State v. Shaw, A-33/34 September Term 2016
| Citation | 237 N.J. 588,207 A.3d 229 |
| Decision Date | 13 May 2019 |
| Docket Number | A-33/34 September Term 2016,078247 |
| Parties | STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Respondent/Cross-Appellant, v. Nathan N. SHAW, a/k/a Dion Shaw, a/k/a Leroy Anderson, Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Respondent. State of New Jersey, Plaintiff, v. Keon L. Bolden, Defendant. |
| Court | New Jersey Supreme Court |
Margaret McLane, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant/cross-respondent (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Margaret McLane, of counsel and on the briefs).
Frank Muroski, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent/cross-appellant (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney; Frank Muroski and Jenny M. Hsu, Deputy Attorney General, of counsel and on the briefs).
Alexander Shalom argued the cause for amicus curiae American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey Foundation and Rutgers Constitutional Rights Clinic Center for Law and Justice, attorneys; Alexander Shalom, Edward L. Barocas and Jeanne M. LoCicero, of counsel and on the briefs, and Ronald K. Chen on the briefs).
This appeal concerns a cascade of missteps by police, resulting in several constitutional violations. The case begins with the warrantless search of a motel room, followed by the extended detention of automobile passengers without reasonable suspicion. One defendant then involuntarily consents to a search of an automobile, culminating in the warrantless search of a tote bag found in the car in which another defendant was a passenger. The State raises a number of well-expressed arguments in support of the admissibility of the evidence obtained from the searches. Nevertheless, the record before us compels the suppression of all evidence seized.
To provide an overview, we will begin our analysis by considering the application of the third-party intervention doctrine -- a recognition that law enforcement need not obtain a warrant to "reexamine property that has been searched by a private actor and presented to law enforcement" under certain circumstances, State v. Wright, 221 N.J. 456, 479, 114 A.3d 340 (2015) -- to the warrantless search of a motel room. Next, we examine whether a confession spontaneously made during an extended detention not predicated on individualized reasonable suspicion must be suppressed under the circumstances. Thereafter, we review the events surrounding the search of a tote bag and assess whether a passenger had standing to challenge the search of a tote bag that ultimately proved to belong to another passenger. We consider whether the principles of the trespasser and abandoned property exceptions to automatic standing apply under these circumstances, and whether the driver's consent to the vehicle search justified the search of the tote bag. Lastly, we address the applicability of the inevitable discovery doctrine and independent source rule to this case.
For the reasons stated below, we hold that the police's warrantless search of the motel room ran afoul of the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 7 of the New Jersey Constitution. We further find the third-party intervention doctrine does not apply to motel rooms and that the State's warrantless entry into the room was unlawful. We also find the defendant's extended detention constituted a de facto arrest and that the State failed to show his confession was not a by-product of that arrest. Concerning the tote bag, we find defendant had automatic standing, the trespass and abandoned property exceptions do not apply, and the State failed to show the voluntariness of the driver's consent. Finally, we will not apply the inevitable discovery or independent source exceptions to the exclusionary rule because on remand the State chose not to develop the record on those issues.
With that, we find defendant's confession and the drug evidence must be suppressed.
The facts are culled from the testimony elicited at the suppression hearing. Florida resident Jasmine Hanson was staying at the Crystal Inn motel in Neptune City, New Jersey. She called the front desk to complain she had been bitten by bed bugs and demanded a full refund. She was referred to the motel's owner. Later that afternoon, the motel owner inspected Hanson's room. When no one answered his knocks, he entered her room using his pass key. In search of bed bugs, the motel owner pulled a bed comforter down, revealing a plastic bag containing what he suspected were narcotics. The motel owner called the police and reported his suspicion.
Upon his arrival, Officer Jason Rademacher had the motel owner lead him to Hanson's room where, again using his pass key, the motel owner unlocked the door for the officer to enter. Inside, Rademacher saw a clear plastic bag containing what appeared to him to be two other clear plastic bags of crack cocaine and several small glassine bags of heroin. Nearby, the officer saw a jar of what he suspected was synthetic marijuana on the nightstand and a glass measuring cup containing a spoon and a white, rock-like substance in a drawer.
Next to the measuring cup was a black scale dusted with a white powder.
Rademacher contacted his supervisor, who sent Sergeant William Kirchner to the motel as backup. The officer requested a criminal history check on Hanson. It revealed an outstanding traffic warrant and a recently issued traffic summons on a 2012 black Chevrolet Tahoe, and its plate number. Rademacher collected all the drug evidence and photographed Hanson's motel room.
Rademacher transported the evidence to the station and returned in an unmarked vehicle to wait for Hanson's arrival. Shortly thereafter, the black Tahoe pulled into a parking space. The front passenger, Keon Bolden, immediately exited the vehicle. Rademacher drew his weapon and, keeping it at his side, ordered Bolden back into the Tahoe. Hanson was in the driver's seat. In the back seat were Shakera Dickerson and Nathan Shaw. Rademacher stood by the driver's door awaiting backup.
At least three units arrived on the scene. Hanson produced her license and the Tahoe's rental agreement. Rademacher informed Hanson she had an active warrant and arrested her. The police patted Hanson down, handcuffed her, and placed her in the back of a patrol car. The officer asked to search the Tahoe; Hanson refused consent. Rademacher and Kirchner explained that a drug-detection canine would be brought to perform an exterior sniff of the vehicle. Hanson did not change her mind. Rademacher testified that they waited until all of the occupants of the Tahoe were removed from the vehicle before they requested the canine. The canine's handler testified that when he arrived there were still occupants in the vehicle, and he had to wait for them to be removed before he could conduct the exterior sniff. The trial court adopted the handler's narrative, while the Appellate Division endorsed the officer's version of events.
The officers conducted warrant checks on the remaining passengers. Only Dickerson's warrant check came back positive. She was arrested and placed in a second patrol car. Shaw and Bolden were patted down and each seated in separate patrol cars, uncuffed.
The canine's handler attempted to explain the sniff procedure to Hanson; Hanson refused to speak to him and again refused to consent to a search of the vehicle. The handler led the canine to the Tahoe. During the sniff, Shaw told an officer that he had a bag of marijuana in the car. The canine alerted to the presence of narcotics. Shaw was arrested. An officer told Hanson that Shaw admitted he had marijuana in the vehicle and, at that point, she consented to the vehicle search. She signed a consent-to-search form, but did not initial the line attesting that she gave her consent free of coercion.
Rademacher searched the car, immediately finding the brown bag containing marijuana. Meanwhile, other officers found a bag of synthetic marijuana and a box of plastic bags in the center console. On the backseat, in between where Dickerson and Shaw were sitting, Rademacher found a green and white tote bag. From inside the tote bag he recovered 113 stamped glassine bags of heroin, a plastic bag containing suspected crack cocaine, and a purse in which he found a plastic bag of what appeared to be marijuana. Twenty-four of the glassine bags of heroin were stamped in red ink with the phrase "Limit 50." That mark resembled the stamp found on the glassine bags of heroin in Hanson's motel room.
Laboratory testing confirmed the suspected drugs were marijuana, crack cocaine, and heroin. All four passengers were charged with multiple counts of possession and possession with intent to distribute the drugs found in both the motel room and the tote bag.
All defendants moved before the Superior Court, Law Division to suppress the drug evidence seized from the motel room and the Tahoe.
After finding that the charged defendants had automatic standing to challenge the search, the motion court denied their suppression motion with the following findings:
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