State v. Siegel

• Decision Date: 01 September 1972
• Docket Number: No. 8,8
• Citation: 292 A.2d 86,266 Md. 256
• Parties: STATE of Maryland v. Maurice T. SIEGEL. ,
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 256

266 Md. 256

292 A.2d 86

STATE of Maryland v. Maurice T. SIEGEL.

No. 8, Sept. Term, 1972.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

July 3, 1972.

Clarence W. Sharp, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Francis B. Burch, Atty. Gen. and Edward F. Borgerding, Asst. Atty. Gen. on the brief), Baltimore, Md., for appellant.

H. Thomas Howell, Baltimore (Norman P. Ramsey, Baltimore, on the brief), for appellee.

Argued before BARNES, McWILLIAMS, SINGLEY, SMITH, DIGGES and PALPH W. POWERS (specially assigned), J.j.

DIGGES, Judge.

This case points up the great problems both legal and moral that we must again ponder in the wake of mankind's continuing scientific advancement-an advancement that staggers the imagination with its potential for good but causes us pause for fear that we may create 'Frankenstein's' monster ¹ and be unable to channel its growth. This is not a new or even unique quandary but one which most recently came into sharp focus with the advent of the atomic age. Nuclear energy offers the promise of relief to a large portion of the earth's population by alleviating such pressing problems as famine and plague but it also portends the very real menace of total destruction because of the weaponry it has produced. The industrialization of most of the world, while offering a life style unparalleled in the history of civilization, has also polluted much of nature's beauty and threatens to contaminate the very air we breathe. This same dichotomy applies to the development of electronic equipment. The benefits accruing to society are innumerable but the possibility of abuse is considerable. The issue now before On October 26, 1969, the State's Attorney for Baltimore City, Charles E. Maylan, 'upon his own authority pursuant to Article 27, Section 125A and Article 35, Section 94, Annotated Code of Maryland, 1957 edition, as amended, and pursuant to Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20)' petitioned the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City to authorize 'the use of electronic, mechanical or other devices and equipment to intercept and record telephonic wire communications pursuant to Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968; Article 27, Section 125A, Annotated Code of Maryland, 1957 edition as amended; Article 35, Sections 92 through 99, Annotated Code of Maryland, 1957 edition as amended; and the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.' The application alleged that Maurice T. Siegel, appellee, and Robert London were conspiring to violate the lottery laws of this State, Maryland Code (1957, 1971 Repl.Vol.), Art. 27, §§ 38, 356-58, and 360-67. Judge Charles D. Harris issued the requested order permitting the State Police to intercept specified telephone lines from 11:00 a. m. October 6, 1969 to 6:00 p. m. October 10, 1969, so as to gather evidence of the illegal activities. Following expiration of this original authorization, renewal orders were issued by Judge Harris on October 13 and again on November 5, 1969. All told the wires were tapped for a total of twenty-one days intercepting 1448 conversations. ²

this Court concerns electronic surveillance, more especially the wiretap.

On the basis of this electronically acquired evidence, an indictment was returned on November 14, 1969, jointly charging Siegel, a member of the bar, and London with conspiracy to violate the lottery laws of the State. ³ The appellee filed a motion to suppress all the intercepted conversations and on November 30, 1970 Judge Harris (the initial issuing authority) so ordered. He based his decision on Siegel's claim, 'That the indictment is founded upon the contents of telephonic and oral communications unlawfully intercepted by the State . . . in violation of the Defendant's rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, and of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, and of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.' From that ruling the State unsuccessfully appealed to the Court of Special Appeals. (State v. Siegel, 13 Md.App. 444, 285 A.2d 671 (1971).) We granted certiorari.

Several issues are presented for our consideration but under our view of the case we need only discuss the following two:

(i) Are the provisions of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act constitutional and properly implemented in Maryland by the provisions of Code (1957, 1965 Repl.Vol.), Art, 35, §§ 92-99, and Code (1971 Repl.Vol.), Art. 27, §§ 125A-D?

(ii) Were the wiretap orders of Judge Harris void for failure to comply with the provisions of Title III?

CONSTITUTIONALITY

To begin with it is necessary for us to determine whether Title III is in violation of the Fourth Amendment We recognize of course that the Fourth Amendment itself restricts the rights of which it speaks. Its guarantees are broad but not boundless. United States v. United States Dist. Ct., E.D.Mich., 405 U.S. --, 92 S.Ct. 2125, 32 L.Ed.2d 752 (1972). In entirety it provides: 'The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.' The Supreme Court of the United States, Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 87 S.Ct. 1642, 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967), recently discussed the historical background of the Fourth Amendment. There, Mr. Justice Brennan stated for the Court:

                of the Constitution of the United States.  4  Siegel contends that the Omnibus Crime Bill is facially unconstitutional because it fails 'to prescribe adequate standards as to the duration, particularity, and judicial supervision of court-ordered wiretapping.'  In responding to this claim we must first ovserve that any statute which trespasses upon 'The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects . . .' must be viewed with a jaundiced eye.  The right to privacy is not only a keystone to our legal philosophy but also one of the most cherished ideals of our form of democracy.  It is a concept which should foster security in the minds of our citizenry and not foster anxiety that they will be subjected to excessive governmental intrusion.  5  Under the Constitution there is no place in this country for an unfettered police force such as terrorized Germany [292 A.2d 89] and Italy during the 1930's and 1940's and which runs rampant today in many other parts of the world.  It would be intolerable for the spectre of recrimination to silence the dialogue and dissent which is so necessary to the lifeblood of our society.  In these scientifically sophisticated times the distinct possibility of 'Big Brotherism' 6 is apparent.  We live in a world which has the capability not only to monitor our conversations, to 'bug' our houses, but soon probably to delve into our innermost thoughts.  The allow any of these things to occur without  
                the strictest of controls would utterly destroy the basis of this nation's existence
                

'We have examined on many occasions the history and purposes of the Amendment. It was a reaction to the evils of the use of the general warrant in England and the writs of assistance in the Colonies, and was intended to protect against invasions of 'the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life,' Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630, 6 S.Ct. 524, 532, 29 L.Ed. 746, from searches under indiscriminate, general authority. Protection of these interests was assured by prohibiting all 'unreasonable' searches and seizures, and by requiring the use of warrants, which particularly describe 'the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized,' thereby interposing 'a magistrate between the citizen and the police,' . . .' Id. at 301, 87 S.Ct. at 1647 (citations omitted).

The question now before us is whether the deferal statute was drawn in conformity with these requirements.

The long and undistinguished history of eavesdropping can undoubtedly be traced to man's earliest beginnings and at common May 24, 1844, Samuel F. B. Morse telegraphed The language of the (Fourth) Amendment cannot be extended and expanded to include telephone wires, reaching to the whole world from the defendant's house or office. The intervening wires are not part of his house or office, any more than are the highways along which they are stretched.

                nuisance.  4 Blackstone's Commentaries, 1570, Ch. 13 (Lewis ed. 1897).  Originally, the act was accomplished by someone listening 'under walls or windows or the eaves of a house, to harken after discourse, and thereupon to frame slanderous and mischievous tales . . ..'  Blackstone, supra.  However, this crude methodology quickly became outmoded.  On May 124, 1844, Samuel F. B. Morse telgraphed the rather prophetic message, 'What hath God wronght', and from then on every advancement noted in telecommunications has been received by a like response in the ability to surreptitiously intercept.  To combat this threat the first statute prohibiting wiretapping was passed as early as 1862 and since that time such laws have proliferated.  7  The Supreme Court heard its initial wiretap case in 1928, Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 48 S.Ct. 564, 72 L.Ed. 944 (1928).  There, Mr. Chief Justice Taft, for the Court, said
                

This court, in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 . . . declared:

'The Fourth Amendment is to be construed in the light of what was deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when it was adopted, and in a manner which will conserve public interests, as well as the interest and rights of individual citizens.'

We think, therefore, that the wire tapping Subsequent to Olmstead, there were several other decisions involving wiretaps and 'bugging' in which...