State v. Sigler

• Decision Date: 22 August 1921
• Docket Number: 15662.
• Citation: 200 P. 323,116 Wash. 581
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE v. SIGLER.

200 P. 323

116 Wash. 581

STATE v. SIGLER.

No. 15662.

Supreme Court of Washington

August 22, 1921

Department 1.

Appeal from Superior Court, Yakima County; Geo. B. Holden, Judge.

A. F Sigler was convicted of having unlawful sexual intercourse with a female, more than 15 and less than 18 years of age and he appeals. Affirmed.

H. J. Snively, of Yakima, for appellant.

O. R Schumann, of Olympia, and J. Lenox Ward, of Yakima, for the State.

BRIDGES J.

The defendant was convicted of the crime of having unlawful sexual intercourse with a certain female child, not his wife of previous chaste character, who, at the time of such offense, was more than 15 and less than 18 years of age. He appeals to this court for redress.

His first complaint is that the court permitted the state to introduce evidence showing, or tending to show, the commission by him of other and independent crimes. The testimony particularly objected to is that of the prosecuting witness to the effect that the defendant would take her to the big cities and make money with her, and that he kept certain capsules which he gave her for the purpose of preventing pregnancy, and also certain other testimony tending to show the appellant's connection with an abortion operation performed, or planned to be performed, upon the person of the prosecuting witness. The rule in this jurisdiction, with reference to these matters, is that----

'Proof of the commission of a separate and distinct crime will not be admitted for the purpose of aiding the conviction of defendant for the crime charged. There are exceptions, however, to this general rule, as where the testimony shows a connection between the transaction under investigation and some other transaction, and where they are so interwoven that the omission of the testimony in relation to the other crime would detract something from the testimony which the state would have a right to introduce as tending to show the commission of the crime charged by the defendant. * * *' State v. Gottfreedson, 24 Wash. 398, 64 P. 523; State v. Kaukos, 109 Wash. 20, 186 P. 269.

The rule is well stated in State v. Geddes, 22 Mont. 68, 55 P. 919, as follows:

'While it is thoroughly well established that the commission of one crime cannot be proved on the trial of a defendant for another, merely for the purpose of inducing a belief in the minds of the jury that the accused is guilty of the crime for which he is being tried, on the other hand it is a part of the criminal law that whatsoever testimony directly tends to establish the guilt of a person on trial of the crime charged is proper, even though it tends to show guilt of another distinct offense.'

The testimony objected to here was not in violation of the principles so announced. One of the questions to be proved by the state and determined by the jury was whether the appellant had carnal knowledge of the prosecuting witness. Any testimony tending to show that such relationship had existed was competent, and so testimony to the effect that the appellant obtained and gave to the prosecuting witness capsules to prevent her from becoming pregnant had a strong tendency to prove the charge that he had had sexual relations with her. Also the testimony to the effect that the appellant had made arrangements with a certain physician to perform an operation upon the prosecuting witness for the purpose of bringing about a miscarriage was proof tending to show that the appellant was responsible for the condition of the witness. The state would not have had any right to go into the details concerning these matters. This the trial court recognized, and constantly kept such details out of the case. In fact, time and again during the trial, it warned the jury that they were to try the defendant on the charge specified in the information, and that they should consider testimony concerning other offenses only in so far as it bore upon the guilt or innocence of the defendant of the crime with which he was charged. There was no error in receiving this testimony. What we have said will be sufficient to answer the objections of appellant concerning certain statements made by the prosecuting attorney in his opening statement.

The statute under which the information was drawn is section 2436, Rem. Code, and reads as follows:

'Every person who shall carnally know and abuse any female child under the age of 18 years, not his wife, shall be punished as follows: * * * (3) When such child is fifteen and under eighteen years of age, and of previously chaste character, by imprisonment in the state penitentiary for not more than ten years, or by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than one year.'

The trial court instructed the jury that if, before the time alleged in the information, the prosecuting witness had been carnally known, she would not be of previous chaste character and that----

'No act of indiscretion or indecorum on her part, no matter how serious, could constitute her unchaste within the meaning of these instructions, if she had not been carnally known.'

The appellant requested, and the court refused to give, the following instruction:

'You are instructed that the phrase 'previously chaste character' is not limited alone to acts of sexual intercourse, but includes purity in conduct and principle up to the time of the commission of the alleged offense.'

The appellant's argument is that----

'The common understanding of the word 'character' * * * does not include a physical condition, but instead it is understood, as applied to a human being, to define and describe a condition arising largely from the action of the mind.'

The substance of appellant's argument on this question is tersely stated in the case of Andre v. State, 5 Iowa, 389, 68 Am. Dec. 708, cited by him, where that court said:

'Finally, it seems to us that, if the Legislature intended as argued by the prosecution, it would have used the phrase 'a woman previously chaste,' or of 'previous chastity,' or the like, which are entirely natural words to express the idea of actual chastity, or chastity in fact. * * * We cannot think that a female who delights in lewdness, who is guilty of every indecency, and lost to all sense of shame, and who may be even the mistress of a brothel, is equally the object of this statute (if she has only escaped actual sexual intercourse) with an innocent and pure woman. * * * The statute is for the protection of the pure in mind, for the innocent in heart, who may have been led astray, seduced, from the path of rectitude. * * *'

The appellant's contention is novel and interesting, but, in our judgment, unsound. Indeed, the question is not an open one in this jurisdiction. The case of State v. Dacke, 59 Wash. 238, 109 P. 1050, 30 L. R. A. (N. S.) 173, was one under the statute here being considered. We there said:

'The term 'of previously chaste character' means the same in law as in morals. It describes a condition of sexual purity.

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