State v. Silva
| Decision Date | 17 July 1974 |
| Docket Number | No. 1181,1181 |
| Citation | 86 N.M. 543,1974 NMCA 72,525 P.2d 903 |
| Parties | STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Larry SILVA, Juan Manuel Soliz, Ramon Soliz, Charles Richard McCurdy, Sylvia Maria Larez, Michael Peter Garcia, Pete Schuler, Mary Meza, Carlos Anaya, Israel Dominguez, Louis Cordova, and Frank Sanchez, Defendants-Appellants. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of New Mexico |
Defendants were tried de novo in district court on an appeal from a conviction in magistrate court for violation of § 40A--20--10. N.M.S.A.1953 (Repl.Vol.1972). See § 36--15--1 through § 36--15--4, N.M.S.A.1953 (Repl.Vol.1972); § 36--21--42, N.M.S.A.1953 (Repl.Vol.1972); Southern Union Gas Company v. Taylor, 82 N.M. 670, 486 P.2d 606 (1971). They now appeal the judgment of the district court, affirming the magistrate court's decision. Four isses are presented for reversal: (1) Delegation of Judicial Power; (2) Vagueness; (3) Overbreadth; and, (4) Unconstitutional Statute Application. We affirm.
The case arose from an incident on the campus fo Eastern New Mexico University on April 11, 1972. On that morning the twelve defendants, mostly students, attended the regular meeting of the Administrative Council of the University to discuss additional funding for the Ethnic Studies Program. The meeting was held at 9:00 a.m. in the office of Dr. Meister, the University President, and Chairman of the Council. At approximately 10:30 a.m. Dr. Meister opened the discussion on the Ethnic Studies Program funding. At 11:15 a.m. he determined that the proceeding '. . . was getting to be . . . possibly disorderly . . .', and terminated the discussion. The defendants would not leave. The Council members then moved to another office to dispose of further business. At 12:00 p.m. Dr. Meister received word that the defendants were still in his office. He and the Council members then reconvened in his office to talk further with the defendants. Because of the luncheon appointments of several Council members Dr. Meister adjourned the meeting at 12:10 p.m. He then told the students he would need his office at 1:30 p.m. for other business and they must leave. At 1:30 p.m. Dr. Meister returned from lunch for an appointment with Dr. Shannon to discuss a faculty personnel matter, followed at 2:00 p.m. by another appointment. The defendants had not left. He again requested they do so. When they did not leave he and the University attorney read § 40A--20--10, supra, to the defendants. He told the attorney that the defendants were disrupting his normal business. The defendants were then arrested by police. The arrests were without violence.
Section 40A--20--10, supra, states:
'40A--20--10. Interference with members of staff, faculty or students of institutions of higher education--Trespass--Damage to property--Misdemeanors--Penalties.--A. No person shall on the campus of any community college, junior college, college or university in this state, hereinafter referred to as 'institutions of higher education' or at or in any building or other facility owned, operated or controlled by the governing board of any institution of higher education, willfully deny to students, school officials, employees and invitees:
'(1) lawful freedom of movement on the campus;
'(2) lawful use of the property, facilities or parts of any institution of higher education; or
'(3) the right of lawful ingress and egress to the institution's physical facilities.
Defendants were charged and found guilty of violation of § 40A--20--10, supra, without specification of any subsection. Nonetheless, they have standing to only challenge the constitutionality of subsection C, particularly since they raise First Amendment issues. Compare State v. Marchiondo, 85 N.M. 627, 515 P.2d 146 (Ct.App.1973); see Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 60 S.Ct. 736, 84 L.Ed. 1093 (1940).
Defendants claim State v. Jaramillo, 83 N.M. 800, 498 P.2d 687 (Ct.App.1972) controls this case. We disagree. Jaramillo, invalidated a statute conditioning criminality on a finding by a state custodian that a state building was '. . . being used or occupied contrary to its intended or customary use. . . .' The court held that allowing criminal liability to turn on this essentially adjudicative determination without more adequate standards was unconstitutional. See N.M.Const. Art. III, § 1.
As our Supreme Court stated in Huey v. Lente, 85 N.M. 597, 514 P.2d 1093 (1973):
'. . . if a statute is susceptible to two constructions, one supporting it and the other rendering it void, a court should adopt the construction which will uphold its constitutionality. . . .'
By interpreting § 40A--20--10, supra, consistent with this rule we find the legislature avoided the problem which arose in Jaramillo by specifying adequate standards and guidelines to be followed. Criminality is based first on a refusal to leave after requests by the chief administrative officer and second on a determination that the person '. . . is committing, threatens to commit or incites others to commit any act which would disrupt, impair, interfere with or obstruct the lawful mission, processes, procedures or functions of the institution.' The second determination is not made by the requesting officer but the trier of fact. City Commission of Albuquerque v. State, 75 N.M. 438, 405 P.2d 924 (1965). As it is with all criminal statutes, the determination is preliminarily made by the arresting officer under statutory standards. Thus, regardless of how unreasonable the request of the administrative officer may be no criminal liability attaches until a judge or jury determines that the person committed the disrupting act. In Jaramillo it was the custodian who determined criminal liability. No matter how unreasonable his request, once it was made the judge or jury had to convict.
Any statute which forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms '. . . so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application . . .', violates due process. Connally v. General Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 46 S.Ct. 126, 70 L.Ed. 322 (1926); State v. Marchiondo, supra. Defendants claim subsection C of § 40A--20--10, supra, suffers from this vice. Moreover, they assert the statute '. . . abut(s) upon sensitive areas of basic First Amendment freedoms, . . .' and its vagueness, therefore, '. . . operates to inhibit the exercise of (those) freedoms.' Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972). Defendants challenge in particular the words '. . . disrupt, impair, interfere with or obstruct. . . .'
In Grayned v. City of Rockford, supra, a similar statute, applicable in similar circumstances, was upheld. That statute proscribed '. . . the making of any noise or diversion which disturbs or tends to disturb the peace or good order of (a) school session or class thereof.' The court concluded:
'We do not have here a vague, general 'breach of the peace' ordinance, but a statute written specifically for the school context, where the prohibited disturbances are easily measured by their impact on the normal activities of the school.'
Compare Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 91 S.Ct. 1686, 29 L.Ed.2d 214 (1971); Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 88 S.Ct. 1335, 20 L.Ed.2d 182(1968) and Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 85 S.Ct. 453, 13 L.Ed.2d 471 (1965).
Numerous courts have upheld terms similar to those questioned here, particularly when applied in the school context. State v. Wiggins, 272 N.C. 147, 158 S.E.2d 37 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1028, 88 S.Ct. 1418, 20 L.Ed.2d 285 (1968) ('interrupt', 'disturb'); State v. Sullivan, 189 Neb. 465, 203 N.W.2d 169 (1973) ('obstruct', 'unreasonably interfere'); People v. Witzkowski, 53 Ill.2d 216, 290 N.E.2d 236 (1972), appeal dismissed, 411 U.S. 961, 93 S.Ct. 2162, 36 L.Ed.2d 682 (1973) ('interfere'); McAlpine v. Reese, 309 F.Supp. 136 (E.D.Mich.1970) ('disturbance'); Dougherty v. Walker, 349 F.Supp. 629 (W.D.Mo.1972) ('interf...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Santillanes v. State
...it sweeps so broadly to impinge unnecessarily on conduct protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. See State v. Silva, 86 N.M. 543, 547, 525 P.2d 903, 907 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 86 N.M. 528, 525 P.2d 888 (1974); see also State v. Pierce, 110 N.M. 76, 81, 792 P.2d 408, 413 (1990). ......
-
Castaneda v. City of Albuquerque
...this statute and its predecessor, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40A–20–10(C) (1953),6 in the context of an educational environment: State v. Silva , 86 N.M. 543, 525 P.2d 903 (1974) and Casalduc , 982 F.Supp.2d 1235.The New Mexico Supreme Court examined the constitutionality of § 40A–20–10(C) in Silva ......
-
A.M. ex rel. F.M. v. Holmes
...its clearly-established-law argument, A.M. principally relies on a decision of the New Mexico Court of Appeals, State v. Silva , 86 N.M. 543, 525 P.2d 903 (N.M. Ct. App. 1974). We conclude, however, that Silva does not get A.M. over her clearly-established-law hurdle. Silva involved a di......
-
G.M. ex rel. Her Minor Child B.M. v. Bernalillo Cnty. Sheriff Sch. Res. Officer Casalduc
...in order to avoid arrest. Only one New Mexico case construes the plain language of NMSA § 30–20–13(D). See State v. Silva, 86 N.M. 543, 525 P.2d 903 (N.M.Ct.App.1974) (interpreting NMSA 1953 § 40A–20–10, a precursor to NMSA § 30–20–13). In Silva, police arrested nonviolent student protestor......
-
SADOMASOCHISTIC JUDGING.
...added). (70.) A.M. v. Holmes, 830 F.3d 1123 (10th Cir. 2016). (71.) Id. at 1169 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (quoting State v. Silva, 525 P.2d 903, 907 (N.M.Ct. App. (72.) Id. at 1170. (73.) Josh Blackman, Why Courts Shouldn't Try to Read Trump's Mind, POLITICO MAG. (Mar. 16, 2017), https://ww......