State v. Shedroi

• Decision Date: 16 May 1903
• Citation: 54 A. 1081,75 Vt. 277
• Court: Vermont Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE v. SHEDROI.

54 A. 1081

75 Vt. 277

STATE

v. SHEDROI.

Supreme Court of Vermont. Caledonia.

May 16, 1903.

Exceptions from Caledonia County Court; Watson, Judge.

Information against Albert Shedroi for peddling without a license. Demurrer overruled pro forma, and information adjudged sufficient. The respondent brings exceptions. Reversed.

Argued before TYLER, MUNSON, START, WATSON, STAFFORD, and HASELTON, JJ.

M. G. Morse, State's Atty., for the State.

G. C. Frye, for respondent.

WATSON, J. The respondent is informed against for becoming a peddler without a license in force, under the provisions of V. S. c. 198, as amended by No. 94, p. 66, Laws 1900, and the case is here upon demurrer to the information. It is contended that the law upon which this information is based is in conflict with the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

That the license fee required to be paid under the provisions of this chapter for the privilege of selling goods as a peddler is a tax upon the goods themselves was determined by this court in State v. Hoyt, 71 Vt. 59, 42 Atl. 973. In that case the law was held to discriminate unjustly against goods manufactured in this state, and for that reason unconstitutional. Later the law was so amended as to avoid such discrimination. Laws 1900, p. 66, No. 94. V. S. 4732, provides that a person who becomes a peddler without a license in force as provided in that chapter (198) shall be fined not more than $300 and not less than $50. By V. S. 4733, persons resident of this state who served as soldiers in the war for the suppression of the Rebellion in the Southern States, and were honorably discharged, are exempt from the payment of a license tax under the provisions of that chapter. It is urged that herein the law unjustly discriminates in favor of such soldiers and against other persons, by reason of which it is in violation of the fourteenth amendment, whereby no state can "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Can such an exemption be made by the Legislature without affecting the validity of the general provisions of that chapter? Is the question. In Bell's Gap R. R. Go. v. Penn., 134 U. S. 232, 10 Sup. Ct. 533, 33 L. Ed. 892, speaking through Mr. Justice Bradley, the court said: "The provision of the fourteenth amendment that no state shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws was not intended to prevent a state from adjusting its system of taxation in all proper and reasonable ways. It may, if it chooses, exempt certain classes of property from any taxation at all, such as churches, libraries, and the property of charitable institutions; it may impose different specific taxes upon different trades and professions, and may vary the rates of excise upon various products; it may tax real estate and personal property in a different manner; it may tax visible property only, and not tax securities for payment of money; it may allow deductions for indebtedness or not allow them. All such regulations, and those of like character, so long as they proceed within reasonable limits and general usage, are within the discretion of the state Legislature, or the people of the state in framing their Constitution. But clear and hostile discriminations against particular persons and classes, especially such as are of an unusual character, unknown to the practice of our governments, might be obnoxious to the constitutional prohibition. It would, however, be impossible and unwise to attempt to lay down any general rule or definition on the subject that would include all cases. They must be decided as they arise. We think we are safe in saying that the fourteenth amendment was not intended to compel a state to adopt any iron rule of equal taxation." And in Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27, 5 Sup. Ct. 357, 28 L. Ed. 923, the court, speaking through Mr. Justice Field, said this amendment, "in declaring that no state 'shall deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,' undoubtedly intended not only that there should be no arbitrary deprivation of life or liberty, or arbitrary spoliation of property, but that equal protection and security should be given to all under like circumstances in the enjoyment of their personal and civil rights; that all persons should be equally entitled to pursue their happiness and acquire and enjoy property; that they should have like access to the courts of the country for the protection of their persons and property, the prevention and redress of wrongs, and the enforcement of contracts; that no impediment should be interposed to the pursuits of any one except as applied to the same pursuits by others under like circumstances; that no greater burdens should be laid upon one than are laid upon others in the same calling and condition; and that in the administration of criminal justice no different or higher punishment should be imposed upon one than such as is prescribed to all for like offenses." And in Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Savings Bank, 170 U. S. 283, 18 Sup. Ct. 594, 42 L. Ed. 1037, it is said that the rule only prescribes that the "law have the attribute of equality of operation; and equality of operation does not mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely, as such, but on persons according to their relation." Such is the rule laid down by this court in State v. Hoyt, above cited. It was there held that the mere fact of classification is not enough to exempt the operation of the statute from the equality clause of the Constitution, but that it must also appear that the classification made is one based upon some reasonable ground, some difference which bears a just and proper relation to the attempted classification, and not a mere arbitrary...