State v. Shannon
| Decision Date | 01 August 1989 |
| Docket Number | 13388,Nos. 13387,s. 13387 |
| Parties | STATE of Connecticut v. Graylon SHANNON. |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
A. Paul Spinella, Bloomfield, for appellant (defendant).
John O'Meara, Deputy Asst. State's Atty., with whom were Warren Maxwell, Asst. State's Atty., and, on the brief, John M. Bailey, State's Atty., for appellee (state).
Before PETERS, C.J., and ARTHUR H. HEALEY, CALLAHAN, GLASS and SANTANIELLO, JJ.
The charges against the defendant, Graylon Shannon, stem from the murders of Gaspar Munoz on February 27, 1984, and Leon Walker on March 19, 1984. As to each of these incidents, the state charged the defendant with one count of murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a, 1 one count of felony murder in the course of committing a robbery in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54c, 2 one count of felony murder in the course of committing a kidnapping in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54c, and one count of conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-48 and 53a-134(a)(4). 3 After a jury trial, the defendant was found guilty on all counts in both cases, and received a total effective sentence of sixty years imprisonment.
On appeal, the defendant claims that this court should grant him a new trial on all of the convictions for the following reasons: (1) the state violated his constitutional rights under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), by failing to disclose exculpatory evidence; 4 (2) the trial court erred in finding probable cause in light of the fact that the subsequent trial testimony of the state's only eyewitness deviated from his probable cause testimony, and because the state failed to disclose material exculpatory evidence prior to the probable cause hearing; and because the state failed to disclose material exculpatory evidence prior to the probable cause hearing; and (3) the trial court's charge to the jury unfairly emphasized the state's evidence to such a degree that there was a reasonable possibility that the jury was misled. We find no error.
In regard to the murder of Gaspar Munoz, the jury could reasonably have found the following facts. At approximately 10 p.m., on February 27, 1984, Munoz left his cousin's home in Bloomfield. At 10:30 p.m., Munoz stopped his car at a Connecticut Bank and Trust office on Farmington Avenue in Hartford to use an automated teller machine. At the same time that Munoz was using the teller machine, the defendant, Ronnie Walker, Keith Johnson and Tyrone "Cowboy" Carmichael were riding along Farmington Avenue in Ronnie Walker's car with the avowed purpose of committing a robbery. When the occupants of the car noticed Munoz at the teller machine, the defendant told Ronnie Walker to pull over. The defendant and Carmichael then exited the car, grabbed Munoz from behind and took his money. They put Munoz in his own car and told Ronnie Walker to follow them in his car. The defendant drove Munoz to the area of Mark Twain Drive in Hartford. At this point, the defendant and Carmichael dragged Munoz out of his car and into a wooded area. The defendant then fatally shot Munoz in the back of the head.
In regard to the murder of Leon Walker, the jury could reasonably have found the following facts. In the early morning hours of March 19, 1984, Leon Walker was on duty as a cab driver for the Yellow Cab Company. At approximately 3:15 a.m. the company received a call from someone who wanted to be picked up at Hillside and Bonner Streets in Hartford and brought to Barbour Street in Hartford. The cab company dispatcher sent Leon Walker to respond to this call. At some point thereafter, the defendant and Johnson got into Leon Walker's cab. Ronnie Walker followed the cab in his car as the cab proceeded to the area of Pope Park in Hartford. In Pope Park, the cab stopped, and the defendant, Johnson and Leon Walker all got out. The defendant then threw Leon Walker against the cab. Leon Walker attempted to run. The defendant chased and caught him, however, and threw him against a fence. The defendant then fatally shot Leon Walker in the back of the head. The defendant and Johnson thereafter removed a cigar box from Leon Walker's cab, and returned to Ronnie Walker's car, whereupon the three men drove away.
The state's primary witnesses at trial were Edward Dailey, Michael Jiles and Ronnie Walker. Dailey testified that while he was in custody with the defendant in Hartford, in December, 1985, the defendant had told him not only that he was involved in both crimes, but that he had shot both Munoz and Leon Walker. Jiles testified that in January, 1986, while in custody in Hartford, he similarly had heard the defendant admit to his involvement in both crimes, and in particular to his shooting of both victims.
Ronnie Walker testified at trial that, on the night of the Munoz murder, he, the defendant, Johnson and Carmichael were driving in his car in Hartford for the express purpose of committing a robbery. He stated that the car's occupants noticed Munoz at a bank teller machine on Farmington Avenue, that the defendant and Carmichael got out of his car and forced Munoz into his own car, that the cars then were driven to an area off Mark Twain Drive, and that the defendant and Carmichael dragged Munoz out of his car and into a wooded area. In regard to the Leon Walker murder, Ronnie Walker testified that the defendant and Johnson got into Leon Walker's cab, that the cab then proceeded to an area in the south end of Hartford while he followed the cab in his own car, that the cab eventually stopped and Leon Walker attempted to run, and that the defendant chased after Leon Walker and eventually threw him up against a fence. Ronnie Walker further testified that after he had lost sight of the defendant and Leon Walker, he heard a gunshot, and the defendant then returned to view and got into his car with Johnson.
In addition, Jiles' and Dailey's testimony corroborated significant details described by Ronnie Walker in his trial testimony. For example, Jiles testified that the defendant stated that he and Carmichael forced Munoz into his own car and then told Ronnie Walker to follow them. Dailey testified that the defendant had told him that the cab driven by Leon Walker was driven to the area of Pope Park where the defendant thereafter shot him.
Ronnie Walker's trial testimony, however, contained numerous inconsistencies in relation to four statements he had previously given to the police and the state's attorney's office, and in relation to his testimony at the probable cause hearing. At the probable cause hearing Ronnie Walker stated that the four statements he previously had given were false and that his present testimony was the truth. He also testified at that hearing that he saw the defendant shoot and kill Leon Walker. He stated that on March 19, 1984, the date of Leon Walker's murder, he first encountered the defendant and Keith Johnson at the home of the defendant's sister, Vicky White, on Barbour Street in the north end of Hartford, and that White called for Leon Walker's cab from the Barbour Street address. Ronnie Walker further testified that after the defendant had entered the cab with Johnson outside the Barbour Street address, the defendant knocked out Leon Walker with a lug wrench. He stated that he followed the cab in his own car to the south end of Hartford, where he saw the defendant shoot Leon Walker after a brief scuffle in which Leon Walker had drawn a knife.
At trial, however, Ronnie Walker varied the details of his version of these events. In particular, he testified that the first time he saw the defendant and Johnson on the night of Leon Walker's murder was upon departing from a party in the south end of Hartford. He testified that he saw the defendant and Johnson already in Leon Walker's cab and that he followed the cab in his car to the spot where Leon Walker was killed. According to his trial testimony, however, he did not actually see the defendant pull the trigger, but instead saw the defendant and Leon Walker disappear from sight. He testified that he then heard a gunshot, that the defendant returned to view, and that the three men drove away. 5
Defense counsel brought out these and several other inconsistent statements on cross-examination. For example, Ronnie Walker contradicted at trial prior statements that an individual named William Johnson was involved in both murders. Regarding the Munoz murder, Ronnie Walker had stated previously that the defendant and Keith Johnson had forced Munoz into the car, rather than the defendant and Carmichael, as he testified at trial. Further, at one time he told investigators that he had actually witnessed the defendant shoot Munoz, whereas at trial he denied seeing the shooting. Regarding the Walker murder, he had previously disclosed that the call for Walker's cab had been made from the apartment of a woman named Brenda Browning, a claim he contradicted with one story at the probable cause hearing and yet another at trial. Further, he had also told police prior to trial that he had witnessed the defendant partially undress and sexually assault Leon Walker after the shooting, although at trial he had claimed that he had not witnessed such events. In all, defense counsel placed into evidence more than fifteen inconsistent statements in regard to Ronnie Walker's trial testimony.
In addition, the defendant called Leon Harris as a witness. Harris testified that in December, 1985, he overheard Ronnie Walker state that the defendant "didn't know nothing about" the murders but that he was "going along with it" because the defendant had been charged with the crimes. The defense also called Carmichael, who specifically denied any involvement in the crimes as testified to by Ronnie Walker.
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