State v. Segrain
| Decision Date | 24 June 2021 |
| Docket Number | P1/17-1236AG,No. 2018-144-C.A.,2018-144-C.A. |
| Citation | 252 A.3d 1255 |
| Parties | STATE v. Joseph SEGRAIN. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
Owen Murphy, Department of Attorney General, for State
Christopher S. Gontarz, Esq., for Defendant
Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Long, JJ.
This case is replete with complexities that necessitate a relatively lengthy factual narrative on our part. In the end, however, our focus will of course be on the legal issues implicated by the appeal of the defendant, Joseph Segrain. The defendant appeals from a March 29, 2018 judgment of conviction and commitment entered in the Providence County Superior Court, reflecting the fact that he was found guilty by a jury on five counts related to conduct stemming from a drive-by shooting.1 On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial justice2 erred by: (1) granting the first mistrial, thereby allegedly violating his constitutional right against being put in double jeopardy; (2) denying his motion to suppress a particular eyewitness identification; (3) denying his motion to recuse; (4) denying his right to represent himself at trial and at the sentencing hearing; and (5) allowing certain videos and testimony to be admitted into evidence.
For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.
The instant case arises out of what can best be characterized as a feud involving members of two rival gangs based in Pawtucket—one called "Bucket East" and the other "Bucket West." That feud ultimately led to a drive-by shooting on January 9, 2017, which resulted in a number of criminal charges being lodged against defendant. The relevant facts as to what transpired on that date will be set forth in detail when we relate the witness testimony that is part of the voluminous record in this case.
On May 10, 2017, defendant was indicted by a grand jury on the following counts: assault with a dangerous weapon (Count One); discharge of a firearm during a crime of violence (Count Two); conspiracy to commit a felony (Count Three); unlawful possession of a firearm (Count Four); unlawful possession of a firearm (Count Five); discharge of a firearm from a motor vehicle (Count Six); and unlawful possession of a firearm by an individual having previously been convicted of a crime of violence (Count Seven).3
Before the eventual criminal trial of defendant took place, the trial justice heard pretrial motions with respect to a number of issues, the rulings on all but one of which motions have not been challenged on appeal. Accordingly, we need only focus on the pretrial hearing relative to defendant's motion to suppress a particular eyewitness identification.
Geovanni Perez, a parking attendant, testified at the pretrial hearing (and later at trial). Mr. Perez testified that, on January 9, 2017, he was employed as a valet at the Hope Club, which is located on the corner of Benefit Street and Benevolent Street in Providence, and where an event was scheduled for noon. He stated that, when he arrived in the vicinity of the Hope Club, he parked his car on Benevolent Street toward the top of the hill. He said that, while he was walking down Benevolent Street towards the Hope Club, he was interrupted by a man sitting in the driver's seat of a "black" "BMW X5 SUV," who lowered his window and asked him if one was permitted to park on that street. Mr. Perez added that, during this interaction, he was standing on the driver's side of the car, roughly one foot away from the driver.
Mr. Perez also testified that, at some point thereafter, people began to arrive for the scheduled event at the Hope Club and that, because there were so many cars trying to park, traffic was overflowing onto Benefit Street (which runs perpendicular to Benevolent Street).4 He stated that he then once again saw the man with whom he had spoken earlier and that the man was still driving the BMW and was attempting to get around the traffic. Mr. Perez testified that, when the car tried to "come up" Benevolent Street, he approached the driver and helped him "back out" onto, and proceed down, Benefit Street. He added that, while doing so, he made eye contact with the man.
Mr. Perez proceeded to testify at the hearing that, on January 19, 2017 (ten days after his encounters with the driver of the BMW near the Hope Club), he spoke with detectives from the Providence Police Department about his above-described interactions with the driver of the BMW. He stated that the detectives first showed him a single photograph of a car (in which there was a driver), which car he identified as the car that he had twice seen near the Hope Club on January 9. Mr. Perez added that, following his identification of the vehicle, the detectives had him participate in a photographic lineup by displaying a series of photographs sequentially. He testified that, when he saw the second photograph in the sequential display, he told the detectives that it was a photograph of the man with whom he had spoken on January 9.
After he had testified at the suppression hearing with respect to his January 19 out-of-court identification of defendant in the presence of the detectives, Mr. Perez proceeded next to make an in-court identification of defendant as being the individual whom he had spoken to and seen driving the BMW on January 9.
The trial justice ultimately denied defendant's motion to suppress Mr. Perez's identification, and Mr. Perez was thereafter permitted to testify at trial.
The defendant's first trial commenced on January 2, 2018. The first witness to testify was Attorney Lauren Balkcom. She testified on direct examination about what occurred in and around Courtroom 10 of the Superior Court on January 9, 2017. While being cross-examined by defense counsel and while attempting to seek clarification of a question posed to her by counsel, she made reference to "the violation hearing * * *."5 Immediately following that mention of "the violation hearing," defense counsel requested a sidebar conference with the trial justice. At that conference, defense counsel moved for a mistrial on the ground that Attorney Balkcom's reference to a prior judicial proceeding involving defendant ("the violation hearing") prejudiced defendant in the eyes of the jury. After hearing arguments from counsel, the trial justice denied the motion for a mistrial, finding that the reference to the violation hearing was not a "purposeful remark on [Attorney Balkcom's] part to try and derail this train." Nonetheless, the trial justice gave a cautionary instruction to the jury, which included the following statement (characterized by the trial justice as "a civil untruth"): The trial justice added: "That is to say, the proceedings before this Court."
The trial then resumed. However, partway through the testimony of the second witness for the state, the trial justice revisited the issue of the motion for a mistrial. He stated that, although he had told the jury "a civil untruth," he considered the jury to be a "smart group," and he said that he was not sure "[w]hether they buy [the civil untruth] or not * * *." Ultimately, the trial justice opted to grant the mistrial. The defendant did not immediately move for dismissal of the indictment on double jeopardy grounds. See, e.g. , State v. Casas , 792 A.2d 737, 738 (R.I. 2002).
The defendant's second trial began on January 10, 2018. Before jury impanelment commenced, defendant asked to address the trial justice. In the midst of the trial justice's admonition to defendant that he would not permit "hybrid counsel,"6 defendant interrupted to complain about what he claimed to be "the violation of [his] rights" under the Fourteenth Amendment. The defendant specifically stated that his rights were violated because the trial justice was "supposed to call th[e] mistrial immediately, and * * * didn't" and because the trial justice had "lied" when he "gave the jurors the wrong instructions." The trial justice did not respond to defendant's comments and instead directed the sheriffs to bring the jury into the courtroom. Before the jury entered, however, defendant refused to let the sheriffs remove his leg restraints, and he complained about being "sprayed and tasered" by the sheriffs. When defendant finally permitted the sheriffs to remove his leg restraints, jury voir dire began.
On January 16, 2018, the third day of defendant's second trial, while the jury was still being impaneled, defendant again asked to address the court directly because he "ha[d] a couple of issues that [he] would like to bring up * * *." Specifically, and for the first time, defendant raised the issue of the double jeopardy provision in the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution,7 stating that it "affords a criminal defendant a valued right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal, which the first one was tainted, not because of me." He further added that he wanted to "stop[ ] these proceedings" because he "never consented to a mistrial."
In a response spanning thirteen transcript pages, the trial justice outlined the ways whereby he had attempted to protect defendant's rights—which included his having given the jury a cautionary instruction and having granted the mistrial motion with respect to the first trial. After the trial justice completed his remarks and attempted to let the impanelment process continue, defendant stated that, for the remainder of the trial, he planned to proceed pro se and that defense counsel would thereafter act as standby counsel. The trial justice warned defendant that "[r]epresenting oneself is very chancy and not a very smart move," to which defendant responded:
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