State v. Simmons
| Decision Date | 12 November 1974 |
| Docket Number | No. 73-273-C,73-273-C |
| Citation | 114 R.I. 16,327 A.2d 843 |
| Parties | , 74 A.L.R.3d 1251 STATE v. Harvey C. SIMMONS. A. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
The defendant, Harvey C. Simmons, was indicted for violating G.L.1956 (1969 Reenactment) § 11- 42-2 1 in that he unlawfully and maliciously verbally threatened to expose another to disgrace and to injure the reputation of that other with the intent thereby to compel him to do an act against his will, to wit: to resign from the presidency of the Coventry Town Council. The defendant moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that it did not charge an offense under § 11-42-2, and alternatively on the ground that the crime charged was unconstitutionally vague because it failed to give him adequate notice that the conduct for which he had been indicted was forbidden by law. When the motion was granted, the state appealed. 2
The statutory language, 'any injury to the person * * * of another,' does not explain itself, is of doubtful meaning, and therefore is ambiguous. Hence it must be construed. Commerce Oil Ref. Corp. v. Miner, 98 R.I. 14, 18, 199 A.2d 606, 608 (1964); Mason v. Bowerman Bros., 95 R.I. 425, 431, 187 A.2d 772, 775-776 (1963). Thus, the threshould question for decision is whether the language in question should embrace only threats of actual physical harm, or whether it should also include threats to injure one's reputation. Only if we construe it to include the latter, must we address the constitutional question.
In support of its contention that we should read the language to include threats of injury to another's reputation, the state relies principally on McDonald v. Brown, 23 R.I. 546, 51 A. 213 (1902). There we held that a judgment for libel was based upon a willful and malicious injury to the person and therefore was not a dischargeable debt in bankruptcy. 3 In so holding, we gave the bankruptcy act a broad reading and observed that '(w)ounded feelings, mental anguish, loss of social position and standing, personal mortification and dishonor, are clearly injuries that pertain to the person.' McDonald, supra at 550, 51 A. at 214.
While that is strong language apparently supporting the state's position, it pertains to remedial legislation which ought to be liberally construed and taken 'in its broad and general sense.' McDonald, supra at 549, 51 A. at 214. In this case, however, the legislation is penal rather than remedial, and because it is penal the same language liberally construed in McDonald must be read narrowly here, State v. Nadeau, 81 R.I. 505, 512, 105 A.2d 194, 198 (1954), and defendant must be given the benefit of any reasonable doubt as to whether the act charged is within the meaning of the statute. State v. Beck, 21 R.I. 288, 295, 43 A. 366, 368 (1899); State v. Mylod, 20 R.I. 632, 637, 40 A. 753, 755 (1898). Moreover, to construe the language 'injury to the person' here solely in reliance on the reading it received in McDonald would be to give weight to a holding that has 'little value as precedent here' and would 'verge upon speculation with reference to the legislative intent.' Commerce Oil Ref. Corp. v. Miner,supra, 98 R.I. at 18, 199 A.2d at 608. 4
Thus, when we view the language of the penal extortion statute in the required light, uninhibited by how we construed the identical phrase in the McDonald context, we are persuaded that the requirement that there be a threat of 'injury to the person' contemplates the peril of actual bodily harm and does not include danger to reputation alone. This result finds support in the following authorities. In each, the circumstances called for strict construction, and similar language was held to mean bodily or physical injury. Freese v. Tripp, 70 Ill. 496, 500 (1873) (); Calloway v. Laydon, 47 Iowa 456, 458 (1877) () Commonwealth v. Mosby, 163 Mass. 291, 294, 39 N.E. 1030 (1895) (); Mulford v. Clewell, 21 Ohio 191, 196 (1871) (). 5
The state's appeal is denied and dismissed, the order appealed from is affirmed, and the case is remitted to the Superior Court for further proceedings.
1 General Laws 1956 (1969 Reenactment) § 11-42-2 reads as follows:
'Extortion and blackmail.-Whoever, verbally or by a written or printed communication, maliciously threatens to accuse another of a crime or offense, or by a verval or written or printed communication maliciously threatens any injury to...
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...Language that is narrowly construed in a penal statute may be liberally construed in a remedial statute. State v. Simmons, 114 R.I. 16, 18, 327 A.2d 843, 845 (1974). A statute, however, may contain one section that is penal in nature and another that is remedial. State v. Pullen, 58 R.I. 29......
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