State v. Seeley

• Decision Date: 27 June 2017
• Docket Number: SC 19790
• Citation: 326 Conn. 65,161 A.3d 1278
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. James SEELEY

326 Conn. 65

161 A.3d 1278

STATE of Connecticut

v.James SEELEY

SC 19790

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued January 26, 2017

Officially released June 27, 2017

Norman A. Pattis, with whom were Christopher La Tronica and, on the brief, Kevin Smith, for the appellant (defendant).

Matthew A. Weiner, assistant state's attorney, with whom were Deborah P. Mabbett, senior assistant state's attorney, and, on the brief, Stephen J. Sedensky III, state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

Rogers, C. J., and Palmer, Eveleigh, McDonald, Espinosa and Robinson, Js.^*

ROBINSON, J.

The principal issue in this appeal is whether, in a trial to the court, the state presented sufficient evidence in its case-in-chief to support the conviction of the defendant, James Seeley, of forgery in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a–139(a)(1)¹ in connection with a document created to facilitate the purchase of a vehicle on behalf of a corporation.² In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence presented, the defendant claims that we should exercise our supervisory authority over the administration of justice to abandon the waiver rule³ in the context of court trials, and review the trial court's denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal following the state's case-in-chief, despite the fact that he elected to introduce evidence of his own. We need not reach the defendant's claim regarding the waiver rule because we conclude that there was sufficient evidence in the state's case-in-chief to support the defendant's conviction. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The record reveals the following relevant facts and procedural history. In 2009, the defendant and Joshua Bennett formed a company, Miller & Stone, Inc., for the purpose of manufacturing and selling dietary supplements.

By May, 2010, the shareholders of Miller & Stone, Inc., were the defendant, Bennett, Sandra Scott, E. Duane Meyer, and Sean Macpherson. The defendant ran the daily operations of Miller & Stone, Inc., while Bennett developed and designed its products. Although the other shareholders did not actively participate in management, their consent was required prior to any substantial expenditure of funds. Despite the efforts of the defendant and Bennett, Miller & Stone, Inc., never became profitable and was valued at less than $100,000.

In June, 2010, the defendant went to BMW of Ridgefield (dealership) to purchase a vehicle in the name of Miller & Stone, Inc. In order to do so, the defendant was required to submit his driver's license and numerous documents to the dealership, including a "Certified Resolution for Business Entity" (certified resolution), which is the document at issue in the present case. Because the defendant sought to purchase a vehicle in the name of Miller & Stone, Inc., a company he did not wholly own, the dealership required a certified resolution signed by at least two different corporate officers. Generally, the dealership required the parties signing a certified resolution to provide identification upon submission. The certified resolution in the present case, however, was sent through a fax machine located at the home of the defendant's father, Ian Seeley, and the dealership did not subsequently request identification. On June 28, 2010, the defendant completed the sale in the name of Miller & Stone, Inc., and took possession of a BMW M6 automobile (automobile).

Shortly thereafter, Bennett began receiving calls from customers who were interested in products from Miller & Stone, Inc., but who complained that the defendant was not following through on orders. A subsequent review of corporate bank records, which previously had been sent to the defendant's home, revealed certain unauthorized charges and checks sent to the dealership.

After seeing these expenditures, Bennett and Sandra Scott's husband, Andrew Scott, drove to the dealership, where they discovered that the automobile had been purchased in the name of Miller & Stone, Inc. They informed the dealership that the purchase was unauthorized.

Bennett, Andrew Scott, Macpherson, Meyer, and the defendant subsequently met to discuss the unauthorized expenditures. During this meeting, the defendant was "[v]ery upset," "crying," and "apologetic," and referred to the purchase of the automobile as "a mistake ...." The defendant was told that he needed either to return the automobile or list himself on the title. The defendant agreed and, on the following day, returned the automobile to the dealership. The automobile was subsequently resold at auction for $18,000 less than the amount owed by Miller & Stone, Inc., on the loan.

In early 2011, Bennett met with George Bryce, a detective with the Bethel Police Department, to review potential evidence in connection with the defendant's purchase of the automobile in the name of Miller & Stone, Inc. Convinced that one of the three signatures that appeared on the certified resolution purported to be but was not actually his, Bennett pursued a criminal complaint.

The state charged the defendant with forgery in the second degree in violation of § 53a–139(a)(1). The case was subsequently tried to the court, Russo, J. Following the presentation of the state's case-in-chief, the defendant filed a motion seeking a judgment of acquittal, which was denied. Following the presentation of evidence by the defendant, the court found the defendant guilty as charged. The court subsequently rendered a corresponding judgment of conviction and sentenced the defendant to five years incarceration, execution suspended, and three years probation with special conditions. This appeal followed.

On appeal, the defendant asks us to exercise our supervisory powers over the administration of justice to hold the waiver rule inapplicable to court trials, and to consider his claim that the trial court improperly denied his motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of the state's case-in-chief. In the alternative, the defendant claims that the evidence, considered in its entirety, was insufficient to find him guilty of forgery in the second degree. Additional relevant facts and procedural history will be set forth as necessary.

I

We initially address the defendant's request that we abandon the waiver rule in the context of court trials.⁴

"The so-called waiver rule provides that, when a motion for [a judgment of] acquittal at the close of the state's case is denied, a defendant may not secure appellate review of the trial court's ruling without [forgoing] the right to put on evidence in his or her own behalf. The defendant's sole remedy is to remain silent and, if convicted, to seek reversal of the conviction because of insufficiency of the state's evidence. If the defendant elects to introduce evidence, the appellate review encompasses the evidence in toto." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Perkins , 271 Conn. 218, 220, 856 A.2d 917 (2004) ; see also State v. Papandrea , 302 Conn. 340, 350 and n.5, 26 A.3d 75 (2011) ; State v. Rutan , 194 Conn. 438, 440, 479 A.2d 1209 (1984).

We need not, however, presently consider abandoning the waiver rule in the context of court trials because, "[b]ased on a review of the state's evidence only, the state ha[s] proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of [the crime charged]. On its merits, the defendant's claim is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence at the end of the state's case. Our review of the state's evidence is limited to ... whether [a finder of fact] could have reasonably concluded, upon the facts established and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom, that the cumulative effect of the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Calonico , 256 Conn. 135, 139–40, 770 A.2d 454 (2001) ; see also State v. Perkins , supra, 271 Conn. at 230 and n.12, 856 A.2d 917. Accordingly, we leave for another day the issue of whether we should abandon the waiver rule in the context of court trials.

II

We turn next to the defendant's claims regarding the sufficiency of the state's evidence. The defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction of forgery in the second degree for two reasons. First, he contends that the state failed to present evidence from which a fact finder reasonably could have concluded that the defendant forged the signature, namely, because the handwriting evidence was inconclusive and did not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed a forgery. Second, he claims that the state presented insufficient evidence from which a fact finder could have concluded that the defendant forged with intent to deceive. We address each of these claims in turn.

"The standard of review [that] we [ordinarily] apply to a claim of insufficient evidence is well established. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction we apply a two-part test. First, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict. Second, we determine whether upon the facts so construed and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom the [finder of fact] reasonably could have concluded that the cumulative force of the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.... In evaluating evidence, the trier of fact is not required to accept as dispositive those inferences that are consistent with the defendant's innocence.... The trier may draw whatever inferences from the evidence or facts established by the evidence it deems to be reasonable and logical.... This does not require that each subordinate conclusion established by or inferred from the evidence, or even from other inferences, be proved beyond a reasonable doubt ... because this court has held that a [fact finder's] factual inferences that support a guilty verdict need only be reasonable....

"[A]s we have often noted, proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond all possible doubt ......