State v. Simpson
| Decision Date | 19 May 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 34,488.,34,488. |
| Citation | 388 P.3d 277 |
| Parties | STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Tommy SIMPSON, Defendant–Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of New Mexico |
Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General, Laura E. Horton, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellee.
Law Offices of Nancy L. Simmons, P.C., Nancy L. Simmons, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellant.
{1} In this driving while intoxicated (DWI) case, Defendant Tommy Simpson appeals from the denial of his motion to suppress. We understand Defendant's argument to be that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the arresting officer violated his constitutional rights by detaining and seizing him without reasonable suspicion and by opening the door to the car he occupied without first obtaining a warrant. We affirm.
{2} Defendant was charged with a single felony count of aggravated DWI (0.16 or above). NMSA 1978, § 66–8–102(D)(1) (2010). He subsequently filed a motion to suppress, claiming that evidence was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution. The district court denied the motion after a hearing, and Defendant entered a conditional plea of guilty to felony DWI, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion. Farmington Police Department Officer Jonathan Jensen, who arrested Defendant, was the sole witness at the hearing. The following facts derive from his testimony.
{3} Officer Jensen was on duty during the late afternoon of March 1, 2014, when he was dispatched to a Church's Chicken restaurant on Main Street in Farmington, New Mexico. Dispatch told Officer Jensen that a caller had reported a "parked DWI in the parking lot" and described the subject vehicle as a "dark blue Plymouth" with a partial New Mexico license plate of "Y820." Dispatch also told Officer Jensen that the caller reported the following: a male subject had entered the restaurant, he was passed out in the bathroom, and he smelled of an alcoholic beverage. The male got up, left the restaurant, got into the dark blue Plymouth, and moved the car from one parking space to another a few spots away, almost striking several other vehicles in the parking lot.
{4} Officer Jensen arrived at Church's Chicken within minutes of receiving the dispatch call and saw a dark blue vehicle with "very dark tinted windows" backed into a parking spot. He walked around the car and confirmed that the partial license plate number given to him by dispatch matched the vehicle's license plate—"LKY 820." Because of the dark tinted windows, Officer Jensen was initially unable to see inside the car and whether it was occupied. After verifying that this was the correct vehicle, he walked around to the driver's side door, where the window was cracked "a couple of inches," and saw a female in the passenger seat and a man later identified as Defendant in the back seat. There was nobody in the driver's seat, so there was no one to open the driver's side window, and because of the dark tinted windows, Officer Jensen could not see inside the vehicle to determine what the occupants were doing. Under the circumstances, Officer Jensen felt that the safest way to make contact with the occupants was to open the driver's side door. That way, he could remain outside of the vehicle but able to see both occupants while he was conducting his investigation.
{5} After he opened the door, Officer Jensen noted a strong odor of alcohol coming from the car. He observed that the man in the back seat did not appear to be comfortable and that the driver's seat was "pretty far back," suggesting that he had moved the front seat deliberately in order to slide into the back of the car.
{6} After counsel completed direct and cross examination, the district court reviewed with Officer Jensen the information Jensen had received from dispatch. In addition, a video of the encounter was admitted into evidence without objection. Although stating "this seems righteous to me," the judge said he would look at the video before issuing a ruling. The district court rejected Defendant's argument that he had been subjected to a warrantless search or seizure that was presumed to be unreasonable and denied Defendant's motion to suppress the evidence obtained after Officer Jensen "opened the vehicle door and seized" him. In a letter decision explaining its order, the court reasoned:
This is not a stop case. The officer approached a stopped vehicle containing [D]efendant. The vehicle was not blocked. The police unit did not have siren or lights engaged. The officer knocked on the car window, waited for a response (to no avail) and peered through the slightly opened window before opening the door. At the time the officer opened the door, he had reasonable suspicion to pursue the investigation. Due to the dark tint on the car windows, it was appropriate for him to open the door. At the time he asked [D]efendant to exit the vehicle, he had probable cause to arrest based on the earlier dispatch, what he observed, and statements made by [D]efendant.
{7} Defendant subsequently entered a conditional plea of guilty to a DWI 5th offense, a fourth degree felony, Section 66–8–102(D)(1), (H), reserving the right to appeal the suppression issue and to withdraw his guilty plea, if successful.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
{8} On appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress, we determine under de novo review whether the district court correctly applied the law to the facts, State v. Garcia,
2009–NMSC–046, ¶ 9, 147 N.M. 134, 217 P.3d 1032, viewing the facts "in a manner most favorable to the prevailing party" and deferring to the district court's "findings of historical fact so long as they are supported by substantial evidence." State v. Jason L., 2000–NMSC–018, ¶ 10, 129 N.M. 119, 2 P.3d 856 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Where there are no findings of fact, we "indulge in all reasonable presumptions in support of the district court's ruling." Id. ¶ 11 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Absent a contrary indication in the record, "we presume the court believed all uncontradicted evidence." Id.
{9} Although Defendant mentions Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution, he does not explain how that provision affords more protection than the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution in the context of this appeal. We therefore assume without deciding that both constitutions afford equal protection in this context and analyze the constitutionality of the challenged conduct under one uniform standard. State v. Gomez, 1997–NMSC–006, ¶ 22, 122 N.M. 777, 932 P.2d 1.
{10} Defendant states the question presented as "whether opening the car door was a detention of the occupants and/or a search of the vehicle and, if so[,] whether the officer required a warrant to do either." He contends that Officer's Jensen's conduct in opening the door "was both a seizure of the occupants and a search of the vehicle" requiring a warrant or at least "reasonable suspicion to believe that a crime had been committed." The State does not disagree that there was an investigatory detention and seizure but argues that the challenged conduct was supported by a reasonable suspicion that, minutes before Officer Jensen arrived, Defendant had driven the car while intoxicated and that no warrant was required "[b]ecause of the exigent circumstances inherent to the crime of DWI, including both preservation of evidence and public safety[.]" As in all cases in the search and seizure context, the ultimate question is whether Officer Jensen's conduct was objectively reasonable under the totality of the circumstances confronting him. See State v. Funderburg, 2008–NMSC–026, ¶ 10, 144 N.M. 37, 183 P.3d 922. Applying the governing standards to the record before us, viewed in the light most favorable to the State as the prevailing party, we hold that it was.
{11} A police officer may approach and detain a person to investigate possible criminal behavior, even if there is no probable cause to make an arrest, "if the officer is aware of specific articulable facts, together with rational inferences from those facts, that, when judged objectively, would lead a reasonable person to believe criminal activity occurred or was occurring." State v. Lope, 2015–NMCA–011, ¶ 18, 343 P.3d 186 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), cert. denied, 2014–NMCERT–010, 339 P.3d 425 ; see Funderburg, 2008–NMSC–026, ¶ 14, 144 N.M. 37, 183 P.3d 922 . Whether an investigatory detention is justified by reasonable suspicion depends on the totality of the circumstances, Jason L., 2000–NMSC–018, ¶ 20, 129 N.M. 119, 2 P.3d 856, including "the content of information possessed by the police and its degree of reliability." State v. Contreras, 2003–NMCA–129, ¶ 5, 134 N.M. 503, 79 P.3d 1111 ; see Lope, 2015–NMCA–011, ¶ 18, 343 P.3d 186 ( this standard). "Determinations of reasonable suspicion are reviewed de novo." Garcia, 2009–NMSC–046, ¶ 9, 147 N.M. 134, 217 P.3d 1032 ; see Funderburg, 2008–NMSC–026, ¶ 10, 144 N.M. 37, 183 P.3d 922 .
{12} An investigatory detention is a seizure subject to the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness requirement. Contreras, 2003–NMCA–129, ¶ 5, 134 N.M. 503, 79 P.3d 1111 ; see U.S. Const. amend. IV (). " ‘Reasonableness ... depends on a balance between the public interest and the individual's...
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