State v. Seeger, 14438
| Decision Date | 10 November 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 14438,14438 |
| Citation | 725 S.W.2d 39 |
| Parties | STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Brian Keith SEEGER, Appellant. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Kathleen Murphy Markie, Columbia, for appellant.
William L. Webster, Atty. Gen., Kevin B. Behrndt, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondent.
Brian Keith Seeger ("appellant"), found guilty by a jury of the class D felony of leaving the scene of a motor vehicle accident, § 577.060, 1 was sentenced as a prior offender, § 558.016.2, to three years' imprisonment. He appeals, insisting the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict.
In deciding that issue, we consider the evidence and all inferences reasonably to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the verdict, and disregard all contrary evidence and inferences. State v. Guinan, 665 S.W.2d 325, 327 (Mo. banc 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 873, 105 S.Ct. 227, 83 L.Ed.2d 156 (1984); State v. McDonald, 661 S.W.2d 497, 500 (Mo. banc 1983), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1009, 105 S.Ct. 1875, 85 L.Ed.2d 168 (1985). The test is whether the evidence, so viewed, was sufficient to make a submissible case from which rational jurors could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was guilty. State v. Bonuchi, 636 S.W.2d 338, 340 (Mo. banc 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1211, 103 S.Ct. 1206, 75 L.Ed.2d 446 (1983); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2791-92, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, 576-77 (1979).
Cast in that light, the evidence establishes that about 2:50 a.m., October 13, 1984, a Mazda GLC motor vehicle ran off highway 67 in Poplar Bluff, hit a ditch, struck a "portable" sign, and then collided with a pole supporting the "Bluff Estates Shopping Center" sign.
Someone at a nearby restaurant "called the accident in," and patrolman David A. Harkey of the Poplar Bluff police department arrived within minutes to investigate. In the "passenger front seat," Harkey found Harold John Grassham. According to Harkey, Grassham's "face was cut up and he had a lot of blood." In the rear seat, Harkey found Glenn Allen Wyatt. Harkey found no one else in the vehicle.
Observing that Grassham and Wyatt were "conscious," Harkey asked them who was driving the Mazda. Their responses caused Harkey to begin searching for appellant. Describing what he found, Harkey testified:
Harkey added that after Grassham and Wyatt had been taken to the hospital, he "searched extensively on foot at the rear of the building," but was unable to find appellant.
Asked about the damage to the Mazda, Harkey testified that the "front end" was "completely smashed in," and that the "entire front end, the windshield, part of the roof was all damaged." Regarding the signs, Harkey recounted that the portable sign was "completely damaged," and that there was "no way of ever repairing the ... Bluff Estates sign."
Some time later, Harkey found appellant at the hospital emergency room. There, appellant admitted to Harkey that he had been driving the Mazda at the time of the accident.
Grassham, testifying for the State, confirmed that appellant was driving the Mazda at the time of the mishap. Grassham revealed that he (Grassham) was "heavily intoxicated," and that just before the crash he "grabbed" the steering wheel and said, "Let's cut a doughnut." 2 Grassham explained, "[T]o cut a doughnut means to take and slide the car totally around in a three hundred sixty degree angle."
Asked whether he remembered the Mazda striking the pole, Grassham replied: According to Grassham, he sustained "some severe head injuries," and "chest injuries."
Grassham related that he had been with appellant since about 10:30 or 11:00 p.m., and that he (Grassham) did not see appellant "drink any alcoholic beverages."
Wyatt, also called as a State's witness, testified that he, like Grassham, was "drunk" when the accident occurred. Wyatt was nonetheless aware that appellant was driving, and that Grassham was "[i]n the front on the passenger's side."
Asked to tell the jury about the accident, Wyatt said, "All I know is that I--I didn't see [Grassham] grab the whell [sic], but all I know is when we hit the ditch and then I was out and then I woke up and they was taking me out of the car." Describing his injuries, Wyatt testified, "I fractured my spine in three places and I broke my shoulder and pushed this bone up into my chest."
Wyatt disavowed any knowledge of whether appellant had been drinking.
Appellant, age 20 at the time of the accident, gave this testimony at trial:
"... I remember [Grassham] saying that he wanted to cut a doughnut and he reached over and grabbed the steering wheel and he give it a jerk and we just took off to the right hand side.
* * *
Q. And what happened after that?
A. We struck a pole and went to the hospital.
Q. What happened when you struck the pole? Do you remember what happened when you struck the pole?
A. No, sir. I don't even remember leaving the road.
Q. Why is it you don't remember?
A. Well, I hit the dash with my chest and my head and blacked out and went unconscious.
Q. What happened after that?
A. Uhh, supposedly got out of the car somehow and went behind Wal-Mart and when I got behind Wal-Mart I realized I was sitting down in a puddle of water and blood was all over my hands and my arms and T-shirt and I started washing the blood and everything off and was trying to realize what the blood was doing all over me. And I got back up and started walking one way behind Wal-Mart and I don't remember getting to the end of the Wal-Mart parking lot.
Q. And what do you remember after that?
A. Being at Donna Wyatt's house.
Q. What happened at Donna Wyatt's house?
A. Well, as I got up to the door somewhere in the parking lot, Donna came out of the house and asked me where I had been and informed--said Glenn was in an accident and informed me, she said he was in an accident with me, and he was in the hospital and ... Grassham was in the hospital. And they wanted me to go to the hospital and then I really didn't think I was hurt and she said the best thing to do was go to the hospital because your head is bleeding quite a bit. And they put me in the car and took me to the Lucy Lee Hospital and I saw a cop sitting there and I said, And they took me in and took x-rays and blood samples and I forgot what they did. And Officer Harkey and another officer came in and told me I was under arrest and read me my rights and told me I was under arrest for leaving the scene of an accident."
Appellant admitted drinking a beer about 5:00 p.m., some 10 hours before the accident, but insisted he had drunk nothing else. He maintained he was unaware he had been in a "wreck" until Donna Wyatt told him.
Donna Wyatt, the wife of Flynn Wyatt (a brother of Glenn Wyatt), testified that appellant came to her door around 3:00 a.m., and asked whether she had seen Glenn Wyatt and Grassham. According to Mrs. Wyatt, appellant "had no idea where they were at."
Describing appellant's physical appearance, Mrs. Wyatt explained that he had a cut on his forehead and was "slumped over." She added:
Based on her observations, Mrs. Wyatt opined that appellant was "sober."
Flynn Wyatt saw appellant for approximately five minutes at the hospital. According to Flynn, "[Appellant] was, uhh, crying because, you know, I told him, you know, I thought my brother's back was broke and that his arm was paralyzed, and he was just ... I thought he was in shock."
Appellant's assignment of error is:
"The trial court erred in denying appellant's motion for judgment of acquittal made at the conclusion of the evidence because the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction of leaving the scene of an accident in that there was no evidence presented by which the trier of fact could conclude that the appellant knew that Glenn Wyatt and ... Grassham had been injured or that damage had occurred to the car he was driving or to any signs in the Bluff Estates Shopping Center, so that the element of knowledge could not reasonably have been found."
Section 577.060.1, as pertinent to appellant's contention, provides:
"A person commits the crime of leaving the scene of a motor vehicle accident when being the operator or driver of a vehicle on the highway or on any publicly or privately owned parking lot or parking facility generally open for use by the public and knowing that an injury has been caused to a person or damage has been caused to property, due to ... accident, he leaves the place of the injury, damage or accident without stopping and giving his name, residence, including city and street number, motor vehicle number and chauffeur's or registered operator's number, if any, to the injured party or to a police officer, or if no police officer is in the vicinity, then to the nearest police station or judicial officer." (Emphasis added.)
The thrust of appellant's argument is, in his words: "Appellant contends that because there was no evidence that appellant knew...
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