State v. Sellers

• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: JUSTICE FEW
• Citation: State v. Sellers, 898 S.E.2d 116, 442 S.C. 140 (S.C. 2024)
• Docket Number: Appellate Case No. 2021-000910,Opinion No. 28188
• Decision Date: 17 January 2024
• Parties: The STATE, Respondent, v. William C. (Billy) SELLERS, Petitioner.
• topic: Criminal procedure,Civil Procedure

442 S.C. 140

898 S.E.2d 116

The STATE, Respondent,

v.William C. (Billy) SELLERS, Petitioner.

Appellate Case No. 2021-000910

Opinion No. 28188

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Heard March 30, 2023

Filed January 17, 2024

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS

Appeal from Edgefield County, Eugene C. Griffith Jr., Circuit Court Judge

Chief Appellate Defender Robert Michael Dudek, of Columbia, for Petitioner.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Deputy Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, Senior Assistant Deputy Attorney General Melody Jane Brown, and Senior Assistant Attorney General J. Anthony Mabry, of Columbia; and Solicitor Samuel R. Hubbard III, of Lexington, all for Respondent.

JUSTICE FEW:

The court of appeals affirmed Billy Sellers’ conviction for murder arising from the brutal killing of Johnny Hydrick. We granted Sellers’ petition for a writ of certiorari to address two questions. First, did the trial court’s jury instruction defining malice in part as "the intentional doing of a wrongful act without just cause or excuse" shift the burden of proof to Sellers to provide justification or excuse for his wrongful acts, or was that portion of the instruction otherwise contrary to law. Second, did the State present evidence to support the trial court instructing the jury as to Sellers’ criminal liability under the doctrine of "the hand of one is the hand of all." We affirm the court of appeals.

L Background

Johnny Hydrick—disabled from a car accident—was widely known in his hometown of Trenton, South Carolina, to keep large supplies of Oxycodone on hand to alleviate the pain associated with his disability. Hydrick often illegally sold Oxycodone to others, including Sellers. At trial, the State presented strong evidence Sellers personally murdered Hydrick in his home on October 10, 2014, during the course of burglarizing his home and robbing him of Oxycodone, guns, and cash. A pathologist testified the cause of death was "multiple blunt-force injuries" to the head "due to a beating." While the State’s primary theory was Sellers personally beat Hydrick to death,¹ the State presented the alternative theory Sellers was guilty under the doctrine the hand of one is the hand of all because he and a man named "Gee" agreed to carry out the burglary and robbery, during the course of which Gee beat Hydrick to death or did so jointly with Sellers.

The jury convicted Sellers of murder. Because Sellers had a prior conviction from Florida for burglary of a dwelling while armed with a deadly weapon, "an offense that would be classified as a most serious offense" under subsection 17-25-45(C)(1) of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2023), the trial court was required to sentence him to life in prison without the possibility of parole pursuant to subsection 17-25-45(A)(l) (2014). The court of appeals’ opinion affirming the conviction is unpublished. State v. Sellers, Op. No. 2021-UP-254, 2021 WL 2822545 (S.C. Ct. App. filed July 7, 2021).

II. Malice Jury Instruction

[1] Sellers contends that, by including the language "the intentional doing of a wrongful act without just cause or excuse" in the definition of malice in its jury charge, the trial court violated his due process rights by shifting the burden to him to prove he acted with just cause or excuse. We begin our discussion of Sellers’ burden-shifting argument by pointing out the trial court gave the jury a thorough and complete instruction on the State’s burden of proving "all of the elements, each of them, beyond a reasonable doubt." Among multiple specific references in its jury charge to the State’s burden of proof, the trial court instructed the jury that "to sustain a conviction for murder the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt … the defendant killed another person with malice …. " The trial court then defined malice "as hatred, ill will, hostility toward another person. It is the intentional doing of a wrongful act without just cause or excuse …. "

Under the State’s clearly-articulated burden of proof and the trial court’s definition of malice, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Sellers acted "without just cause or excuse." Thus, we find the trial court’s jury instruction on malice could not have been reasonably interpreted by the jury as shifting the burden of proof to Sellers. See Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 517, 99 S. Ct. 2450, 2456, 61 L. Ed. 2d 39, 47 (1979) (analyzing whether a jury instruction violated the Due Process Clause because of improper burden shifting as whether "a reasonable jury could well have interpreted" the instruction to relieve the State of its burden of proof); see also State v. Bell, 305 S.C. 11, 19, 406 S.E.2d 165, 170 (1991) (holding a jury instruction defining malice as "the doing of a wrongful act intentionally and without just cause or excuse" was not "an unconstitutional burden-shifting" instruction).

[2] Sellers also argues the malice instruction was "needlessly confusing" and violated "this Court’s modern pattern of disapproving of jury instructions on how the jury should interpret certain evidence." On this point, the court of appeals stated,

We understand Sellers’ argument that a reasonable jury could apply the phrase equating malice with "intentional doing of a wrongful act without just cause or excuse" in problematic ways. We are not sure what the challenged phrase adds to a malice charge and can see the wisdom in not charging it. We are also not sure how a wrongful act can be said to be done with malice if all that is proven is that the act was done with intent …. Nor are we sure how an intentional act that is justified or excusable by law could be a crime.

Sellers, Op. No. 2021-UP-254, at 2-3.

[3] Instructing a jury on any point of law is difficult, but it can be particularly so on the principle of malice. In some cases, such as where there is evidence the defendant acted in self-defense, it is true the State must prove the defendant acted without just cause or excuse. See State v. Dickey, 394 S.C. 491, 499, 716 S.E.2d 97, 101 (2011) (holding "when a defendant claims self-defense, the State is required to disprove the elements of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt"). Here, however, there was no evidence of self-defense or any other legal justification for the killing of Hydrick. The only question in this case was whether it was Sellers who committed the crime. Thus, like the court of appeals, we question what the phrase "without just cause or excuse" added to the jury’s understanding of the legal principle of malice. While we caution our trial courts to carefully consider whether to include any phrase in a jury instruction, however, we do not believe the phrase "without just cause or excuse" in this case could have caused the jury to be confused, nor could have improperly guided the jury on how to interpret specific evidence. We find no error.

[4, 5] In his brief to the court of appeals, Sellers argued for the first time the trial court did not connect the phrase "the intentional doing of a wrongful act" to an act that proximately caused Hydrick’s death. He argued the jury instruction could thus lead the jury to conclude the State proved malice merely by showing Sellers engaged in the "wrongful act" of buying or selling drugs, burglarizing Hydrick’s home, or robbing Hydrick, unless Sellers showed "just cause or excuse" for those acts. "There was," counsel wrote in his brief to this Court, "a variety of … unlawful or wrongful acts that this jury instruction impermissibly called upon [Sellers] to show ‘just cause or excuse’ for …. " At oral argument before this Court, Sellers argued for the first time—in connection with the hand of one is the hand of all—the instruction permitted the jury to find the State proved Sellers’ malice merely by showing another person committed one of these wrongful acts.

Neither of these arguments is preserved for appellate review, however, as neither argument was presented to the trial court. See State v. Field, 429 S.C. 578, 582, 840 S.E.2d 548, 550 (2020) ("As we have repeatedly held, ‘A party need not use the exact name of a legal doctrine in order to preserve it, but it must be clear that the argument has been presented on that ground. A party may not argue one ground at trial and an alternate ground on appeal.’ " (quoting State v. Dunbar, 356 S.C. 138, 142, 587 S.E.2d 691, 694 (2003))).

III. The Hand of One is the Hand of All Jury Charge

[6, 7] Ordinarily, the State convicts a defendant of a crime by proving that he personally committed the criminal act. As discussed above, the State’s primary theory in this case was Sellers committed the murder by personally beating Hydrick to death. Under the doctrine we refer to in South Carolina as "the hand of one is the hand of all," the State proves the defendant guilty by proving he had a mutual plan or agreement with another person to commit one crime, and during the course of committing that initial crime, the other person committed a second crime they had not agreed to commit. State v. Harry, 420 S.C. 290, 299, 803 S.E.2d 272, 276 (2017); see also Butler v. State, 435 S.C. 96, 97-98, 866 S.E.2d 347, 348 (2021) ("Under the theory the ‘hand of one is the hand of all,’ when two people join together to commit a crime, and during the commission of that crime one of the two commits another crime, both may be criminally liable for the unplanned crime if it was a natural and probable consequence of their common plan to commit the initial crime."). In this case, the State’s alternative theory was that Sellers and Gee mutually planned to burglarize Hydrick’s home and rob him of Oxycodone, guns, or cash, and while the two of them were carrying out those initial crimes, either Gee beat Hydrick to death or the two of them mutually beat Hydrick to death.

In most cases in which the State attempts to convict a defendant of murder under the hand of one doctrine, the factual scenario involves a gunshot, not a beating. In...