State v. Shoemaker, 21400
| Decision Date | 04 March 1981 |
| Docket Number | No. 21400,21400 |
| Citation | 276 S.C. 86,275 S.E.2d 878 |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | The STATE, Respondent, v. Sandra Foster SHOEMAKER, Appellant. |
Asst. Appellate Defender David W. Carpenter, S. C. Commission of Appellate Defense, Columbia, for appellant.
Atty. Gen. Daniel R. McLeod and Asst. Atty. Gen. Kay G. Crowe, Columbia, and
Sol. William W. Wilkins, Jr., Greenville, for respondent.
Sandra Foster Shoemaker appeals her conviction of obtaining a controlled substance by misrepresentation, deception and subterfuge in violation of Section 44-53-390(a)(3), Code of Laws of South Carolina (1976). We affirm.
Shoemaker contends that the trial judge erred by failing to grant her timely motion to quash the indictment against her. 1 She asserts that the indictment is too general and that it fails to specify the alleged misrepresentations or deception.
The indictment provides in relevant part: "That SANDRA JEAN SHOEMAKER a/k/a SANDRA RENEE FOSTER did in Greenville County on or about the October 8th through October 15th, 1979, acquire a controlled substance, Demerol, by misrepresentation, deception and subterfuge in violation of 44-53-390(a)(3)." We also take note from the record that the parties evidently engaged in voluntary, mutual discovery prior to the trial. Shoemaker therefore had actual knowledge of the State's case against her.
We have stated that an indictment must set forth the offense charged with sufficient certainty and particularity to enable the court to know what judgment to pronounce, the defendant to know what he or she is called upon to answer, and acquittal or conviction to be placed in bar to any subsequent conviction. State v. Crenshaw, S.C., 266 S.E.2d 61, 62 (1980). An indictment phrased substantially in the language of the statute which creates and defines the offense is ordinarily sufficient. State v. Tabory, 262 S.C. 136, 202 S.E.2d 852 (1974).
Section 44-53-390(a) provides in pertinent part that, The indictment at issue is certainly phrased substantially in the language of the statute. The indictment also gives the appellant notice of the time of the alleged unlawful activity and identifies the substance allegedly acquired.
Shoemaker's knowledge of the case against her is significant too. She obviously knew what crime she...
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State v. Dudley
...phrased substantially in the language of the statute which creates and defines the offense is ordinarily sufficient. State v. Shoemaker, 276 S.C. 86, 275 S.E.2d 878 (1981). South Carolina courts have held that the sufficiency of an indictment must be viewed with a practical eye. State v. Ad......
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State v. Means
...of the statute prohibiting the crime or so plainly that the nature of the offense charged may be easily understood. State v. Shoemaker, 276 S.C. 86, 275 S.E.2d 878 (1981); Guthrie, 352 S.C. at 107-08, 572 S.E.2d at "In determining whether an indictment meets the sufficiency standard, the co......
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State v. Reddick
...an accurate determination of whether a defendant was or was not prejudiced can be reached. State v. Hiott, supra; State v. Shoemaker[216 S.C. 86, 275 S.E.2d 878 (1981)] supra; State v. Evans, 216 S.C. 328, 57 S.E.2d 756 In this case the statement signed by Adams itself described his mens re......
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State v. Wade
...that did not set forth the specific date (and apparently even hour, according to the dissent) of the alleged offense. State v. Shoemaker, 276 S.C. 86, 275 S.E.2d 878 (1981). See also State v. Sweat, 276 S.C. 448, 279 S.E.2d 375 (1981). We have also addressed the sufficiency of an indictment......