State v. Seymour

• Decision Date: 28 July 1900
• Parties: STATE v. SEYMOUR
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

61 P. 1033

7 Idaho 257

STATE v. SEYMOUR

Supreme Court of Idaho

July 28, 1900

GRAND LARCENY-INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE-FLIGHT OF DEFENDANT.-The flight of the defendant after he had been arrested and held to answer, is not conclusive evidence of his guilt, while flight is very strong evidence of his guilt, it is open to explanation.

POSSESSION OF THE STOLEN PROPERTY.-The possession of stolen property unexplained is evidence of guilt. But where a reasonable explanation is given, and there is no conflict of evidence in regard thereto, and the witness is not impeached, the jury cannot arbitrarily ignore such evidence.

PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE.-Before a legal conviction can be had, the state must have established the accused person's guilt of the crime charged by legal evidence, and beyond a reasonable doubt; until that is done, the presumption of innocence is an absolute shield to the defendant.

(Syllabus by the court.)

APPEAL from District Court, Fremont County.

Reversed and remanded.

Hawley Puckett & Hawley and Caleb Jones, for Appellant.

There is absolutely no evidence to sustain the verdict, and it must be presumed to have been rendered under the influence of passion and prejudice, and should be set aside. (State v Nesbit, 4 Idaho 548, 43 P. 66; State v. Crump, 5 Idaho 166, 47 P. 814; State v. Mason, 4 Idaho 543 43 P. 63.) Section 7057 of our Penal Code is in effect section 496 of the California code. The supreme court of California holds that receiving stolen property is a distinct and specific offense under that section, and that although a defendant may receive stolen property and assist in disposing of it for the benefit of himself and the real thief, he cannot be convicted either of larceny or as an accessary after the fact, but must be tried for the offense of receiving the stolen property only. (People v. Stakem, 40 Cal. 599; People v. Fagan, 98 Cal. 230, 33 P. 60; People v. Maxwell, 24 Cal. 14; People v. Ribolsi, 89 Cal. 492, 26 P. 1082; People v. Avila, 43 Cal. 196.) Larceny must be with the intent to steal the property of another, not the intent to deprive the owner thereof. (Mason v. State, 32 Ark. 328; Hart v. State, 57 Ind. 102; Corn v. Hard, 123 Mass. 438; Idaho Rev. Stats., sec. 7045.)

Samuel H. Hays, Attorney General, for the State, cites no authorities upon the points decided.

OPINION

PER CURIAM

The defendant was convicted of the crime of grand larceny, and from the judgment of conviction and from the order denying a new trial this appeal is taken. The defendant was arrested upon a charge of grand larceny, in the stealing of a certain head of livestock. He had a preliminary examination before a committing magistrate, upon which he was committed to appear and answer any indictment or information that might be filed against him upon said charge at the next term of the district court. Defendant gave bail for his appearance at the district court. At the next term of the district court an information was regularly filed by the county attorney against the defendant, charging him with the crime for which he had been held to answer. At the next term of the district court the defendant failed to appear and answer, and his bail was forfeited. A reward for his apprehension was offered, and he was subsequently arrested in the northern part of the state, and was brought to trial, upon which trial he was convicted of the crime of grand larceny, and duly sentenced for a term of years in the state penitentiary.

There are four specifications of error assigned in the brief of the appellant, the first of which is, to wit, "that the evidence was insufficient to justify the verdict," etc. These facts seem to be established by the evidence: The identity of the animal alleged to have been stolen. That said animal was slaughtered by or for the defendant, and by his direction. Much of the transcript is taken up with evidence going to prove the possession of the animal and its slaughter by defendant--a fact which does not appear to have been contested or denied by defendant.

The only question remaining is, Was the possession of the animal by the defendant a felonious possession? The bare possession of property recently stolen is not conclusive evidence of guilt. Especially is this so of property of the kind involved in this case. The only question for us to consider in this case, then, is, Does the evidence as presented by the record show that the possession of the animal by the defendant was a guilty possession? The only evidence on the part of the state tending to establish this fact is that of the alleged owner, who states that he never sold the animal. Against this evidence is that of the defendant that one Williams was employed by him to purchase and drive to his place of business, or to the place where the animals for his business were slaughtered,...