State v. Simmons
Decision Date | 31 March 2005 |
Docket Number | No. 25941.,25941. |
Citation | 158 S.W.3d 901 |
Parties | STATE of Missouri, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Robert SIMMONS, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
A jury found Robert Simmons ("Defendant") guilty of nine felony charges related to illicit drugs. These charges arose out of three separate instances of criminal conduct with each one occurring months apart from the others. The convictions encompassed three counts of manufacturing methamphetamine (§ 195.211), three counts of possession of drug paraphernalia with the intent to manufacture (§ 195.233), two counts of possessing pseudoephedrine with the intent to manufacture (§ 195.246), and one count of possession of ether with the intent to manufacture (§ 195.420).1
Defendant's first point asserts reversible error occurred when the trial court overruled his motion to suppress physical evidence seized in the first case and then admitted the evidence at trial over his objection. His second point maintains reversible error occurred when the trial court overruled his motion to sever the cases. We find merit in the first point, but not the second; accordingly, we reverse and remand in part and affirm in part.
On November 11, 2001, the police found a methamphetamine lab and other contraband in Defendant's building located at 1835 East St. Louis Street, Springfield, Missouri. This discovery was made under the following circumstances.
At approximately 8:00 a.m., Springfield policeman Joe Motte ("Motte") was directed via police dispatch to Defendant's building. Evidence regarding this dispatch and the reasons for Motte entering the building once he arrived are as follows.
At the suppression hearing, Motte testified he was sent to the building "to check on the well-being of a person." He explained that a "check on-the-well-being call" was one where "we want to find out if somebody is okay." He remembered nothing about the dispatch directive, other than the address. Motte stated there "was probably more information[,][b]ut I can't remember exactly what she [the dispatcher] said." Admittedly, the dispatcher never gave Motte the specific name of a person "who was hurt, or anything like that."
Upon arriving, Motte found no one "in that location[ ]" or "around the building." However, he saw "the front door [was] shattered[ ]" and the east end garage door "was partly opened." In other testimony, Motte claimed the glass front door was "spider webbed" and "[t]here might have been a hole in it also." At yet another point in his testimony, Motte described the garage door as being open to a height of three feet.
Based on the foregoing, Motte decided to enter Defendant's building. He based his decision on the directive he received to check on the well-being of a person at that site and his discovery of the open garage door and shattered front glass once he arrived. At the suppression hearing, he testified: "When I got there I found out that it had been vandalized, and I wanted to make sure there was nobody hurt inside." At trial, this was his testimony:
Once Motte and another officer entered Defendant's building, they found (in plain view) numerous items that led to Defendant being charged with multiple crimes, including Counts I, II, and IV. Defendant's convictions on these counts are the subject of his first point on appeal.
On March 2, 2002, policeman Travis Wilson ("Wilson") drove to a business site at 1821 East St. Louis, Springfield, Missouri. He was dispatched to that address to investigate a reported act of vandalism there. The victim also reported seeing footprints in the snow leading from his building to the one next door, which happened to be Defendant's premises.
Once Wilson's investigation led him toward Defendant's building, he viewed several cars parked there. He also saw two people exit the building and noted a "strong chemical odor" emanating from the building. He associated the smell with methamphetamine manufacturing.
One of the people who exited the building was Defendant's son. After some delay, the son allowed Wilson entry. Once inside, Wilson saw several people, but Defendant was not among them. When Defendant finally appeared, Wilson called for back up and conducted a protective search. In doing so, he witnessed numerous items normally used in the manufacture of methamphetamine.
All persons present were then arrested. When Wilson searched Defendant, he found methamphetamine in his pocket. Defendant then explained he "had been cooking meth at the business ... that morning." This incident led to Defendant being charged and convicted by the jury of four illicit drug-related charges.
On July 11, 2002, trooper Tod Vermillion ("Vermillion") was dispatched to the parking lot of a convenience store to investigate a "suspicious" vehicle. Upon arrival, Vermillion found a pick-up truck with front-end damage and its two occupants asleep. As he looked in the truck window, Vermillion viewed what appeared to be a bag of marijuana and a package of rolling papers on the truck's console and an acetylene torch on the dash. He then learned the vehicle's occupants were Defendant and his son. He arrested Defendant, read him the Miranda warnings, and searched him. The search revealed Defendant possessed a sandwich bag on his person containing a white powdery substance and coffee filters. Other items found in open view in the back of the pickup truck and on the truck's floorboard led Vermilion to ask Defendant about a possible methamphetamine lab in the back of the truck. Defendant answered it was only "lab trash." Later, Defendant told Vermillion he needed methamphetamine to survive and that he would bond out and be cooking again that night.
This incident led to Defendant being charged with two of the drug-related offenses for which he was found guilty by the jury. This appeal followed.
Defendant's first point maintains reversible error was committed when the trial court overruled his motion to suppress and admitted into evidence items seized from his building on November 11, 2001. He insists that officer Motte's entry into his building without a warrant was "unlawful since there was no probable cause and no exigent circumstances to justify the intrusion."2
Replying to this argument, the State points to four facts that it claims warrant a finding of exigent circumstances: (1) officer Motte was dispatched to check on the well-being of a person, (2) he found a shattered door glass at the building in question, (3) he found a partially opened garage door, and (4) no one answered when Motte identified himself as a police officer. From this, the State argues that it is reasonable to infer a burglary occurred and some person might have been injured inside the building; consequently (according to the State), the trial court did not commit reversible error in its rulings.3
The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 15 of the Missouri Constitution guarantee the right of citizens to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.4 State v. Rutter, 93 S.W.3d 714, 723 (Mo.banc 2002). A search or seizure that occurs on a suspect's premises without a warrant is presumptively unreasonable.5 Id. at 723[2].
Exceptions to the warrant requirement exist, but they are few in number and carefully delineated. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 749, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 2097, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984). As the Rutter court explained it, "[t]he state can overcome the presumption that a warrantless search and seizure is unreasonable by showing that it falls within one of a carefully defined set of exceptions, many of which are based on the presence of exigent circumstances." 93 S.W.3d at 723[4]. For instance, "warrantless intrusion may be justified by hot pursuit of a fleeing felon, imminent destruction of evidence, need to prevent a suspect's escape, or risk of danger to the police or to other persons inside or outside the dwelling." Id. at 723 n. 5.
Additionally, warrantless entries and searches are allowed when the police reasonably believe that a person within the dwelling is in need of immediate aid, Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 2413, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978), or the occupants of a house are missing under unusual circumstances. State v. Epperson, 571 S.W.2d 260, 264-65 (Mo.banc 1978). The Epperson court suggested, albeit by dicta, that an objective standard was sufficient when officers, in good faith, search for missing persons in unusual circumstances or when they, in good faith, enter a building based on medical emergency factors. Id.6
When, as here, there is little or no dispute about the facts, the question of whether the Fourth Amendment has been violated is a question of law and is therefore reviewed de novo. State v. Kimberley, 103 S.W.3d 850, 856 [11] (Mo.App.2003)
In this case, two police officers arrived on the scene; however, only one...
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