State v. Sexsmith

• Decision Date: 15 December 1925
• Docket Number: No. 37148.,37148.
• Citation: 200 Iowa 1244,206 N.W. 100
• Parties: STATE v. SEXSMITH.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

200 Iowa 1244

206 N.W. 100

STATE

v.SEXSMITH.

No. 37148.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Dec. 15, 1925.

Appeal from District Court, Mahaska, County; Chas. A. Dewey, Judge.

The defendant was charged with manslaughter, in that he had caused the death of one Ridpath by gross negligence on his part. There was a verdict of guilty and sentence entered thereon. The defendant has appealed. Reversed.McCoy & McCoy, of Oskaloosa, for appellant.

Roscoe J. Woodard and Byron W. Preston, both of Oskaloosa, and Ben Gibson, Atty. Gen., for the State.

EVANS, J.

[1] By proper demurrer, the defendant challenged the sufficiency of the indictment as a charge of manslaughter, or of any other crime. This demurrer was overruled, and error is assigned and argued on the ruling. The charging part of the indictment was as follows:

“Did willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with gross negligence and recklessness, so manage and drive a certain motor vehicle, then and there driven by him, the said W. A. Sexsmith, that thereby, and by reason of said gross negligence and recklessness, mortal wounds were inflicted upon the body and person of one J. W. Ridpath, then and there being, of which mortal wounds so inflicted by him, the said W. A. Sexsmith, he, the said J. W. Ridpath, did languish, and languishing did live until on or about the 26th day of October, 1924, when the said J. W. Ridpath did die, and so, the grand jury aforesaid being legally impaneled as aforesaid, aver, present, find and say that he, the said W. A. Sexsmith, in manner and form as aforesaid, did willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously kill the said J. W. Ridpath, a human being then there being. A more particular statement of the facts constituting the offense herein charged as to the time, place, and manner of the commission thereof being to this grand jury at this time unknown. All contrary to the statute in such cases made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the state of Iowa.”

The question presented is whether the indictment fairly complies with section 13735 of the Code of 1924, which provides as follows:

“The indictment must be direct and certain as regards:

1. The party charged.

2. The offense charged.

3. The particular circumstances of the offense charged, when they are necessary to constitute a complete offense.”

[2] The indictment before us contains no allegation of any specific fact, as distinguished from conclusions of fact and law. The defendant in a criminal case is entitled “to be informed” by the indictment of the specific charges made against him. In this manner the defendant is apprised of the general character of the evidence which will confront him at the trial. He is thereby furnished a fair opportunity to meet such evidence. To charge a defendant in general terms with manslaughter involves a multiplicity of possibilities as to the method by which the manslaughter was committed. Likewise, a charge of gross negligence offers a similar multiplicity of possibilities as to the acts constituting such negligence. To join these two allegations, and to aver that the gross negligence resulted in the manslaughter, adds no information of fact. Negligence in its generic sense takes on a myriad of forms; but every case of negligence is individualized by its own specific acts. If it be asked: What act or acts of negligence did the defendant commit? In what manner did such act or acts operate upon the deceased so as to result in his killing?--no answer can be found in the indictment to either question. No act of the defendant is so specified as to enable the court to say whether it was lawful or unlawful.

The argument for the state is that this indictment conformed to section 13733 of the Code of 1924, in that it contains:

“A statement of the facts constituting the offense * * * in such manner as to enable a person of common understanding to know what is intended.”

There is no want of harmony between these two sections. Each of them calls for a “statement of the facts” constituting the alleged offense. It is argued that the defendant knew what was intended, because he was there and knew his own acts...