State v. Shapiro
| Decision Date | 27 June 1917 |
| Docket Number | 37. |
| Citation | 101 A. 703,131 Md. 168 |
| Parties | STATE v. SHAPIRO. |
| Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Appeal from Criminal Court of Baltimore City; James P. Gorter Judge.
"To be officially reported."
Jacob S. Shapiro was indicted for dealing in junk without first having obtained a license. From a judgment discharging defendant, after his demurrer to the indictment had been sustained, the State appeals. Reversed, with costs, and new trial awarded.
Argued before BOYD, C.J., and BRISCOE, BURKE, THOMAS, PATTISON URNER, and STOCKBRIDGE, JJ.
Philip B. Perlman, of Baltimore, and Albert C. Ritchie, Atty. Gen (William F. Broening, State's Atty., Lindsay C. Spencer Asst. State's Atty., both of Baltimore, on the brief), for the State.
Henry M. Siegel, of Baltimore (Siegel & Siegel, of Baltimore, on the brief), for appellee.
The indictment in this case charges the defendant with unlawfully dealing in junk in Baltimore City without first taking out a license therefor as required by law. The statute alleged to be violated is the Act of 1916 (chapter 704, § 172), which, under the caption, "Junk Dealers," provides as follows:
"Each person, firm or corporation dealing in junk within this state shall pay for the privilege of conducting such business by first taking out an annual license therefor, for each place of business and paying the following license fee, namely: In cities or counties of 50,000 inhabitants or over, each, per annum, $30.00; in cities or counties of 10,000 to 50,000 inhabitants, each, per annum, $20.00; in cities or counties of 5,000 to 10,000 inhabitants, each, per annum, $10.00; in Baltimore City, $250.00."
By a later section of the act a fine of $100 is directed to be imposed for the failure of one engaged in the business to procure the requisite license.
A demurrer to the indictment disputes the validity of the statute on the following grounds: (1) That it violates the Fourteenth Amendment of the federal Constitution, by attempting an exercise of taxing power which unjustly, arbitrarily, and unreasonably discriminates against the defendant and all others similarly engaged in business in Baltimore City and in favor of other persons located elsewhere in the state, and which deprives the defendant and others in like situation of their liberty, property, and business without due process of law, and denies them also the equal protection of the law. (2) That the act violates the Constitution of Maryland for the reasons just stated, and also because the license required to be obtained by the defendant for his business in Baltimore City is an arbitrary and unequal tax imposed contrary to the fifteenth article of the Bill of Rights, and is not a lawful exercise of the police power. (3) That the license fee attempted to be levied upon the defendant is an abuse of the police power of the state, in that it is manifestly in excess of any legitimate charge for supervision or regulation of the business in which the defendant is engaged. (4) That there is no definition of the term "junk dealer" in the act, and no fixed or certain popular meaning of the term, and hence the act is void for uncertainty.
The appeal is by the state, and is from a judgment discharging the defendant, after his demurrer to the indictment had been sustained.
The license fee required by the act of 1916 to be paid by a dealer in junk "for the privilege of conducting such business" is a tax imposed upon an occupation. It is not a property tax to which the equality provision of article 15 of the Bill of Rights applies. It belongs to the class of taxes which that article permits to be "laid with a political view for the good government and benefit of the community." Ruggles v. State, 120 Md. 562, 87 A. 1080; State v. Applegarth, 81 Md. 300, 31 A. 961, 28 L. R. A. 812; Rohr v. Gray, 80 Md. 276, 30 A. 632.
The Legislature is under no constitutional obligation, either federal or state, to observe a definite rule of uniformity in the enactment of its license laws. It is not required to establish the same license system and regulations for all the interests and political divisions over which its authority extends. It has the right to make separate and different provisions for distinct classes and areas. The exercise of such power does not conflict with the constitutional right to the equal protection of the laws, or to due process of law, if the prescribed regulations operate equally and uniformly upon the class and within the area affected, and their limitations are not clearly unreasonable. These principles have been firmly settled by the decisions. Magoun v. Illinois Trust Co., 170 U.S. 283, 18 S.Ct. 594, 42 L.Ed. 1037; Budd v. New York, 143 U.S. 517, 12 S.Ct. 468, 36 L.Ed. 247; Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 5 S.Ct. 357, 28 L.Ed. 923; Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 395, 18 S.Ct. 383, 42 L.Ed. 780; German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Hale, 219 U.S. 307, 31 S.Ct. 246, 55 L.Ed. 229; Bowman v. Lewis, 101 U.S. 22, 25 L.Ed. 989; L'Hote v. New Orleans, 177 U.S. 587, 20 S.Ct. 788, 44 L.Ed. 899; Field v. Barber Asphalt Co., 194 U.S. 618, 24 S.Ct. 784, 48 L.Ed. 1142; Duncan v. Missouri, 152 U.S. 377, 14 S.Ct. 570, 38 L.Ed. 485; Amer. Coal Co. v. Allegany Co., 128 Md. 564, 98 A. 143; Mt. Vernon Co. v. Frankfort Co., 111 Md. 561, 75 A. 105, 134 Am. St. Rep. 636; Clark v. Harford Agr. Ass'n, 118 Md. 608, 85 A. 503; Criswell v. State, 126 Md. 103, 94 A. 549; Sweeten v. State, 122 Md. 634, 90 A. 180; State v. Broadbelt, 89 Md. 565, 43 A. 771, 45 L. R. A. 433, 73 Am. St. Rep. 201; Ruggles v. State, 120 Md. 561, 87 A. 1080.
The statute here in question provides different rates of license fees for the privilege of dealing in junk, according to the population of the county or city where the business is being conducted. In Baltimore City, in which approximately one-half of the inhabitants of the state reside, the rate is $250, while it ranges from $10 to $30 in the counties and other cities with their much smaller populations. There is nothing in the terms of the act, or in the record, to reflect upon the propriety of such a provision. It is in fact based upon an accepted theory of classification for license purposes. Commonwealth v. Danziger, 176 Mass. 290, 57 N.E. 461; Douglas v. People, 225 Ill. 536, 80 N.E. 341, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1116, 116 Am. St. Rep. 162. It must be presumed to be reasonable, in the absence of clear and conclusive indications to the contrary. Bachtel v. Wilson, 204 U.S. 36, 27 S.Ct. 243, 51 L.Ed. 357; Holden v. Hardy, supra; Mt. Vernon Co. v. Frankport Co., supra; Ruggles v. State, supra. Provision might have been made by independent local laws for the licensing of junk dealers in one or more of the political subdivisions of the state. The courts would not be justified in declaring such statutes invalid merely because they were of local application or divergent in their terms. If this were a proper ground upon which to defeat an act of assembly, the validity of much important local legislation might be successfully disputed. As this court had occasion to say in Stevens v. State, 89 Md. 674, 43 A. 931:
"It has long been the policy of the state of Maryland to enact local laws affecting only certain...
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