State v. Seekins

Decision Date07 December 2010
Docket NumberNo. 18467.,18467.
Citation299 Conn. 141,8 A.3d 491
CourtConnecticut Supreme Court
PartiesSTATE of Connecticut v. Christopher SEEKINS.
8 A.3d 491
299 Conn. 141


STATE of Connecticut
v.
Christopher SEEKINS.


No. 18467.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued March 15, 2010.
Decided Dec. 7, 2010.

8 A.3d 493

Richard C. Marquette, special public defender, for the appellant (defendant).

Raheem L. Mullins, assistant state's attorney, with whom were Cynthia J. Palermo-Murchison, assistant state's attorney, and, on the brief, David Shepack, state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

ROGERS, C.J., and NORCOTT, KATZ, PALMER, VERTEFEUILLE, ZARELLA and McLACHLAN, Js.*

PALMER, J.

299 Conn. 143

Under General Statutes § 54-56d (k)(2),1 a criminal defendant who has

8 A.3d 494
been found incompetent
299 Conn. 144
to stand trial may be medicated involuntarily for the purpose of rendering him competent to stand trial if the trial court finds by clear and convincing evidence that, inter alia, "the seriousness of the alleged crime is such that the criminal law enforcement interest of the state in fairly and accurately determining the defendant's guilt or innocence overrides the defendant's interest in self-determination." The defendant, Christopher Seekins, appeals 2 from the decision of the trial court ordering that he be medicated pursuant to § 54-56d (k)(2). The defendant claims that, because the crimes with which he has been charged are nonviolent offenses involving the recreational use of marijuana, as opposed to the sale and distribution of that drug, the trial court improperly concluded that the state's interest in determining his guilt or innocence outweighs his right to refuse the administration of medication. We reject this claim and, accordingly, affirm the decision of the trial court. 3
299 Conn. 145

The record reveals the following facts and procedural history. On June 30, 2006, the defendant pleaded guilty to production or preparation of a controlled substance without a license in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 2005) § 21a-246. The trial court sentenced the defendant to two years incarceration, execution suspended, and three years of probation. On or about September 18, 2007, during an unannounced visit to the defendant's home with the defendant's probation officer, officers from the Torrington police department discovered approximately 1.8 pounds of marijuana in the defendant's refrigerator,4 fifty

8 A.3d 495
marijuana plants, a digital
299 Conn. 146
scale, growing lights, pots, fertilizer and soil. The defendant was arrested and charged with the following offenses: (1) possession of drug paraphernalia within 1500 feet of a school by a person who is not enrolled in such school as a student in violation of General Statutes § 21a-267 (c), which carries a maximum sentence of one year imprisonment; (2) possession of four ounces or more of marijuana in violation of General Statutes § 21a-279 (b), which carries a maximum sentence of five years imprisonment for the first offense; (3) possession of a controlled substance with intent to sell in violation of General Statutes § 21a-277 (b), which carries a maximum sentence of seven years imprisonment for the first offense; (4) possession of four ounces or more of marijuana within 1500 feet of a school by a person who is not enrolled in such school as a student in violation of § 21a-279 (d), which carries a mandatory, nonsuspendable sentence of two years imprisonment that is to be served consecutively to the sentence imposed in connection with the underlying conviction under § 21a-279 (a), (b) or (c); (5) production or preparation of a controlled substance without a license in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 2007) § 21a-246 (a), which carries a maximum sentence of ten years imprisonment for a second or subsequent offense; 5 (6) sale of one kilogram or more of marijuana in violation of General Statutes § 21a-278 (b), which carries a mandatory minimum sentence of five years imprisonment and a maximum sentence of twenty years imprisonment for the first offense; 6 and (7) violation of probation; see
299 Conn. 147
General Statutes § 53a-32; which, in the present case, carries a maximum sentence of two years imprisonment.

A pretrial hearing was held on September 3, 2008, at which time the state moved for a competency hearing pursuant to § 54-56d (c).7 At that time, the assistant state's attorney informed the trial court that, in addition to the charges pending in the present case, the defendant also had a charge of harassment in the second degree 8 pending in the judicial district of New Haven at Meriden. In the Meriden case, the trial court found the defendant incompetent to stand trial and committed him to the custody of Connecticut Valley Hospital, Whiting Forensic Division (Whiting), for restoration of competency.

8 A.3d 496
During his commitment, however, the defendant refused to take psychotropic medication as prescribed by his treating physicians, and the trial court in the Meriden case subsequently determined that it would be inappropriate to medicate him forcibly in view of the relatively minor nature of the crime with which he had been charged. On the basis of the defendant's psychiatric history in the Meriden case, the trial court in the present case granted the state's motion for a competency evaluation, and the defendant subsequently was evaluated by a clinical team at the New Haven community correctional center, where the defendant was being detained.

On September 23, 2008, the trial court conducted a hearing to ascertain the results of the competency evaluation. Bruce Knox, a licensed clinical social worker and member of the clinical team that had evaluated

299 Conn. 148
the defendant, testified that it was the unanimous opinion of that team that the defendant was incompetent to stand trial. According to the team's evaluation report, which was admitted into evidence without objection, the defendant suffered from bipolar disorder, was "pervasively delusional," and was incapable of understanding the proceedings against him. Knox testified, however, that, with appropriate treatment, a "substantial probability" existed that the defendant could be restored to competency within sixty days through inpatient psychiatric hospitalization that included the administration of psychotropic medication. Knox further testified that the defendant previously had been restored to competency very quickly using standard medication for bipolar disorder and, further, that the medication likely would prove effective again in treating the defendant's symptoms. Knox confirmed the assistant state's attorney's report to the court, however, that the defendant had refused to take any medication during his most recent admission to Whiting.

On cross-examination, defense counsel asked Knox whether there were any health risks associated with psychotropic medication. Knox responded that "there's always some potential risk with any medication, but the treatment team at Whiting is familiar with the defendant. They've known him for many months, and I'm sure they would monitor any medication very closely, given [the defendant's] ... concerns about [the] matter." The trial court then asked Knox whether, when the defendant previously had been restored to competency, he had suffered any adverse side effects from the medication. Knox responded that, as far as he knew, the defendant had suffered no such side effects.

After Knox completed his testimony, the trial court found the defendant incompetent to stand trial. The court further found, however, that the defendant could be restored to competency within sixty days through

299 Conn. 149
inpatient treatment at Whiting if that treatment included the administration of psychotropic medication. The court then inquired of defense counsel as to whether the defendant would be willing to take such medication. Defense counsel responded that the defendant would be willing to take medication as long as it was not detrimental to his health. The trial court observed that the defendant previously had been restored to competency through the use of standard bipolar medication and inquired of defense counsel whether the defendant had experienced any adverse side effects from that medication. The defendant himself interjected that he had not experienced any side effects during the restoration period but that, later, he had experienced several side effects that he believed were adverse to his health. Specifically, the defendant
8 A.3d 497
stated that his veins turned purple, his hands shook, he saw bright auras around every light and periodically lost his balance. After the defendant finished speaking, defense counsel informed the court that the defendant also believed that the side effects he had experienced may have been attributable to the dosage of the medication that he had received. In light of the defendant's representation that he would be willing to take medication on the condition that it was not harmful to him, the trial court committed the defendant to the custody of Whiting for a period not to exceed sixty days for the purpose of restoring him to competency. The court observed, however, that, if at any point during that period the defendant refused to take his medication, the parties were to return to court to consider other options.

A second competency hearing was held on November 18, 2008, at which Susan McKinley, a licensed clinical social worker, testified. McKinley informed the court that she and a clinical team from Whiting recently had evaluated the defendant for competency to stand trial and had found him to be incompetent. McKinley testified

299 Conn. 150
that, although the defendant understood the charges against him and the general workings of the judicial system, he was unable to assist in his defense because "his persecutory and delusional [thinking] interfere[d] with his ability to think logically and rationally about the proceedings ... [to] [c]onsider advice from counsel ... [and to] [m]ake reasonable decisions about his case." McKinley explained that, since his commitment to Whiting on...

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7 cases
  • Comm'r of Corr. v. Coleman
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • March 13, 2012
    ...treatments this court previously has condoned because it is not designed to alter the defendant's mind or will. See State v. Seekins, 299 Conn. 141, 166–67, 8 A.3d 491 (2010) (allowing order of involuntary medication to render defendant competent to stand trial). Additionally, the state pre......
  • State v. Yoon Chul Shin, AC 40385
    • United States
    • Connecticut Court of Appeals
    • October 1, 2019
    ...seven; the judgment is affirmed in all other respects.In this opinion the other judges concurred.1 See, e.g., State v. Seekins , 299 Conn. 141, 147–48, 8 A.3d 491 (2010) (defendant found incompetent to stand trial but restorable to competency).2 The defendant also alleges that the state has......
  • State v. Holden
    • United States
    • Connecticut Superior Court
    • December 2, 2014
    ...and the mind of the subject, it constitutes a deprivation of liberty in the most literal and fundamental sense." State v. Seekins, 299 Conn. 141, 154, 8 A.3d 491 (2010), citing Washington v. Harper, supra, at 237–38, 110 S.Ct. 1028 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). T......
  • State v. Lishan Wang
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • September 13, 2016
    ...quoting Sell v. United States, supra, 539 U.S. [at] 180–81 .” (Footnote added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Seekins, 299 Conn. 141, 154–56, 8 A.3d 491 (2010). The court in Sell did not prescribe the standard of appellate review of the trial court's conclusions with respect to......
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