State v. Sidway, 64-79

• Decision Date: 14 April 1981
• Docket Number: No. 64-79,64-79
• Citation: 431 A.2d 1237,139 Vt. 480
• Parties: STATE of Vermont v. Sandra SIDWAY.
• Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Page 1237

431 A.2d 1237

139 Vt. 480

STATE of Vermont v. Sandra SIDWAY.

No. 64-79.

Supreme Court of Vermont.

April 14, 1981.

Motion for Reargument Denied April 28, 1981.

M. Jerome Diamond, Atty. Gen., and Susan R. Harritt, Asst. Atty. Gen., Montpelier, for plaintiff.

James L. Morse, Defender General, William A. Nelson, Appellate Defender, and Jacqueline Majoros, Law Clerk on the brief, Montpelier, for defendant.

Before BARNEY, C. J., BILLINGS, HILL and UNDERWOOD, JJ., and DALEY, J. (Ret.), Specially Assigned.

UNDERWOOD, Justice.

This is an appeal from the verdict of the jury and a judgment and sentence of the District Court of Vermont, Lamoille Circuit, Unit No. 3, convicting the defendant of the crime of leaving the scene of an accident. 23 V.S.A. § 1128. The sentence of 0-6 months was suspended, she was fined $200, and granted probation. The sentence was stayed pending appeal.

The defendant, who had no valid operator's license, was driving her mother's car home from a bistro in Stow, over a highway known as the River Road, at about 11:00 P.M. on January 15, 1978, when she lost control of her car. The weather was fair and the dirt road surface was dry and hard. Her car left the travelled portion of the highway and proceeded approximately 200 feet through a field of uncut vegetation some three to four feet high, crossed a portion of a driveway and struck an unoccupied parked car. It then crossed a lawn and returned to the highway.

The unoccupied car was parked in the driveway about 80 feet from the River Road and 40 feet from the home of its owner. The force of the impact moved it approximately ten feet. The damage to that car was to the right rear fender and bumper, a tail light was smashed out, and the frame was bent. Chrome trim, gravel and broken glass lay on the ground at the accident scene. There were traces of maroon paint on its green fender.

The occupants of the house, who were preparing to retire for the night and still had their lights on, heard a noise which they described as a loud crash. The children looked out and saw that the family car had been damaged. The father saw a car on the highway pause momentarily and then drive off.

The defendant testified that she had no knowledge at the time that she had struck or damaged anyone else's car. She did note that her car steered improperly after she returned to the highway and kept swerving to one side, but she surmised that the problem arose when she drove over some rocks in the field. When she got home, the defendant told her mother, the owner of the car, that she had wrecked it. She then went to the hospital where she remained until the following morning.

The defendant's car sustained extensive damage to its right side, and the passenger door was caved in to the extent that it could not be opened. A window was completely smashed out, and broken glass was scattered over the interior of the car. The car's maroon paint matched that found on the fender of the unoccupied car.

The next day the defendant's brother-in-law, who had made his own investigation of the incident, informed her of the accident. The defendant insists that this was the first time she became aware of the accident.

The sole issue before us, and one of first impression in this state, is whether the defendant need have had actual knowledge that she was involved in an accident causing damage, or only such knowledge as would ordinarily cause a reasonably prudent person, under like circumstances, to conclude that an impact had occurred and that damage had resulted.

23 V.S.A. § 1128 provides:

The operator of a motor vehicle who has caused or is involved in an accident resulting in injury to any person or property, other than the vehicle then under his control or its occupants, shall immediately stop and render any assistance reasonably necessary. He shall give his name, residence, license number and the name of the owner of the motor vehicle to any party whose person or property is injured and to any enforcement officer. A person who violates this section shall be fined not more than $2,000.00 or imprisoned for not more than two years, or both.

This is popularly known as a "hit and run" statute and is primarily directed against a callous class known as "hit and run" drivers. Its legislative purpose is to prohibit drivers of motor vehicles from seeking to evade civil or criminal liability by escaping before their identity can be established, and from leaving persons injured, abandoned and destitute of first aid or medical care. The duty imposed by the statute on the driver involved in a collision is not a passive one. It requires that he take affirmative action by stopping to give aid and information. State v. Severance, 120 Vt. 268, 272-73, 138 A.2d 425, 428 (1958).

Our hit and run statute is silent as to whether actual knowledge of impact is a necessary element of the offense. In interpreting the legislative intent behind a penal statute such as this, the interpretation adopted must be one most favorable to the accused. It should not, however, be construed so strictly as to defeat its purpose or lead to an absurd consequence. State v. Cushman, 133 Vt. 121, 123, 329 A.2d 648, 650 (1974). Furthermore, since the statute prescribes an affirmative course of action on the part of the driver, it is implicit therein that there be an element of recognition or awareness on the part of the driver of the fact of an accident. State v. Wall, 206 Kan. 760, 764, 482 P.2d 41, 45 (1971). The offense of leaving the scene of an accident makes little sense unless knowledge of the occurrence of an accident is a part of that offense.

A majority of the states (see citations, infra) have hit and run statutes, and many of these statutes, like ours, contain no express requirement of knowledge on the part of the driver of the car that he was involved in an accident. Most courts, however, in interpreting the legislative intent behind these statutes, have taken the view that actual knowledge of the collision is an essential element of the offense. They have rejected the notion that the omission of the word "knowingly" makes those hit and run statutes strict liability offenses.

The defendant rested her entire defense on the claim that she did not know at the time of the alleged accident that she had struck and damaged another car. She contends that the trial court, therefore, should have granted her motion for an acquittal or should have charged the jury, as she requested, that she could not be convicted unless they found from the evidence that she had actual knowledge of the impact.

The trial court denied the defendant's motion for an acquittal and did not charge the jury as she requested. Instead, the trial court gave the following instruction on the issue of knowledge:

(K)nowledge that an accident occurred and some impact of some kind, is an element of the offense of leaving the scene of an accident ... However, it is not absolute or positive knowledge...