State v. Shiffrin

• Decision Date: 28 May 1918
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE v. SHIFFRIN.

103 A. 899

92 Conn. 583

STATE

v. SHIFFRIN.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

May 28, 1918.

Roraback and Wheeler, JJ., dissenting.

Appeal from Criminal Court of Common Pleas, New Haven County; Earnest C. Simpson, Judge.

Philip Shiffrin was convicted of violation of the motor vehicle law, and appeals. Error, and new trial.

The evidence in this case was confined to that given on behalf of the state by a deputy automobile inspector. That portion of his testimony which concerned the public service character of the automobile which accused was operating was to the effect that on the evening of December 20th, 1917, at about 6:30 o'clock, he observed it standing near the curb in a portion of College street in New Haven which had been officially designated as a public stand for motor vehicles, hacks, express wagons, and so forth that the accused was standing on the sidewalk beside it; that the witness thereupon approached the accused, then personally unknown to him, and asked him if he would take the witness down to the station as a public service driver; that the accused replied in the affirmative; that the witness then entered the accused's automobile, which was forthwith driven by him in the direction of the station; that after proceeding about two blocks the witness changed his destination; and that after reaching the latter he alighted from the car and paid the regular fare of 50 cents, which the accused accepted.

Arthur B. O'Keefe, of New Haven, for appellant. Edwin S. Pickett, Pros. Atty., of New Haven, for the State.

PRENTICE, C. J. (after stating the facts as above). The defendant was convicted upon an information which charged him with operating a public service motor vehicle without complying with the requirements of sec tion 24 of the Public Acts of 1917, concerning the display of the public service registration number plates and the maintenance of interior lights. That there was noncompliance with these requirements was not denied. The defense was that the motor vehicle which the accused was operating was not operated as a public service one within the meaning of the statute.

The act, in its first section, contains a definition of terms employed in it. Among these definitions is one of public service motor vehicles which it is said:

"Shall include any motor vehicle operated as a jitney and any motor vehicle used for the purpose of soliciting and receiving passengers upon any public highway and carrying such passengers upon the payment of an individual fare, but not including omnibuses running regularly between railway stations or boat landings and hotels."

The court instructed the jury that by force of this definition a motor...