State v. Serna
| Decision Date | 17 November 2021 |
| Docket Number | 03-20-00087-CR |
| Citation | 644 S.W.3d 712 |
| Parties | The STATE of Texas, Appellant v. Johnny Joe SERNA, Appellee |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Susan Schoon, Schoon Law Firm, P.C., 208 S. Castell Ave., Ste.201, New Braunfels, TX 78130, for Appellant.
Joshua D. Presley, Assistant District Attorney, 199 Main Plaza, Ste. 2007, New Braunfels, TX 78130, Sammy M. McCrary, Chief Felony Prosecutor, Comal County Criminal District, Attorney's Office, 150 N. Seguin Avenue, Suite 307, New Braunfels, TX 78130, for Appellee.
Before Justices Baker, Kelly, and Smith
Johnny Joe Serna was charged with the third-degree felony of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon, see Tex. Penal Code § 46.04(a), (e), and the State alleged habitual-offender enhancement paragraphs, see id. § 12.42(d). After a pre-trial hearing, the trial court suppressed evidence of a handgun seized from a locked car parked in a home's carport, and the State appeals, see Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 44.01(a)(5). The State argues on appeal that the court made errors of law because (1) Serna lacked Fourth Amendment standing to contest the seizure because he lacked any legitimate expectation of privacy in the place where the car was parked and (2) the plain-view and automobile exceptions to the Fourth Amendment's default warrant requirement allowed the seizure. We affirm because Serna had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the home and its curtilage, where the locked car was parked, and the officers did not have the right to be within the curtilage when they seized the handgun.
Officers obtained a warrant to arrest Serna for "credit/debit card abuse." They learned his current address, which was a "residence at which [he] frequently stayed," and confirmed it with his parole officer. When they approached the home, they saw him sitting in the driver's seat of a car parked "beneath [a] carport" abutting the home. He was "partially blocked in the driveway" by other vehicles parked behind him. The carport was "directly under a single roof covering both the house and the carport," which meant that the car "was physically and squarely beneath the umbrella of the home." The car was also "within a few steps of and a very short distance to a doorway of the" home. Just before the officers approached, Serna "had driven the vehicle forward a short distance within the driveway and beneath the carport" to clear the path to the doorway for a family member.
The officers asked Serna if he had any guns, which he denied, and to talk outside the car. He got out but locked the car behind him. He was holding a dog, so he said that he needed to put it inside the home and did so "[w]ithout asking." The officers followed him inside, where he "requested that he be allowed to secure [the] dog in his room." "[T]he officers followed and escorted Serna into his room," where "Serna, stalling, rummaged around his room and through his pockets." He, "[u]ncooperative, ... created a diversion, i.e., likely secreting the keys to the" car. (Emphasis removed.) But he then went back outside the home at the officers' request, and they put him in handcuffs while they all stood next to the car. He asked to call his mother-in-law because she owned the home and needed to come lock it because he did not have a key.
The officers "walked Serna to the street past [the] two other cars in the driveway to confirm and verify the warrant." There they let him call his mother-in-law. "[O]ne of the officers then walked back to the passenger side of the" car that Serna had been in and saw a handgun in plain view. The officers asked Serna if they could search the car, but he refused. Serna's mother-in-law soon arrived, and she "attempted, unsuccessfully, to assist law enforcement locating keys to the" car. With the car still locked and "[w]ithout a search warrant, law enforcement forcibly, but without damage, entered the locked [car] and retrieved the handgun from beneath the front passenger seat."
The State indicted Serna for unlawfully possessing a handgun. He moved to suppress "any and all evidence seized from inside" the car, and the trial court held an evidentiary hearing. The only witness who testified was one of the officers who arrested Serna and seized the handgun, and the court admitted as exhibits a second officer's bodycam recording of the events surrounding the arrest and two pictures of the handgun. The court ultimately suppressed the handgun seized from the locked car because the seizure was warrantless and the car was parked within the home's curtilage. The State now appeals the trial court's suppression order.
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States assures the "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." Under the Amendment, officers generally must obtain a warrant before seizing items unless an exception to the default warrant requirement applies. See Collins v. Virginia , ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S. Ct. 1663, 1669, 201 L.Ed.2d 9 (2018) ; State v. Villarreal , 475 S.W.3d 784, 796 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) ; State v. Pena , 581 S.W.3d 467, 480–81 (Tex. App.—Austin 2019, pet. ref'd).
Collins , 138 S. Ct. at 1670 (internal quotation and citation omitted) (quoting Florida v. Jardines , 569 U.S. 1, 6, 133 S.Ct. 1409, 185 L.Ed.2d 495 (2013) ).
"[T]he area ‘immediately surrounding and associated with the home’ "—its "curtilage"—is "part of the home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes." Id. (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Jardines , 569 U.S. at 6, 133 S.Ct. 1409 ). "The protection afforded the curtilage is essentially a protection of families and personal privacy in an area intimately linked to the home, both physically and psychologically, where privacy expectations are most heightened." Id. (internal quotation omitted) (quoting California v. Ciraolo , 476 U.S. 207, 212–13, 106 S.Ct. 1809, 90 L.Ed.2d 210 (1986) ). Id. (internal citation omitted).
For a warrantless seizure, the State bears the burden of proving an exception to the default warrant requirement. See State v. Martinez , 569 S.W.3d 621, 624 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019). Two such exceptions are the plain-view exception and the automobile exception. The plain-view exception allows seizure of an object only when all three of these conditions are met: (1) "officials must lawfully be where the object can be ‘plainly viewed,’ " (2) "the ‘incriminating character’ of the object in plain view must be " ‘immediately apparent’ " to the officials," and (3) "the officials must have the right to access the object." Keehn v. State , 279 S.W.3d 330, 334 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (quoting Horton v. California , 496 U.S. 128, 136–37, 110 S.Ct. 2301, 110 L.Ed.2d 112 (1990) ); accord Collins , 138 S. Ct. at 1672 (quoting Horton , 496 U.S. at 136–37, 110 S.Ct. 2301 ).
"Under the automobile exception, law enforcement officials may conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle if it is readily mobile and there is probable cause to believe that it contains contraband." Pena , 581 S.W.3d at 481 (internal quotation omitted) (quoting Keehn , 279 S.W.3d at 335 ). But despite the automobile exception, when an officer wishes to seize an item from an automobile parked within the curtilage of a home, the officer must obtain a warrant or sufficient permission or another recognized exception must apply for the seizure or it is unlawful. See Collins , 138 S. Ct. at 1668, 1675 ( ).
We review a suppression order under a bifurcated standard of review. Pena , 581 S.W.3d at 474 (quoting State v. Cuong Phu Le , 463 S.W.3d 872, 876 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) ). We give almost total deference to (i) the trial court's findings of historical facts if those findings are supported by the record and (ii) its application of the law to questions of fact, and to mixed questions of fact and law, if the application depended on evaluating witness credibility or demeanor. See State v. Granville , 423 S.W.3d 399, 404 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) ; Pena , 581 S.W.3d at 474 (quoting Cuong Phu Le , 463 S.W.3d at 876 ; Crain v. State , 315 S.W.3d 43, 48 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) ). "If the trial court makes a finding of fact that is derived from video evidence admitted at a suppression hearing, that finding ‘is still reviewed under a deferential standard.’ " Pena , 581 S.W.3d at 474 (quoting Carter v. State , 309 S.W.3d 31, 40 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) ). By contrast, we review de novo the court's legal conclusions and the rest of its application of the law to the facts. See id. (quoting Cuong Phu Le , 463 S.W.3d at 876 ). We view the record in the light most favorable to the trial court's decision. Granville , 423 S.W.3d at 404 ; Pena , 581 S.W.3d at 474 (quoting State v. Story , 445 S.W.3d 729, 732 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) ). We must affirm the trial court's order "if it is correct under any theory of law applicable to the case regardless of whether the trial court based its ruling on that theory, but ‘a trial court's ruling will not be reversed based on a...
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