State v. Shelnutt
Decision Date | 04 October 2022 |
Docket Number | A22A1085 |
Citation | 365 Ga.App. 498,879 S.E.2d 510 |
Parties | The STATE v. SHELNUTT. |
Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
John Herbert Cranford Jr., District Attorney, Newnan, Jessica Leigh Williams-Vickery, Assistant District Attorney, for Appellant.
Monte Kevin Davis, Atlanta, for Appellee.
Phipps, Senior Appellate Judge.
Following a jury trial, Darrell Reed Shelnutt was found guilty of two counts each of aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer and interference with government property. Shelnutt timely filed a motion for new trial, as amended, which the trial court granted after determining that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by (a) failing to object to testimony that lacked proper foundation, (b) failing to call an expert or other witnesses in support of his defense, (c) leaving the jury with the impression that Shelnutt had a criminal history, and (d) negatively characterizing Shelnutt during his closing argument. On appeal, the State argues that the trial court erred in concluding that Shelnutt's trial counsel performed deficiently and that prejudice resulted from the deficient performance. As explained below, we agree and therefore reverse the order granting Shelnutt a new trial.
The record shows that on August 23, 2018, Shelnutt and his mother-in-law, G. T., were at a property owned by G. T.’s daughter/Shelnutt's wife. At the time, Shelnutt had been living in a residence on the property, and G. T. wanted to evict him. While Shelnutt was loading up his truck to move, he got into a physical altercation with G. T. Following the altercation, G. T. called 911 for assistance, and Shelnutt left. Two sheriff's deputies arrived, parked on the property, exited their vehicles, and began speaking with G. T. Moments later, Shelnutt came "flying up" the driveway in a Ford F-150 truck. According to one of the deputies, as Shelnutt's truck approached the property, he did not apply the brakes and "revved [the] engine the entire time." The deputies and G. T. ran into the yard, while Shelnutt drove his truck into the back of one of the deputies’ vehicles, pushing that vehicle into the back of the other deputy's vehicle. As a result, both vehicles were extensively damaged. Shelnutt exited his truck, appeared to grab a gun, ran and barricaded himself inside the residence, and yelled out a window that he was "not going down without a fight." The deputies called for backup, and a response team arrived at the property. Unbeknownst to the deputies and the response team, Shelnutt had fled the residence. He was later located and arrested approximately one mile from the property with six bullets in his pocket.
Following his arrest, law enforcement interviewed Shelnutt. The investigating officer testified that, during the interview, Shelnutt stated that he was angry about G. T. evicting him. The officer further testified that when asked why he drove his truck into the deputies’ vehicles, Shelnutt stated that "[the] County made [him] do it" and that "it got the officer[s’] attention, didn't it?" When asked whether Shelnutt saw the deputies and where they were located, the investigator testified that Shelnutt told him that he had, but he "locked the brakes up" while driving up the driveway. According to the investigating officer, Shelnutt became irate when questioned about why there were no skid marks at the scene, so the officer changed his line of questioning.
In January 2019, Shelnutt was indicted on two counts each of aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer and interference with government property, and the case proceeded to a jury trial. At trial, the State presented the testimony of G. T. and eight law enforcement officers, including a Georgia State Patrol officer who was trained in crash scene investigation and who wrote a crash scene investigation report and the officer who interviewed Shelnutt following his arrest. The officer who wrote the crash scene investigation report testified that there was no evidence that Shelnutt applied his brakes before colliding with the deputies’ vehicles. The State also introduced dash cam video recording from the deputy's vehicle, a video recording of Shelnutt's in-custody interview, and photographs of the damaged vehicles.
Shelnutt called two witnesses in his defense — an eyewitness, A. M., and his nephew, J. B. — to offer testimony that the collision was not intentional. While Shelnutt did not testify, in his cross-examination of the State's witnesses and closing argument, Shelnutt's counsel took the position that the State's case fell short of proving that Shelnutt acted with intent when he crashed into the deputies’ vehicles. During closing argument, the State contended that the evidence showed that Shelnutt intentionally drove his truck toward the deputies and into their vehicles. The jury found Shelnutt guilty on all counts. Shelnutt was then sentenced to ten years, to serve the first three years in confinement and the remainder on probation.
Following sentencing, Shelnutt moved for a new trial, asserting several claims of error, including that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance. The court held a hearing on the motion, found that Shelnutt had received ineffective assistance of counsel, and granted Shelnutt a new trial. The State appeals, contending that the trial court erred in granting a new trial because Shelnutt did not carry his burden of demonstrating that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance. For the reasons that follow, we agree.
In determining whether Shelnutt received ineffective assistance of counsel, we apply the two-pronged test set out in Strickland v. Washington , 466 U. S. 668, 687 (III), 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). See Harris v. State , 313 Ga. 225, 234 (5), 869 S.E.2d 461 (2022).
To show that the performance of his lawyer was deficient, [Shelnutt] must prove that his lawyer performed [his] duties at trial in an objectively unreasonable way, considering all the circumstances, and in the light of prevailing professional norms. As for prejudice, the proper standard requires [Shelnutt] to show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.
State v. Harris , 301 Ga. 234, 237 (2), 799 S.E.2d 801 (2017) (citations and punctuation omitted). A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is a mixed question of law and fact. Id. "Therefore, when reviewing a trial court's decision to grant a motion for new trial based on ineffective assistance of counsel, we defer to the trial court's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous, but owe no such deference to its conclusions of law[,] which we apply independently to the facts." Id. (citation and punctuation omitted). With these guiding principles in mind, we turn to the State's argument that the trial court erred in finding that Shelnutt met his burden of demonstrating ineffective assistance of counsel.
1. We first consider the State's contention that the trial court erred in finding that Shelnutt's counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to raise an objection, based upon the lack of foundation, to lay testimony about the speed of Shelnutt's vehicle.1 We conclude that trial counsel's failure to object was neither deficient nor prejudicial under Strickland . See 466 U. S. at 687 (III), 104 S.Ct. 2052.
(a) Deficiency. The State asserts that counsel's decision not to raise a foundation objection was strategic and reasonable and that the trial court therefore erred in concluding that counsel performed deficiently. At trial, two lay witnesses testified as to the speed of Shelnutt's truck before impact: (1) G. T. testified that Shelnutt was traveling approximately 90 miles per hour, and (2) A. M. testified that Shelnutt was driving "really fast" and "probably going about seventy, eighty" miles per hour. Neither witness testified as to the basis for their speed estimation, and trial counsel did not object to the referenced testimony.2 Shelnutt's trial counsel testified at the motion for new trial hearing that he did not object to the speed estimation testimony because he thought that such knowledge was in the "normal ken of any adult who drives," and by the time he realized he should have objected, the questions had been already answered. However, trial counsel also testified that he did not object for the additional reason that the testimony supported his trial strategy and accident defense — that Shelnutt was driving fast and "could not stop despite his best efforts." In fact, in his closing argument, trial counsel argued that Shelnutt was driving "too fast" and "recklessly" as he approached the vehicles, implying that Shelnutt struck them by accident. Additionally, trial counsel testified at the motion for new trial hearing that the jury viewed the dash cam video recording, which showed "one car being hit so hard that it [slammed] into another" and that he was "using those facts to make the additional point that ... [Shelnutt] could not stop despite his best efforts."
As general rule, "matters of reasonable tactics and strategy, whether wise or unwise, do not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel." Hutcheson v. State , 361 Ga. App. 890, 898 (3) (a), 864 S.E.2d 106 (2021) (citation and punctuation omitted). Decisions about "when and how to raise [foundation] objections [are] generally a matter of trial strategy." Brown v. State , 307 Ga. App. 797, 807 (5) (d), 706 S.E.2d 170 (2011) (citation and punctuation omitted). Consequently, because "the making of objections falls within the realm of trial tactics and strategy," it "usually provides no basis for reversal of a conviction." Moon v. State , 288 Ga. 508, 516 (9), 705 S.E.2d 649 (2011) (citations and punctuation omitted). Here, counsel testified that he did not object to the testimony, in part, because it supported his trial strategy and...
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