State v. Sherman, CT

Decision Date20 October 1980
Docket NumberNo. CT,CT
PartiesSTATE of Oregon, Respondent, v. Gerald Patrick SHERMAN, Appellant. 79-6329; CA 17591.
CourtOregon Court of Appeals

Martin E. Stone, Coquille, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief was Slack, Slack & Stone, Coquille.

John C. Bradley, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salem, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were James M. Brown, Atty. Gen., John R. McCulloch, Jr., Sol. Gen. and William F. Gary, Deputy Sol. Gen., Salem.

Before RICHARDSON, P. J., and THORNTON and BUTTLER, JJ.

BUTTLER, Judge.

Defendant appeals his conviction for driving while suspended, ORS 487.560, asserting that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. We conclude that there was, and affirm.

Defendant's principal contention is that the trial court erred in receiving into evidence 1 a printout of defendant's driving record contained in the Motor Vehicles Division's computer, certified by the administrator to be a "correct transcript of the specified data as contained within the data processing device or computer." The printout indicated that an Order of Suspension, effective August 13, 1979, was still in effect on October 13, 1979, the date defendant was cited for driving while suspended. The printout stated, in pertinent part:

Transcripts of entries in official records stored within either a data processing device or computer are, if properly certified, admissible as primary evidence of the facts stated. State v. Harris, 288 Or. 703, 609 P.2d 798 (1980); ORS 43.370, 43.470(2). 2 This statutory exception to the common law hearsay rule applies to entries in official records made by a public officer in the performance of his duty or by another person in the performance of a duty "specially enjoined" by the law. ORS 43.370.

Defendant's license was suspended for failure to furnish proof of future financial responsibility. The Motor Vehicles Division is required by ORS 486.054 3 to maintain a driving record for each person who is to file proof of future responsibility. A logical portion of such a driving record is a status report regarding previous entries, i. e., an entry noting the presence or absence of change in the record. Thus, the entries regarding the status of defendant's license were made in the performance of a duty "specially enjoined" by the law. Furthermore, an entry in the record indicating that a suspended license remains in suspension is not, as defendant contends, a summary of the record. See State v. Harris, supra, 280 Or. at 707, 609 P.2d 798. Rather, it is an official entry stating that there has been no change in that suspension as of that date. For these reasons, we conclude that the certified computer printout was properly admitted.

The trial court was entitled to find from reading the printout that defendant's license had not been reinstated because: (1) no reinstatement date appeared ("REIN 00/00/00"), and (2) the status of defendant's license on October 14, and 18, 1979, was listed as suspended for failure to comply with the financial responsibility laws ("STATUS ON 10/18/79 SUSPENDED F COMPLY"). The printout, coupled with the Order of Suspension, constituted sufficient evidence for the trial court to find that on October 13, 1979, defendant was driving at a time when his license to do so was suspended.

Affirmed.

1 The state introduced a certified copy of the Order of Suspension containing the added notation that "our records reveal this order was in full effect on 10-13-79." Defendant correctly contends under State v. Harris, 288 Or. 703, 609 P.2d 798 (1980), that notation constitutes inadmissible hearsay evidence. That document should not have been admitted. However, a second copy of the Order with the quoted notation deleted was also admitted into evidence, and the trial court clearly indicated that it did not rely on the challenged notation in reaching its judgment. Therefore, any error which may have been committed was harmless. State v. Van Hooser, 266 Or. 19, 511 P.2d 359 (1973).

                                     "MOTOR VEHICLE DIVISION
                                              93506
                10/18/79
                *****
                                   **Driving Record Entries**
                *****
                SUSP
...

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5 cases
  • Brown v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc.
    • United States
    • Oregon Supreme Court
    • September 5, 1984
    ...officer that it is a correct transcript of specified data contained within the data processing device or computer."See State v. Sherman, 48 Or.App. 881, 884, 618 P.2d 973, rev. den. 290 Or. 211 (1980).7 ORS 41.690 was repealed by Oregon Laws 1981, chapter 892, and has been replaced by OEC 8......
  • Brown v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc., 78-8085
    • United States
    • Oregon Court of Appeals
    • October 25, 1983
    ...record made by a public officer in the performance of his duty for the City of Eugene Police Department. We held in State v. Sherman, 48 Or.App. 881, 884, 618 P.2d 973, rev. den. 290 Or. 211 "Transcripts of entries in official records stored within either a data processing device or compute......
  • State v. Caswell, 78-38195
    • United States
    • Oregon Court of Appeals
    • August 31, 1981
    ...status of his driving privileges on the day of his arrest, November 17, 1978, and because its recitations are hearsay. In State v. Sherman, 48 Or.App. 881, 618 P.2d 973, rev. den. 290 Or. 211 (1980), we held that the computer printout of a driving record was admissible to establish the stat......
  • State v. Whipps, 80-04403
    • United States
    • Oregon Court of Appeals
    • October 27, 1980
    ...William F. Gary, Deputy Sol. Gen., Salem. Before SCHWAB, C. J., and RICHARDSON and BUTTLER, JJ. PER CURIAM. Affirmed. State v. Sherman, 48 Or.App. 881, 618 P.2d 973 (1980). ...
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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