State v. Shaw

• Decision Date: 26 April 1892
• Citation: 29 P. 1028,22 Or. 287
• Parties: STATE v. SHAW.
• Court: Oregon Supreme Court

29 P. 1028

22 Or. 287

STATE v. SHAW.

Supreme Court of Oregon

April 26, 1892

Appeal from circuit court, Marion county; R.P. BOISE, Judge.

Prosecution of John A. Shaw for depositing sawdust and lumber waste into the Santiam river. From a judgment sustaining a demurrer to the indictment, the state appeals. Reversed.

Geo. E Chamberlain, Atty.Gen., and G.G. Bingham, Dist.Atty., for the State.

Tilmon Ford and Wm. M. Kaiser, for respondent.

BEAN J.

The defendant was indicted for unlawfully discharging and depositing sawdust, planer shavings, and other lumber waste made by a sawmill, into the water of the Santiam river, in violation of section 8 of an act entitled "An act to protect salmon and other food fishes in the state of Oregon and upon all waters upon which this state has concurrent jurisdiction, and to repeal sections 3489, 3490, 3491, 3492, 3493, 3494, 3495, 3496, 3497, and 3498 of Hill's Annotated Laws of Oregon," approved February 16, 1891. To the indictment a demurrer was sustained by the court below, for the reason that it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a crime, and the indictment dismissed, from which judgment the state appeals. To sustain the rulings of the court below, it is contended that the section under which defendant was indicted is unconstitutional and void, because in violation of section 20, art. 4, of the constitution which provides that "every act shall embrace but one subject, and matters properly connected therewith, which subject shall be expressed in the title." The history and object of this constitutional provision, and the mischief against which it was aimed, should be kept steadily in view by the courts in its construction and application. It was intended to prevent the practice common in legislative bodies not thus restricted of embracing in the bill matters having no relation to each other, wholly incongruous, and of which the title gives no notice, thus securing the adoption of measures by fraud, and without attracting attention, or combining subjects representing diverse interests, in order to unite the members of the legislature who favored either in support of all. These combinations, being corruptive of the legislature and dangerous to the state, are prohibited in most, if not all, the states by constitutional provisions similar to ours. Suth. St. & Const.

Law, § 78; COOLEY, Const. Lim. *142. This provision of the constitution was not designed to embarrass legislation, but to put an end to legislation of the vicious character referred to, and has been always liberally construed to sustain legislation not within the mischief. A reasonable construction permits the single subject to be comprehensive enough for practical purposes, and great latitude is allowed the legislature in stating the subject in the title. It was not designed to require the body of the bill to be a mere repetition of the title. Neither is it intended to prevent including in the bill such means as are reasonably adapted to secure the object indicated in the title. It was intended, as said by Mr. Justice COOLEY, "to require that in every case the proposed measure should stand upon its own merits, and that the legislature should be fairly notified of its design when required to pass upon it. But this purpose is fully accomplished when the law has but one general object, which is fairly indicated by its title. To require that every end and means necessary to the accomplishment of this general object should be provided for by a separate act, relating to that alone, would not only be senseless, but would render legislation impossible." People v. Mahaney, 13 Mich. 494. It is not directed against the generality or comprehensiveness of the title to legislative enactments, nor does it require that the title shall index the details of the act. If the title covers the object of the act, the degree of particularity with which it shall be expressed or set out is for the legislature to determine. A disregard of this constitutional provision will be fatal, but the departure must be plain and manifest, and all doubts will be resolved in favor of the law. The conflict between the constitution and the law should be palpable and clear before the courts should disregard a legislative enactment upon the sole ground that it embraces more than one subject. Suth. St. & Const.Law, § 82. If all the provisions of the law relate directly or indirectly to the same subject, are naturally connected, and are not foreign to the subject expressed in the title, they will not be held unconstitutional, as in violation of this clause of the constitution. O'Keefe v. Weber, 14 Or. 55, 12 P. 74; Bowan v. Cockrill, 6 Kan. 311; Coal Co. v. Brown, 13 Ky. 681; Association v. Robinson, 69 Ala. 413; State v. County Judge, 2 Iowa, 280; Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 2 S.Ct. 391; Cole v. Hall, 103 Ill. 30; Gillitt v. McCarthy, 34 Minn. 318, 25 N.W. 637; Brewster v. City of Syracuse, 19 N.Y. 116; Krutz v. People, 33 Mich. 279; Burnside v. Lincoln County Court, 86 Ky. 423, 6 S.W.Rep. 276; Hall v. Bunte, 20 Ind. 304. This clause is not violated by any legislative act having various details properly pertinent and germane to one general object. The question is whether, taking from the title the subject, we can find anything in the bill which cannot be referred to that subject.

The general object and purpose of the...