State v. Sheldon, Cr. N
Citation | 312 N.W.2d 367 |
Decision Date | 16 November 1981 |
Docket Number | Cr. N |
Parties | STATE of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Gary SHELDON, Defendant and Appellee. o. 776. |
Court | United States State Supreme Court of North Dakota |
John Romanick, States Atty., Washburn, for plaintiff and appellant; argued by Romanick.
Lundberg, Conmy, Nodland, Lucas & Schulz, Bismarck, for defendant and appellee; argued by Irvin B. Nodland, Bismarck.
This is an appeal by the State of North Dakota, through the McLean County States Attorney, from the May 5, 1981, order of the District Court of McLean County reducing, under Rule 35, N.D.R.Crim.P., the sentence previously imposed upon the defendant, Gary Sheldon, on his conviction for reckless endangerment. We affirm.
The incident leading to Sheldon's conviction occurred on March 19, 1979, when Deputy Sheriffs James Anderson and Douglas Kresbach responded to a request from Sheldon's wife for assistance relating to a domestic disturbance at the Sheldon's mobile home. Upon their arrival Mrs. Sheldon told the deputies that Sheldon had been drinking and had been using physical force against members of the family. The deputies assured Mrs. Sheldon that they would protect her until she could safely leave the mobile home. The ensuing events culminated with Gary firing a shot from a gun resulting in bullet fragments passing through the walls of the mobile home and striking Deputy Anderson in his stomach and hands. Deputy Anderson's resulting wounds were not fatal, and Gary was subsequently charged with attempted murder. During the trial, the court submitted instructions to the jury on the offenses of aggravated assault, simple assault, and reckless endangerment as well as on the offense of attempted murder. The jury returned a verdict of guilty on the offense of reckless endangerment, for which the court subsequently sentenced Gary to a two-year term of incarceration in the State Penitentiary with one year suspended for a period of two years upon his serving one year.
Gary appealed his conviction, and it was affirmed by this Court in State v. Sheldon, 301 N.W.2d 604 (N.D.1980). He also filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court which was denied. Thereafter, on March 31, 1981, Gary filed a motion for reduction of sentence under Rule 35, N.D.R.Crim.P. By order dated May 5, 1981, the trial court granted Gary's motion for reduction of sentence and suspended the entire two-year term of incarceration at the State Penitentiary for a period of two years upon certain conditions imposed by the court.
On appeal the State has raised the following issues:
(1) Whether or not the two-year suspended sentence imposed upon Gary is an illegal sentence in violation of Section 12.1-32-02.1, N.D.C.C., which requires that one who, in the course of committing a class C felony, inflicts bodily injury upon another with a firearm must be sentenced to a two-year term of imprisonment and serve such term without benefit of parole; and
(2) Whether or not the trial court abused its discretion upon granting Gary's motion for a reduction of sentence under Rule 35, N.D.R.Crim.P.
In State v. Rueb, 249 N.W.2d 506 (N.D.1976), this Court held that the State has a right to appeal from a trial court's order modifying a sentence under Rule 35, N.D.R.Crim.P., which rule provides:
On appeal the State asserts that the trial court's modified sentence is an illegal sentence in violation of Section 12.1-32-02.1, N.D.C.C., which provides:
"12.1-32-02.1 Minimum prison terms for armed offenders. Notwithstanding any other provisions of this title, minimum terms of imprisonment shall be imposed upon an offender and served without benefit of parole when, in the course of committing an offense, he inflicts or attempts to inflict bodily injury upon another, or threatens or menaces another with imminent bodily injury with a dangerous weapon, an explosive, or a firearm. Such minimum penalties shall apply only when possession of a dangerous weapon, an explosive, or a firearm has been charged and admitted or found to be true in the manner provided by law, and shall be imposed as follows:
1. If the offense for which the offender is convicted is a class A or class B felony, the court shall impose a minimum sentence of four years' imprisonment.
2. If the offense for which the offender is convicted is a class C felony, the court shall impose a minimum sentence of two years' imprisonment."
The State asserts that the provisions of the foregoing section require that Gary serve a minimum sentence of two years imprisonment. We conclude that the provisions of Section 12.1-32-02.1, N.D.C.C., do not apply to the instant case.
It is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that penal statutes should be strictly construed against the government or parties seeking to impose them and in favor of persons on whom they are sought to be imposed. See, 3 Sutherland Statutory Construction, § 59.03 (4th Ed. 1974). In this regard, we agree with the following statement of the Minnesota Supreme Court in State v. Simmons, 258 N.W.2d 908 (Minn.1977):
By its expressed terms, Section 12.1-32-02.1, N.D.C.C., provides:
"Such minimum penalties shall apply only when possession of a dangerous weapon, an explosive, or a firearm has been charged and admitted or found to be true in the manner provided by law, ..."
We construe the foregoing provision to mean that Section 12.1-32-02.1, N.D.C.C., applies only if the possession of a dangerous weapon, an explosive, or a firearm is an essential element of the crime committed or if the trier of fact makes a special finding that in the course of committing the offense the accused was in possession of a dangerous weapon, an explosive, or a firearm.
In the instant case, Gary was convicted of the offense of reckless endangerment. Possession of a weapon or firearm is not an element of the offense of reckless endangerment. See, State v. Kroeplin, 266 N.W.2d 537 (N.D.1978). The trial court, in its instructions to the jury on the charge of reckless endangerment, made no reference to the use or possession by Gary of a weapon or firearm. Furthermore, the jury was not requested to, nor did it, make a special finding with regard to the use or possession of a firearm by Gary. Accordingly, we hold that the provisions of Section 12.1-32-02.1, N.D.C.C., do not apply to the instant case because possession of a dangerous weapon, an explosive, or a firearm is not an essential element of the offense of reckless endangerment and because the jury, as trier of fact, did not make a special finding with regard to possession of a firearm by Gary in the course of committing the offense of reckless endangerment.
We believe the decision of the Iowa Supreme Court in State v. Iowa District Court for Shelby County, 308 N.W.2d 27 (Iowa 1981), although involving a mandatory minimum sentence provision containing language different from that of Section 12.1-32-02.1, N.D.C.C., supports our interpretation of the North Dakota statute.
The mandatory minimum sentence provision of the Iowa Code, Section 902.7, provides:
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...of committing the offense, the accused was in possession of a dangerous weapon, an explosive, or a firearm. See, e.g., State v. Sheldon, 312 N.W.2d 367, 370 (N.D.1981). This result was also called for by the statute, which specifically provides the mandatory prison terms apply "only when po......
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