State v. Segars

• Decision Date: 26 June 2002
• Citation: 172 N.J. 481,799 A.2d 541
• Parties: STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Alan SEGARS, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

799 A.2d 541

172 N.J. 481

STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Alan SEGARS, Defendant-Appellant.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Argued March 12, 2002.

Decided June 26, 2002.

Alan Dexter Bowman, Newark, argued the cause for appellant.

Annmarie Cozzi, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent (William H. Schmidt, Bergen County Prosecutor, attorney).

PER CURIAM.

On February 15, 1999, Ridgewood Police Officer Douglas Williams issued defendant, Alan Segars, a summons for operating a motor vehicle with a suspended license. Throughout the proceedings below, Segars, an African-American, maintained that Officer Williams checked his license plates on a Mobile Data Terminal (MDT) because of his race. All parties agree that if that was the case, his action would have been impermissible. The issue presented is narrower: Should the trial court's conclusion that Segars failed to sustain the burden of proving discriminatory targeting be sustained? Under the unusual facts of this case, we think it should not.

I

Segars was charged in Ridgewood Municipal Court with driving with a suspended license, contrary to N.J.S.A. 39:3-40. He subsequently filed a motion to suppress the evidence against him. Before the hearing, he moved for discovery of Officer Williams's personnel file, the Ridgewood Police Department's procedures for use of the MDT, and any reports regarding Officer Williams's use of the MDT on February 15, 1999.

The motion to compel discovery proceeded first. The facts were sharply contested; the parties offered radically different versions of the event. Segars testified that on the date in question, at approximately 1:00 p.m., he drove his car into the parking lot of the Bank of New York in Ridgewood. He parked next to an unoccupied police car, which was the only other car in the lot at the time, and entered the bank to use the automated teller machine. On the way in, he passed Officer Williams, who is Caucasian, exiting the bank. Segars "noticed that [Officer Williams] sort of was looking with sort of a question mark on his face. As I was getting ready to use the machine, he was sort of looking back." Segars was wearing a running outfit and a baseball cap. By the time he returned to his car after using the automated teller machine, Officer Williams's car was blocking the exit lane. Segars exited the parking lot through the teller's lane and drove next door to the Quick Stop. After a few minutes in the Quick Stop, Segars returned to his car where he was approached by Officer Williams, who asked to see his credentials. Segars produced them and, when asked, admitted that his license had been suspended.

According to Segars, before issuing him a ticket Officer Williams went to another car parked on the street in front of the bank and talked to its occupant. Another police officer arrived and issued a ticket to the occupant of that car, who was Caucasian, while Officer Williams issued a ticket to Segars. Officer Williams offered Segars a ride home, which he accepted. Segars testified that Officer Williams was polite and made no comments in respect of race.

Contrariwise, Officer Williams testified that he recalled that Segars's unoccupied car already was in the bank parking lot when he drove in. He decided to check the license plates on his MDT, and may have checked the plates on another car that was parked in the bank lot at the same time. The check of Segars's plate revealed that the registered owner of the vehicle had a suspended driver's license. Officer Williams said he then pulled up next to the parking lot exit and called central dispatch to determine the reason for the suspension, which he discovered was for driving while impaired. While waiting for Segars to return to his car, Officer Williams checked the plates on another car that pulled up in front of the bank because he noticed that it had an expired inspection sticker. He saw the driver of that car use the automated teller machine. That driver, who was the Caucasian mentioned in Segars's testimony, subsequently was issued a ticket. From the point that Segars left the bank, his version of the events coincides with Officer Williams's testimony.

On cross-examination, Officer Williams restated that he did not use the automated teller machine within the span of time in question, although he may have used it at 8:00 a.m., and that he never saw Segars in the bank or anywhere else prior to the MDT check. When asked why he "ran" Segars's plate, Officer Williams replied, "It was a bank holiday ... very light traffic, very—not many cars parked in the lot. There were two cars parked there; I ran both plates.... [A]ny car that was in the lot I would have run." Officer Williams stated that he knew that the driver of the car parked in front of the bank was using the automated teller machine but that did not affect his decision to run those plates. He stated that he runs plates frequently, without "rhyme or reason," and that if it is a slow day, like a holiday, he might check every car that goes by.

At the end of the first day of testimony, the Municipal Court denied Segars's discovery motion regarding Officer Williams's personnel file and motor vehicle stops (other than the two pages that he had received already from the State), but granted his request for a copy of the Ridgewood Police Department's MDT policy and procedures. In making its ruling, the court assumed that Segars's account was true and that Officer Williams had seen him in the bank prior to running his plates, but reasoned:

I haven't heard anything that persuades this Court that Officer Williams ran Mr. Segars MDT—on the MDT just because he was African-American. There were three apparent runnings just within a very short time of each other, and apparently at least one of which was a Caucasian person.... [H]e runs vehicles all of the time, even at random.... The fact that Mr. Segars is African-American alone is not enough, even accepting that the officer knew that he was African-American.

The court stated that it was more likely that Segars was correct regarding the chronology because it is understandable that he would remember the event better.

On the second day of trial, Segars presented the records of the Bank of New York regarding automated teller machine usage on the day in question. Those records supported the accuracy of Segars's testimony where it conflicted with that of Officer Williams. In particular, they bolstered Segars's assertion that he and Officer Williams first encountered each other in the bank, and that the officer only then ran the MDT check on Segars's license plate. The records showed that Officer Williams used the automated teller machine at 1:10 p.m. and Segars used it at 1:11 p.m. Concomitantly, police records revealed that Officer Williams checked the plates on another car at 1:12 p.m., on Segars's at 1:13 p.m., and on a third at 1:16 p.m.

The court denied Segars's motion to suppress. Confronted with Officer Williams's bank records, the court held that his testimony that he had not known Segars was African-American prior to checking his plates was not believable, but noted that even before being presented with the records it believed that Segars's testimony was probably more accurate. The court expressed the view that Officer Williams simply had forgotten the facts of the stop, which had occurred six months before, or that Officer Williams denied using the automated teller machine because he was not supposed to perform personal errands while on duty. The court concluded that given all the facts of the case, including that Officer Williams ran the plates of two other cars at the time he ran Segars's, he was "satisfied that [Officer Williams] used the MDT in this case for other than racial purposes."

Segars pled guilty to driving with a suspended license and was sentenced. The plea was conditioned on his right to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress. On his appeal de novo on the record before the Superior Court, Law Division, Segars again was convicted and the same sentence was imposed. In ruling, the Superior Court held that under State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 470-71, 724 A.2d 234 (1999), "great deference" should be given to "the findings of the trial court because he has an option to hear and see the witnesses and to have a feel for the case" and that "the role to be taken by this court in reviewing a municipal court is to determine whether the findings made by the lower court could reasonably have been reached upon sufficient credible evidence presented in the record." Reviewing the record, the court stated:

There was nothing supplied to [the Municipal Court] indicating that this officer issued this ticket for any racially motivated reason as claimed by the defendant.... [T]here was ... no proof submitted to this court other than the fact that the officer was mistaken in his testimony as to using the [automated teller] machine and the fact that he probably did see the defendant. [The court] went through all that and found credible that the officer made a random check.... The municipal court found that the officer's testimony was credible and such should be considered in the case at bar. The fact that the officer may or may not have noticed the defendant when walking from the [automated teller] machine is not sufficient to determine that the officer was conducting the MDT test in a racially biased manner.

Segars appealed to the Appellate Division. Like the Law Division, the court held that it was not "in a good position to judge credibility and should not make new credibility findings," citing Locurto, supra, 157 N.J. at 470-71, 724 A.2d 234, and State v. Barone, 147 N.J. 599, 615, 689 A.2d 132 (1997), to the effect that an appellate court may not "weigh the evidence," assess the credibility of the witnesses, or make conclusions about the evidence. Hence, its standard for review was "whether there is sufficient credible evidence present...