State v. Shaffer
| Decision Date | 23 November 1971 |
| Docket Number | No. 51034,51034 |
| Citation | 257 So.2d 121,260 La. 605 |
| Parties | STATE of Louisiana v. Matthew SHAFFER et al. |
| Court | Louisiana Supreme Court |
J. Huntington Odom, Eddie G. McGehee, C. Alvin Tyler, Dennis R. Whalen, Leon Gary, Jr., Fred H. Belcher, Jr., Baton Rouge, for defendants-appellants.
Jack P. F. Gremillion, Atty. Gen., Harry H. Howard, Asst. Atty. Gen., Sargent Pitcher, Jr., Dist. Atty., Ralph L. Roy, Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.
Matthew Shaffer, Melvin Lewis, Thomas Lewis Garner, and Albert Willis were jointly indicted and tried for the crime of aggravated rape. The jury returned a verdict of guilty as to Shaffer, Lewis, and Willis and of guilty without capital punishment as to Garner. Accordingly the trial judge sentenced Shaffer, Lewis, and Willis to death and Garner to life imprisonment. All four of the defendants have appealed, and 93 perfected bills of exception have been presented for consideration. (Bills of Exception Nos. 53, 91, 92, and 93 are not in the record.)
This bill of exception was reserved by the defendants when the trial judge refused to grant a motion for a mistrial on the basis that the judge had commented on the facts during the voir dire examination of a potential juror in the presence of other jurors. Although the judge is prohibited from commenting on the facts of the case (C.Cr.P. Art. 772), the objection here was made when the trial judge explained the law and then questioned the potential juror's understanding of that law. The right to interrogate a potential juror is specifically granted to the trial judge. C.Cr.P. Art. 786.
This bill was reserved when the State peremptorily challenged a prospective juror. It is argued that the sole basis of the challenge was that he was a Negro and that it resulted in prejudice since the defendants were Negroes. As noted by the trial judge in his per curiam, there is nothing in the record to indicate that the challenge was based on this ground. Furthermore, the right to exercise peremptory challenges is not restricted to specific causes. See State v. Anderson, 254 La. 1107, 229 So.2d 329, reversed on other grounds, 403 U.S. 949, 91 S.Ct. 2288, 29 L.Ed.2d 861.
Bills of Exception Nos. 8, 11, 12, 13, 19, 47, 61, and 95.
All of the defendants except Garner filed a motion for severance on the ground that interrogation of prospective jurors by counsel for Garner on the guilt or innocence of a bystander was prejudicial to the other defendants as creating an inference that they took an active part. The motion was overruled, and Bill No. 8 was reserved by these three defendants. Bills Nos. 11, 12, 13, 19, 47, and 61 were taken when one or another of the defendants exercised his right of peremptory challenge over the objection of another defendant who found the veniremen acceptable. Bill No. 95 was reserved to the overruling of the motion for a new trial based on Bills Nos. 11, 13, and 47.
Article 704 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that jointly indicted defendants may be tried separately or together. The initial election rests with the State, but the court may order a severance on motion of the defendant if satisfied that justice requires it. Severance is not a matter of right. The granting or refusal of a motion for severance is within the discretion of the trial judge, whose ruling will be disturbed on appeal only if there is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Vale, 252 La. 1056, 215 So.2d 811, reversed on other grounds, 399 U.S. 30, 90 S.Ct. 1969, 26 L.Ed.2d 409; and cases there cited.
The voir dire examination here by counsel for Garner on an issue particular to him did not constitute an injustice to the other defendants which would require us to disturb the trial court's ruling.
Defendants also assert that the joint trial prejudiced them in the selection of the jury. They suggest that several times during the trial one or more defendants accepted a juror only to have another defendant peremptorily challenge him. They submit that the effect of a joint trial is to deny them the assistance of counsel in violation of both the state and federal Constitutions.
In every joint trial each defendant is accorded a limited number of peremptory challenges and has the right to participate in the selection of the jury. See C.Cr.P. Art. 799. Since each defendant in a joint trial is granted the same number of challenges as he would receive in a separate trial, he is equally and sufficiently protected. A severance is not required merely because some potential jurors acceptable to one defendant may be challenged by another. The essential result is had in either a joint or a severed trial, for each defendant and all defendants are provided with a fair and impartial jury. If we were to hold to the contrary under this argument, a joint trial could never be had when opposed by one of the defendants.
Finally, it is asserted that the denial of the motion for severance deprived Garner of the right to compulsory process under the Sixth Amendment and equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. Specifically, he complains that the joint trial prevented him from calling his codefendant Shaffer as a witness in his behalf. He also complains in supplemental brief of denial of due process because he was jointly tried with the other defendants.
Bill of Exception No. 8, which was reserved to the refusal of the motion for severance, specifically excluded this complainant Garner, and he is therefore without standing to argue for a severance when he failed to timely move for such. Moreover, as to any of the defendants, the recitals of the bills of exception, upon which we must rely, indicate that the motion for severance contained no allegation concerning the use of a codefendant as a witness.
The trial judge has not abused his discretion in denying the motion for a severance. See State v. Vale, supra.
Bills of Exception Nos. 3, 10, 80, and 89.
These four bills were reserved during voir dire examination of prospective jurors when the trial judge refused to accept challenges for cause. Bill of Exception No. 80 was taken only by Shaffer, who did not exhaust his peremptory challenges, and it need not be considered for he cannot complain. Code of Criminal Procedure Article 800 reads in pertinent part: 'A defendant cannot complain of a ruling refusing to sustain a challenge for cause made by him, unless his peremptory challenges shall have been exhausted before the completion of the panel.' 1 Bills of Exception Nos. 3, 10, and 89 must be considered, however, since certain defendants who reserved these bills did exhaust their peremptory challenges.
Bill of Exception No. 89 was reserved by defendant Willis to the refusal to accept his challenge for cause of Howard E. Samuel. Since Willis had exhausted all of his peremptory challenges and Samuel was acceptable to the State and the other defendants, he became the twelfth member of the jury. The basis of the complaint was that Samuel could not be impartial as a result of the prejudicial voir dire questions asked by other defense counsel. The questions posed to Samuel dealt with hypothetical situations to illustrate the law that a bystander at the scene of a crime is not guilty of the crime and to ascertain his ability to accept that law. In the instances where the attorney attempted to use the defendants in this case in the illustrations, counsel for Willis objected, and the question was rephrased. There was never any mention of Willis particularly, and nothing in the juror Samuel's answers indicates that he could not act impartially toward all of the defendants. There is no merit in this bill.
Bill of Exception No. 3 was taken to the trial court's refusal to accept defendant Willis's challenge for cause when a prospective juror, Oscar L. Couvillion, in answer to the question propounded said that he thought innocent defendants should testify. In the per curiam to that bill the trial judge points out that Couvillion also said he could put aside his feelings and would accept the law as given by the court and apply it. There is no error in the judge's ruling. C.Cr.P. Art. 797(4).
Defendant Garner reserved Bill of Exception No. 10 when the trial judge refused to excuse prospective juror Lafayette Jarreau for cause. The defense asked the juror whether he would consider factual proof of unchastity in determining whether to return a qualified verdict of guilty without capital punishment. He replied that he did not consider chastity important in deciding whether to qualify the verdict. After a challenge for cause was denied, defendant Willis exercised a peremptory challenge.
We find no error in the ruling. The law provides no guidelines to control a juror's discretion in returning a verdict without capital punishment. State v. Henry, 197 La. 999, 3 So.2d 104. In their consideration of a qualified verdict, jurors are free of standards and criteria. Once guilt has been established, they have full discretion as to whether or not to dispense with capital punishment. The refusal of a prospective juror to commit himself in advance to give weight to any factor provides no ground for a challenge for cause.
In upholding the full-discretion rule, the United States Supreme Court in the recent case of McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 91 S.Ct. 1454, 1467, 28 L.Ed.2d 711, stated:
...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Waddell
... ... Upon consideration upon remand, the per curiam opinion of the Supreme Court of Louisiana contains the following: ... 'We construe the Mandate of the United States Supreme Court to require the imposition of a sentence other than death. Cf., State v. Shaffer, 260 La. 605, 257 So.2d 121 (1971) and State v. Duplessis, 260 La. 644, 257 So.2d 135 (1971) ... 'Accordingly, in compliance with the Mandate of the United States Supreme Court, the death sentence imposed upon defendant is annulled and set aside, and the case is remanded to the ... ...
-
State v. Atkins
... ... It is undisputed,[163 W.Va. 513] however, that the pathologist found that the victim's ... death was caused by five bullet wounds in the back ... A number of the State's witnesses testified that the victim, Mr. Joseph Shaffer, and the defendant together left a Clarksburg bar at approximately 9:00 p.m. on the evening of November 3, 1976. Shaffer had gone to the bar with a companion, a Mr. Wolfe, for the express purpose of finding the defendant. There was a history of prior business and gambling relations between ... ...
-
State v. Jenkins
... ... State v. Frierson, 302 So.2d 605 (La.1974); State v. Medlock, 297 So.2d 190 (La.1974); State v. Shaffer, 260 La. 605, 257 So.2d 121 (1971). In State v. Thibodeaux, 315 So.2d 769 (La.1975), we recently had occasion to overturn a trial judge's denial of a motion for severance. In Thibodeaux, Sallettes, a co-defendant in a possession with intent to distribute marijuana case, established by convincing ... ...
-
State v. Rideau, 2005-1470.
... ... Hundreds of lifers were released pursuant to this policy after serving ten years and six months, or some minimal additional time. This practice was so firmly entrenched as policy that a life sentence was universally spoken of as a "10/6" sentence. In State v. Shaffer, 260 La. 605, 257 So.2d 121, 134 (1971), Justice Sanders, dissenting from a majority opinion commuting three death sentences to life imprisonment, observed: "[A] death sentence is converted into one that really means imprisonment for only ten years and six months. No true life sentence exists in ... ...