State v. Siegler

• Decision Date: 15 June 1953
• Docket Number: No. A--139,A--139
• Citation: 12 N.J. 520,97 A.2d 469
• Parties: STATE v. SIEGLER.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Page 520

12 N.J. 520

97 A.2d 469

STATE v. SIEGLER.

No. A--139.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Argued May 18, 1953.

Decided June 15, 1953.

Herman L. Fast, Newark, for appellant (Fast & Fast, Newark, attorneys).

Joseph A. Hayden, Newark, for the State (Edward Gaulkin, Essex County Pros., Newark, attorney).

The opinion of the court was delivered by

WACHENFELD, J.

The appellant was indicted and convicted for false swearing under R.S. 2:157--4, N.J.S.A. The judgment was unanimously affirmed in the Appellate Division and we granted certification on a petition.

Albert Siegler intended to sell a certain piece of property in Linden, New Jersey. For that purpose he entered into a written contract on August 24, 1950 with Mr. and Mrs. Dunay, agreeing to convey the property in question free of all encumbrances for the sum of $14,000, to be paid upon various stages of construction of the house to be erected thereon. The purchasers paid on account $10,000 and through the appellant made an application for a $4,000 mortgage loan to the First Federal Savings & Loan Association of Montclair.

Subsequently, on January 26, 1951, Siegler executed and delivered to the same title company a bond secured by a mortgage for $9,000 on the premises in question. At the request of the mortgagee, Siegler executed at the closing an affidavit of title which contained no reference to the contract made with the Dunays, although it was then an outstanding contractual obligation.

The State on its case proved the appellant signed an affidavit of title in the presence of the title closing attorney, who subscribed his name as the officer taking the oath, which contained, amongst other things, the following:

'Albert Siegler, being duly sworn, says * * * and that no person has any contract for the purchase of, or claim to or against, said premises, except as hereinafter stated; and that the same are now free and clear of all taxes, encumbrances or liens by mortgage decree, judgment, or by statute, or by virtue of any proceeding in any Court, or filed in the office of the clerk of any County or Court in this state, and of all other liens of every nature or description, Excepting--'

After the word 'excepting' a large space appears in which nothing was written.

The closing paragraph recites:

'Deponent makes this affidavit to induce First Fed. Sav. & Loan Asso. of Mtc to accept a mortgage of said premises, and pay the consideration therefor, knowing that it relies upon the truth of the statements herein contained.'

The pertinent sections of the statute under which the defendant was indicted, R.S. 2:157--4, N.J.S.A., read:

'Any person, his procurers, aiders and abettors, who shall willfully swear falsely in any judicial proceeding, or who shall willfully swear falsely before any person authorized by virtue of any provision of law of this state to administer an oath and acting within his authority, shall be guilty of false swearing.'

Section 8:

'An affirmation shall be for all the purposes of this article the same as an oath. Willful shall, for the purposes of this article, be understood to mean intentional and knowing the same to be false.'

As claimed by the appellant, the State must prove the statutory requirements and carry the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

The trial court so charged:

'Our Revised Statutes 2:157--8 (N.J.S.A.) provides, in part, that willful shall, for the purpose of this article, be understood to mean intentional and knowing the same to be false. The mere fact that statements made under oath are untrue, if that be the fact. is not enough in itself to convict the defendant of false swearing.

'It is, of course, incumbent upon the State to satisfy you, the Jury, by proofs beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's statement was both false and willful.'

The appellant strenuously urges there are no facts or circumstances proving willfulness.

The State's proof need not necessarily be by direct evidence; it may be by such circumstances and conduct of the defendant as would entitle the jury to infer the defendant willfully swore falsely.

'When specific intent is an essential element of the crime charged, the burden is on the State to prove such intent. This burden may be met by direct proof or by circumstantial evidence. Underhill, Criminal Evidence, § 54 (4th Ed.1935); 22 C.J.S., Criminal Law, § 568; 14 Am.Jur., Criminal Law, § 24, n. 19. There must be proof, at least, of some circumstance or circumstances, in addition to the proof of the possession of the tool itself, from which the jury could draw a legitimate inference of the required intent.' State v. Walsh, 9 N.J.Super. 43, 46, 74 A.2d 613, 614 (App.Div.1950).

To a like effect is this court's pronouncement in State v. Costa, 11 N.J. 239, 246--247, 94 A.2d 303, 306 (1953):

'Proof of the statutory offense, however, must reach beyond, to his intent, and support the inference that the defendant intended that persons should resort to the place for the purpose of gambling. State v. Ackerman, 62 N.J.L. 456, 41 A. 697 (Sup.Ct.1898); State v. Griffin, 85 N.J.L. 613, 90 A. 259 (E. & A.1914); State v. Terry, 91 N.J.L. 539, 103 A. 238 (E. & A.1918), reversing 89 N.J.L. 522, 99 A. 129 (Sup.Ct.1916); State v. Clark (137 N.J.L. 10, 57 A.2d 537), supra. But 'Intent as a separate proposition for proof does not commonly exist.' Wigmore, supra, sec. 242, p. 39. It must ordinarily be discovered, as other mental states are, in the evidence of defendant's conduct in the surrounding circumstances and upon the instant indictment 'might or might not be inferred from his knowledge and permission.' State v. Ackerman, supra, 62 N.J.L. at page 459, 41 A. (697) at page 698.'

As to the proof in the case Sub judice, the appellant admits signing the affidavit of title, and the closing attorney testified, after taking the oath he subseribed his name beneath the jurat. There was no objection to the affidavit being received in evidence.

As to the suggestion Siegler did not read it, a signature to a sworn document imputes to the affiant knowledge of its contents even though it may not have been read by or to him. State v. McBarron, 66 N.J.L. 680, 51 A. 146 (E. & A.1901); ...