State v. Sill

• Citation: 199 N.W.2d 47
• Decision Date: 29 June 1972
• Docket Number: No. 54920,54920
• Parties: STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Donald D. SILL, Appellant.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Iowa

Page 47

199 N.W.2d 47

STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Donald D. SILL, Appellant.

No. 54920.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

June 29, 1972.

Swift & Swift, Manchester, for appellant.

Richard C. Turner, Atty. Gen., Robert D. Jacobson, Asst. Atty. Gen., and E. Michael Carr, County Atty., Manchester, for appellee.

McCORMICK, Justice.

Defendant was convicted by jury and sentenced for assault with intent to inflict great bodily injury under § 694.6, The Code. We reverse because of error in an instruction on defendant's intoxication defense and in admission of rebuttal evidence of defense witnesses' reputation for truth and veracity.

The trial was on an indictment under Code § 690.6 charging defendant assaulted Khalil Odeh with intent to murder. State evidence indicated a brutal unprovoked beating by defendant of Mr. Odeh outside Club 13 in Ryan, Iowa, in the early evening of October 14, 1969. Defendant offered testimony tending to minimize severity of the attack and to show self-defense. There was also evidence he was highly intoxicated at the time of the incident because of earlier consumption of large quantities of whiskey and beer.

State witnesses in rebuttal testified over foundation objection defendant and three other defense witnesses had bad reputations for truth and veracity in and around Ryan.

The trial court instructed the jury on the main charge, included offenses of assault with intent to commit manslaughter, assault with intent to commit great bodily injury, and assault and battery, and defenses. The two principal questions on appeal are: (1) Was the intoxication defense instruction proper? (2) Did the reputation testimony have sufficient foundation?

I. The intoxication instruction. There is no dispute there was substantial evidence of defendant's voluntary intoxication. The challenged instruction told the jury intoxication was material only on the issue of specific intent and could be considered with all other credible evidence bearing upon defendant's mental condition in determining whether the State proved he had the required intent. However, the instruction also said:

'* * * (N)o amount of voluntary intoxication can entirely excuse commission of the crime of assault charged in the Indictment in this case and * * * the lesser assaults included therein, and thereby entitle defendant to an acquittal.

'Thus, if the defendant * * * voluntarily became intoxicated, or if despite his intoxication, whether voluntary or involuntary, * * * had sufficient purpose, then intoxication would be no defense. But if the defendant involuntarily became intoxicated to the extent that he was incapable of forming an intent to commit the offense charged or any lesser offense included therein as defined in these instructions then he is not criminally responsible.'

Defense counsel took timely and adequate exception to the quoted language. He had also submitted requested instructions making voluntary intoxication a defense to all submitted charges except assault and battery if the jury found defendant so intoxicated as to be incapable of required specific intent.

We have long held, 'When specific intent must be shown, intoxication which prevents one from forming such intent is material and may entitle defendant to acquittal.'...