State v. Silva

• Decision Date: 12 February 2008
• Docket Number: No. 17638.,17638.
• Citation: 285 Conn. 447,939 A.2d 581
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Madalena SILVA.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

939 A.2d 581

285 Conn. 447

STATE of Connecticut v. Madalena SILVA.

No. 17638.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued September 20, 2007.

Decided February 12, 2008.

Ronald G. Weller, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Jonathan Benedict, state's attorney, and Craig Nowalk, assistant state's attorney, for the appellant (state).

Kim Coleman, for the appellee (defendant).

ROGERS, C.J., and NORCOTT, VERTEFEUILLE, ZARELLA and SCHALLER, Js.

VERTEFEUILLE, J.

The defendant, Madalena Silva, appealed to the Appellate Court from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of two counts of interfering with an officer in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 2003) § 53a-167a,¹ claiming that the state did not present sufficient evidence to support her conviction.² The Appellate Court majority agreed with the defendant's claim, reversing the judgment of the trial court and remanding the case with direction to render judgment of not guilty. State v. Silva, 93 Conn.App. 349, 360-61, 889 A.2d 834 (2006).³ Thereafter, we granted the state's petition for certification to appeal, limited to the following issue: "Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that there was insufficient evidence to support the defendant's conviction on two counts of interfering with an officer in violation of . . . § 53a-167a?" State v. Silva, 277 Conn. 931, 896 A.2d 103 (2006). We now conclude that the Appellate Court's determination that the evidence was insufficient to support the defendant's conviction was improper, and, accordingly, we reverse its judgment.

The Appellate Court opinion sets forth the following facts, which the jury reasonably could have found. "At about 5 p.m. on June 22, 2003, the defendant's brother was involved in an automobile collision on North Avenue in Bridgeport. All three vehicles involved in the collision had to be towed from the scene because of major damage, and the defendant's brother complained of neck and back pain. Officers Jason Ferri and Todd Sherback of the Bridgeport police department, who were on routine motor patrol, went to the accident scene to help the investigating officer, Officer Mark Gudauskas, complete necessary paperwork. To avoid obstructing the heavy rush hour traffic, Ferri and Sherback parked their police cruiser in a nearby private parking lot.

"As the defendant drove by the scene, Ferri and Sherback observed her stop abruptly on the street, back up, execute a three point turn and back quickly into the parking lot where they had parked their police cruiser, nearly causing a collision. They also saw that her vehicle did not have a required front license plate. The officers told the defendant that they were going to issue an infraction ticket for unsafe backing and no front license plate. At that time, the officers asked the defendant for her driver's license, automobile registration and insurance card. She asked to be let alone. To the officers' . . . request, she replied, `You Bridgeport cops are all the f___king same. To protect and serve? Yeah right, my ass.' When the officers repeated their request, she stated, `F___k you. I ain't giving you s___t, asshole. I'm taking my brother to the hospital, and you are not f___king stopping me.' She was loud and belligerent, stamping her foot, and a crowd of twenty-five to thirty people gathered. At that time, the officers did not issue the infraction ticket because the defendant became very loud and angry when asked for her registration. At some unknown time, however, the officers did issue an infraction ticket.

"Ferri and Sherback decided to arrest the defendant for breach of the peace and interfering with an officer after her belligerent responses to their requests. The defendant's mother, who [also] was present [at the scene] with the defendant's father, [interrupted] the officers' investigation by stating that her daughter had done nothing wrong. Because of this [interruption], the defendant was not [immediately] arrested. At that time, as the officers tried to talk to the defendant's mother, the defendant immediately ran into the street, entered a vehicle and drove away, leaving her automobile in the parking lot. Ferri had told the defendant not to leave the scene and then asked the defendant's mother to use her cellular telephone to call the defendant. The defendant's mother explained to the officer that the defendant was bringing her brother to a hospital. After speaking with the defendant [on the cellular telephone], her mother told the officers that the defendant would return after she went to the hospital.

"The officers waited for one-half hour and conferred with their supervisor, Sergeant Stephen Lougal, whom they called to explain that they intended to arrest the defendant. They also wanted Lougal to speak to the defendant's mother about the mother's complaint that her son had not received medical assistance. The officers then went to the nearer of the two hospitals in Bridgeport. They located the defendant at the emergency room and arrested her for breach of the peace and interfering with an officer.⁴ When the officers approached her, the defendant stated to them, `Not you assholes again,' and told her friend the officers were coming for her." State v. Silva, supra, 93 Conn. App. at 352-54, 889 A.2d 834.

"The state charged the defendant in an amended information with two counts of interfering with a[n] . . . officer and two counts of breach of the peace [in the second degree]. The first count of interfere[ing] with a[n] . . . officer charged that the defendant did so `by saying to [the officer] when requested to produce [her] license, registration and insurance information during a motor vehicle stop, "F___k you. I ain't giving you s___t, asshole. . . ."' The second count charged the defendant with interfering with an officer `by running from [the officer] and fleeing on foot across North Avenue and entering the driver's side of an unidentified green vehicle which left the scene at a high rate of speed, after being instructed by [the officer] not to leave the scene. . . .'" Id., at 351, 889 A.2d 834.

On appeal to the Appellate Court, the defendant claimed that the evidence was insufficient to support her convictions of both counts of interfering with an officer in violation of § 53a-167a. The Appellate Court majority agreed with the defendant. Citing State v. Williams, 205 Conn. 456, 473-74, 534 A.2d 230 (1987), the Appellate Court noted that a defendant must engage in physical conduct or "fighting words" in order to violate § 53a-167a and determined that the defendant's verbal insults and use of profanity did not constitute fighting words under the facts of the present case. State v. Silva, supra, 93 Conn.App. at 354-55, 889 A.2d 834. The Appellate Court further concluded that "[t]he failure to turn over the [defendant's license, registration and insurance information] alone could not support a conviction [of § 53a-167a] because the legislature penalized that conduct itself as an infraction under General Statutes § 14-217."⁵ Id., at 355, 889 A.2d 834. The Appellate Court further concluded that the evidence was insufficient to support the defendant's conviction of interfering with an officer in violation of § 53a-167a for leaving the scene of the accident in order to bring her injured brother to the hospital. Id., at 359-60, 889 A.2d 834. In doing so, the Appellate Court concluded that "the defendant's conduct in openly going to a hospital and leaving her mother and her automobile behind with the police are circumstances that render evidence of the defendant's conduct insufficient to support a reasonable finding that the defendant intentionally sought to delay the officer's efforts to issue her an infraction ticket." Id., at 360, 889 A.2d 834.⁶ This certified appeal followed.

As a preliminary matter, we set forth the applicable standard of review. "In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we apply a two-part test. First, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict. Second, we determine whether upon the facts so construed and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom the jury reasonably could have concluded that the cumulative force of the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . In evaluating evidence, the trier of fact is not required to accept as dispositive those inferences that are consistent with the defendant's innocence. . . . The trier may draw whatever inferences from the evidence or facts established by the evidence it deems to be reasonable and logical. . . . This does not require that each subordinate conclusion established by or inferred from the evidence, or even from other inferences, be proved beyond a reasonable doubt . . . because this court has held that a jury's factual inferences that support a guilty verdict need only be reasonable. . . .

"[A]s we have often noted, proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond all possible doubt . . . nor does proof beyond a reasonable doubt require acceptance of every hypothesis of innocence posed by the defendant that, had it been found credible by the trier, would have resulted in an acquittal. . . . On appeal, we do not ask whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that would support a reasonable hypothesis of innocence. We ask, instead, whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that supports the jury's verdict of guilty. . . . Furthermore, [i]n [our] process of review, it does not diminish the probative force of the evidence that it consists, in whole or in part, of evidence that is circumstantial rather than direct. . . . It is not one fact, but the cumulative impact of a multitude of facts which establishes guilt in a case involving substantial circumstantial evidence. . . . Indeed, direct evidence of the accused's state of mind is rarely available. . . . Therefore, intent is often inferred from conduct . . . and from the...