State v. Shawn G., AC 42617

• Court: Appellate Court of Connecticut
• Writing for the Court: ELGO, J.
• Citation: 262 A.3d 835,208 Conn.App. 154
• Decision Date: 05 October 2021
• Docket Number: AC 42617
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. SHAWN G.

208 Conn.App. 154
262 A.3d 835

STATE of Connecticut
v.
SHAWN G.^*

AC 42617

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued December 2, 2020
Officially released October 5, 2021

262 A.3d 840

Pamela S. Nagy, assistant public defender, for the appellant (defendant).

Timothy J. Sugrue, assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Michael A. Gailor, state's attorney, and Russell C. Zentner, senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

Bright, C.J., and Elgo and Moll, Js.

ELGO, J.

208 Conn.App. 156

The defendant, Shawn G., appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of one count of possession of narcotics with intent to sell by a person who is not drug-dependent in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 2017) § 21a-278 (b),¹ one count of criminal possession of a revolver in violation of General Statutes § 53a-217c (a) (1), and one count of risk

208 Conn.App. 157

of injury to a child in violation of General Statutes § 53-21 (a) (1). On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to sustain his conviction of each of the three counts, and (2) the trial court violated his sixth amendment right to compulsory process by declining to issue a capias that he requested. We affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the trial court.

At trial, the jury was presented with evidence of the following facts. The defendant lived in the first floor apartment of a two-story, multifamily house at 215 Pearl Street in Middletown (apartment). He shared the apartment with his wife and his two stepchildren—a sixteen year old boy and a twelve year old girl. On May 31, 2017, officers from the Middletown Police Department executed a search warrant on the defendant's apartment. When they arrived at the apartment, they observed the defendant and another male standing in the street. The police then went to the apartment, where the defendant's wife answered the door. The defendant's stepchildren were in the apartment at that time. During the search of the apartment, the

262 A.3d 841

officers found, among other things, crack cocaine and a revolver.

The defendant subsequently was arrested and charged with the aforementioned offenses. A trial followed, at the conclusion of which the jury found the defendant guilty of all counts. The defendant thereafter pleaded guilty to being a persistent serious felony offender in violation of General Statutes § 53a-40 (c). On October 3, 2018, the court sentenced the defendant to a total effective term of twenty years of incarceration, execution suspended after twelve years, plus five years of probation.² This appeal followed.

208 Conn.App. 158

I

The defendant claims that the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to establish his guilt for each of the three offenses of which he was convicted. The state concedes that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction of risk of injury to a child but contends that the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction of criminal possession of a revolver and possession of narcotics with intent to sell by a person who is not drug-dependent. We agree with the state.

As this court has observed, "[a] defendant who asserts an insufficiency of evidence claim bears an arduous burden." State v. Hopkins , 62 Conn. App. 665, 669-70, 772 A.2d 657 (2001). "In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we apply a two part test. First, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict. Second, we determine whether upon the facts so construed and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom the [jury] reasonably could have concluded that the cumulative force of the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt .... This court cannot substitute its own judgment for that of the jury if there is sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict. ...

"While the jury must find every element proven beyond a reasonable doubt in order to find the defendant guilty of the charged offense, each of the basic and inferred facts underlying those conclusions need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. ... If it is reasonable and logical for the jury to conclude that a basic fact or an inferred fact is true, the jury is permitted to consider the fact proven and may consider it in combination with other proven facts in determining whether the cumulative effect of all the evidence proves the defendant guilty of all the elements of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. ... On appeal, we do not

208 Conn.App. 159

ask whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that would support a reasonable hypothesis of innocence. We ask, instead, whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that supports the jury's verdict of guilty." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Capasso , 203 Conn. App. 333, 338–39, 248 A.3d 58, cert. denied, 336 Conn. 939, 249 A.3d 352 (2021).

A

The defendant first claims that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of criminal possession of a revolver in violation of § 53a-217c (a) (1). Although he concedes that he had knowledge of the revolver, the defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to prove that he exercised dominion or control over it. The state counters that, because the defendant

262 A.3d 842

admitted that he owned the revolver and the evidence supported a finding that he lived at the apartment and shared the bedroom where the revolver was found, the jury reasonably could have concluded that the defendant had dominion and control over it. We agree with the state.

The following additional facts are relevant to this claim. While searching the bedroom of the apartment, Detective Daniel Schreiner found a loaded Taurus .38 special revolver and $2661 in cash inside a stackable drawer. The uniform arrest report, which the defendant signed while being processed, listed the apartment as his address. Subsequently, the police questioned the defendant at the Middletown police station. At that time, the defendant waived his Miranda³ rights in writing. During questioning by detectives, the defendant stated that the revolver was his and that he had purchased it for $800 because he needed it to protect his family.

208 Conn.App. 160

Section 53a-217c (a) provides in relevant part: "A person is guilty of criminal possession of a pistol or revolver when such person possesses a pistol or revolver, as defined in section 29-27, and (1) has been convicted of a felony ...."⁴ General Statutes § 53a-3 (2) defines "possess" as "to have physical possession or otherwise to exercise dominion or control over tangible property ...." Because the gun was not found on the defendant's person, the state prosecuted the defendant under the theory of constructive possession.

As our Supreme Court recently explained, "there are two kinds of possession, actual and constructive. ... [C]onstructive possession is possession without direct physical contact. ... To establish constructive possession, the control must be exercised intentionally and with knowledge of the character of the controlled object. ... Moreover, [when] the defendant is not in exclusive possession of the premises where the [contraband is] found, it may not be inferred that [the defendant] knew of the presence of the [contraband] and had control of [it], unless there are other incriminating statements or circumstances tending to buttress such an inference. ... [A]lthough mere presence is not enough to support an inference of dominion or control, [when] there are other pieces of evidence tying the defendant to dominion [or] control, the [finder of fact is] entitled to consider the fact of [the defendant's] presence and to draw inferences from that presence and the other circumstances linking [the defendant] to the crime. ...

"[A] case for constructive possession of a firearm often is necessarily built on inferences, and a jury may draw whatever inferences from the evidence or facts established by the evidence it deems to be reasonable

208 Conn.App. 161

and logical. ... Although [p]roof of a material fact by inference from circumstantial evidence need not be so conclusive as to exclude every other hypothesis ... it must suffice to produce in the mind of the trier a reasonable belief in the probability of the existence of the material fact. ... [I]f the correlation between the facts and the conclusion is slight, or if a different conclusion is more closely correlated with the facts than the chosen conclusion, the inference is less reasonable. At some point, the link between the facts and the conclusion becomes so tenuous that we call it speculation. ... Therefore, [b]ecause [t]he only kind of an inference recognized by the law is a reasonable one ... any such inference cannot be based on possibilities, surmise or

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