, and he appeals. Affirmed.

Nichols C. Downs, for appellant. Stiles Judson, State's Atty., for the State.

BALDWIN, C. J. The information contained two counts, the first charging the commission of the offense at Stamford on April 9, 1907, and the second charging its commission there between April 1st and August 12th, 1907. At the commencement of the trial the accused moved for an order requiring the state's attorney to elect upon which count he would claim a conviction. This motion was denied, but with liberty to renew it at the close of the (case for the state. Before he closed its case, the state's attorney, in the absence of the jury, but in the presence of the court, stated that he elected to stand upon the first count. The court did not then understand this statement to amount to an election, but it was so intended by the state's attorney, and understood by the counsel for the defendant, and at the close of the case for the state, the court, on hearing the stenographer's notes read, ruled that it constituted an election at the time when it was made. The defendant, in a criminal cause of such a nature, cannot, as a matter of right, insist, at the outset of the trial, that the state shall elect between counts. A motion for that purpose is addressed to the discretion of the court. State v. Tuller, 34 Conn. 280, 298. We see nothing to indicate any abuse of such discretion in the case at bar.

Before the election was made, the girl with whom it was alleged that the offense was committed, having testified for the state that she had sexual intercourse with the accused on April 8th or 9th, testified further that they had similar intercourse in the following June and July. After the election she testified as to a similar act in New York, in July. It is obvious that this testimony tended to raise collateral issues, and bore only indirectly on that which the jury were to decide. Remote evidence, however, is not necessarily incompetent. Under the circumstances attending the case at bar, we are of the opinion that it cannot be said, as matter of law, that there was error in the admission of the testimony of this witness as to acts of sexual intercourse in June and July, whether received before or after the making of the election. It went to show the existence of relations between her and the defendant which tended to make the commission of the act of a similar nature, which was the subject of the charge, more probable, and so to confirm her previous testimony. That the accused was under the influence of a sexual passion in respect to this girl in July, which led him then to take advantage of her youth in order to gratify it, was logically relevant to the question whether he gave rein, in the same manner, to such a passion in respect to her, three months before. Thayer v. Thayer, 101 Mass. 111, 100 Am. Dec. 110. One fact is relevant to another fact whenever, according to the common course of events, the existence of the one, taken alone or in connection with other facts, renders the existence of the other either certain or more probable. State v. Blake, 69 Conn. 64, 76, 36 Atl. 1019.

Unless excluded by some rule or principle of law, any fact may be proved in any case which logically tends to aid the trier in the determination of the issue. Plumb v. Curtis, 66 Conn. 166, 33 Atl. 998. The fundamental principle on which the common law, as to the reception of evidence, has been built up is that whatever is relevant is admissible. Thayer's preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law, 522, 269. In the application of this principle, however, courts do not forget that trials must be kept within reasonable bounds as to the time they occupy and the range they cover. Evidence may be relevant, and yet its relevancy may be so slight and inconsequential that to receive it would be to distract attention that ought to Be concentrated on what bears directly on vital points, and to confuse rather than to illuminate the case. In determining whether any particular testimony offered on a jury trial belongs to this category or not, a certain discretion is necessarily vested in the presiding judge. Rosenstein v. Fair Haven & W. R. Co., 78 Conn. 29, 34, 60 Atl. 1061; Leonard v. Gillette, 79 Conn. 664, 669, 66 Atl. 502. Remoteness is a matter of degree. The term is one which has regard to other factors than mere lapse of time. State v. Moriarty, 50 Conn. 415, 419. "The essence of remoteness is such a want of open and visible connection between the evidentiary and the principal facts that, all things considered, the former are not worthy or safe to be admitted in proof of the latter." State v. Kelly, 77 Conn. 266, 269, 58 Atl. 705, 706. It was fully within the discretion of the trial judge to admit the testimony now in question, guarding, as he did, against its misapplication by, instructing the jury that it was not to be considered as proof of offenses other than that charged in the first count. State v. Raymond, 24 Conn. 204, 206. In State v. Bates, 10 Conn. 372, a new trial was granted because, on a prosecution for adultery committed on January 23, 1834, evidence was admitted of repeated acts of adultery with the same person between September 1, 1833, and January 23, 1834. But in that case there was, so far as appears, no election by the state to rely upon any particular act; all being admitted as equally grounds for conviction. While the state argued in this court in opposing the motion for a new trial, that proof of adultery on one day might tend to corroborate evidence, previously offered, of adultery with the same person on a later day, the report does not indicate that the testimony was offered for that purpose in the superior court, or that the jury were instructed that it could be considered by them for that purpose only.

The girl, with whom it was alleged that the offense was committed, further testified in behalf of the state that on August 11th she had a miscarriage. This evidence was received in connection with other evidence that a fœtus was expelled of about 3 1/2 months' development, that she had never had sexual intercourse with any one but the defendant, and that the miscarriage was produced by something done by a physician, at the defendant's procurement. There was no error in admitting proof of these facts. They tended, taken together, to show that the defendant was responsible for her condition, by reason of sexual intercourse between them, had some time in April, 1907. The evidence bearing on the probable date of conception did not necessarily exclude its reference to April 9th; but, so far as it went to prove an act of intercourse later in the mouth, it was equally admissible; under the principles already mentioned.

This witness was cross-examined at length, and made answers...

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  • State v. Samuels, (AC 21681).
    • United States
    • Appellate Court of Connecticut
    • March 25, 2003
    ...and the actor is more than two years older than such person . . . ." Statutory rape is a crime with a long history. See State v. Sebastian, 81 Conn. 1, 69 A. 1054 (1908). In Sebastian, the defendant was a music teacher convicted of carnally knowing and abusing one of his students, a fifteen......
  • State v. Ouellette
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Connecticut
    • May 10, 1983
    ...... We find no error in the rulings of the court, predicated on such cases as State v. Purvis, 157 Conn. 198, 207, 251 A.2d 178 [1968], cert. denied, 395 U.S. 928, 89 S.Ct. 1788, 23 L.Ed.2d 246 [1969]; State v. Dziob, 133 Conn. 167, 169, 48 A.2d 377 [1946]; State v. Sebastian, 81 Conn. 1, 3, 69 A. 1054 [1908]; State v. Byrne, 47 Conn. 465, 466 [1880]; State v. Kinney, 44 Conn. 153, 155 [1876]; State v. De Wolf, 8 Conn. 93 [1830]; see also 1 Wharton, Criminal Evidence (12th Ed.), p. 547 and 1971 Cum.Sup., pp. 133, 134; 1 Wharton, op. cit. § 295; note, 77 ......
  • State v. Saraceno, 5289
    • United States
    • Appellate Court of Connecticut
    • July 19, 1988
    ...as to the weight to be given it. State v. DeWolf, 8 Conn. 93, 100 [1830]; State v. Byrne, 47 Conn. 465, 466 [1880]; State v. Sebastian, 81 Conn. 1, 6, 69 A. 1054 [1908]." State v. Dziob, 133 Conn. 167, 169, 48 A.2d 377 (1946). This axiom has been recently reaffirmed by our Supreme Court in ......
  • State v. Dabkowski
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Connecticut
    • March 18, 1986
    ...State v. Dziob, 133 Conn. 167, 169, 48 A.2d 377 (1946); State v. Orlando, 115 Conn. 672, 677, 163 A. 256 (1932); State v. Sebastian, 81 Conn. 1, 5, 69 A. 1054 (1908); State v. Byrne, 47 Conn. 465, 466 (1880); State v. Kinney, 44 Conn. 153, 155-57 (1876); State v. De Wolf, 8 Conn. 93, 99 (18......
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