State v. Singleton

Decision Date26 September 2006
Docket NumberNo. 25551.,25551.
Citation97 Conn.App. 679,905 A.2d 725
CourtConnecticut Court of Appeals
PartiesSTATE of Connecticut v. Ronald M. SINGLETON.

Kent Drager, senior assistant public defender, for the appellant (defendant).

Toni M. Smith-Rosario, assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Michael Dearington, state's attorney, and James G. Clark, senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

FLYNN, C.J., and SCHALLER and DUPONT, Js.

SCHALLER, J.

The defendant, Ronald M. Singleton, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of manslaughter in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-55 (a)(1).1 On appeal the defendant claims that (1) the state failed to adduce evidence sufficient to disprove that he was acting in self-defense, (2) the trial court improperly instructed the jury on the issue of self-defense and (3) the court improperly instructed the jury on the elements of manslaughter. The defendant cannot prevail as to his first claim on appeal, but we determine that the court improperly instructed the jury regarding the degree of force used in self-defense, thereby depriving him of the right to present a defense. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of conviction and remand the case for a new trial.2

From the evidence presented at trial, the jury reasonably could have found the following facts. The defendant and the victim, Leonard Cobbs, had used illegal drugs together. The victim purchased these drugs with the defendant's money. The defendant was angry that the victim had failed to reimburse him for his share of the drugs. On December 18, 2002, the defendant attempted to find the victim to collect this debt and traveled to both West Haven and New Haven in order to locate him. He eventually found the victim in the Newhall area of West Haven.

The two men spoke and the defendant demanded that the victim pay him. The victim indicated that he did not have the money. The victim agreed to go to the defendant's apartment later that day to repay his debt of $180. After arriving at the apartment, the victim again informed the defendant that he did not have the money, but offered to perform oral sex as an alternative means to settle the debt. The defendant rejected this proposal and became angry. The defendant then threatened the victim by stating: "Yo, I'll fuck you up." At approximately 6:45 p.m., a physical altercation between the two men commenced. The victim and the defendant moved around the room while engaged in this physical altercation. During this encounter, the defendant stabbed the victim several times with both a knife and a screwdriver.3 The stab wound that caused the victim's death was seven and one-half inches deep, running from left to right and was caused by a downward strike.4 This wound penetrated the chest wall, a portion of the left lung, the pericardium and the heart, and the diaphragm, terminating in the liver. The length, depth and size of the wound all were consistent with having been caused by the knife blade.

The defendant did not call the police or paramedics immediately, but instead disposed of the knife blade, which had broken off from the handle, and attempted to clean up the apartment. More than thirty minutes after the altercation had ended, at approximately 7:22 p.m., the defendant called his girlfriend, Victoria Salas. After arriving at the apartment, she attempted to revive the victim and called 911. At approximately 8:51 p.m., the defendant, using Salas' cellular telephone, called the building maintenance supervisor, Richard McCann. McCann helped the defendant retrieve the knife blade that he had thrown down the garbage chute. At 9:06 p.m., Salas telephoned the police department, and officers arrived more than two hours after the fight. The officers discovered blood throughout the defendant's apartment. The knife had the victim's blood on it. The screwdriver had DNA from the victim on the handle, blood from the defendant on the shaft, and a mixture of blood on the tip with the defendant's DNA as the major contributor. One of the detectives observed that the defendant was bleeding from the middle of his chest and that there was a bloodstain on his shirt approximately the size of a fifty cent piece. This wound later was determined to have been caused by the screwdriver.5

The defendant raised the issue of self-defense at trial. The defense was premised on the defendant's version of the fight. The defendant testified that after he had asked the victim to repay him in the apartment, the victim became verbally aggressive and pulled out the screwdriver and threatened him. The victim then stabbed the defendant in the chest, and a struggle ensued. The defendant managed to disarm the victim, and they continued to struggle. Eventually, the victim grabbed the knife. The defendant managed to grab the victim's wrists and at some point, the knife went into the victim's body, ending the struggle. The jury rejected this defense and convicted the defendant of the lesser included offense of manslaughter in the first degree.6 The court sentenced the defendant to a term of twenty years incarceration. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.

As a preliminary matter, we identify certain legal principles applicable to our entire discussion. "Under our Penal Code . . . a defendant has no burden of persuasion for a claim of self-defense; he has only a burden of production. . . . Once the defendant has done so, it becomes the state's burden to disprove the defense beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . As these principles indicate, therefore, only the state has a burden of persuasion regarding a self-defense claim: it must disprove the claim beyond a reasonable doubt." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Hurdle, 85 Conn.App. 128, 144, 856 A.2d 493, cert. denied, 271 Conn. 942, 861 A.2d 516 (2004); State v. Knighton, 7 Conn.App. 223, 231-32, 508 A.2d 772 (1986); see also General Statutes § 53a-12 (a).

General Statutes § 53a-19 (a) provides in relevant part that "a person is justified in using reasonable physical force upon another person to defend himself . . . from what he reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of physical force, and he may use such degree of force which he reasonably believes to be necessary for such purpose; except that deadly physical force may not be used unless the actor reasonably believes that such other person is (1) using or about to use deadly physical force, or (2) inflicting or about to inflict great bodily harm." "`Deadly physical force' means physical force which can be reasonably expected to cause death or serious physical injury . . . ." General Statutes § 53a-3 (5). We now turn to the specific claims raised by the defendant.

I

The defendant first claims that the state failed to adduce evidence sufficient to disprove that he was acting in self-defense. Specifically, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was not justified in using the degree of force that he did.7 We disagree.

As a preliminary matter, we note that in light of our resolution of the defendant's claim pertaining to the improper jury instruction, we will not address every claim that he has raised. Nevertheless, we must address the sufficiency of the evidence claim since the defendant would be entitled to an acquittal of the charge on which he claims insufficient evidence if he prevails on his claim. See State v. Smith, 73 Conn.App. 173, 178, 807 A.2d 500, cert. denied, 262 Conn. 923, 812 A.2d 865 (2002); see also State v. Theriault, 38 Conn.App. 815, 823 n. 7, 663 A.2d 423 ("[a]lthough we find the defendant's [jury charge claim] dispositive, we must address the sufficiency of the evidence claim since the defendant would be entitled to an acquittal of the charge if she prevails on this claim"), cert. denied, 235 Conn. 922, 666 A.2d 1188 (1995).

The standard of review applicable to evidentiary insufficiency claims employs a two part test. "[W]e first construe the evidence most favorably to upholding the defendant's conviction, then ask whether a jury, upon the facts so construed and the reasonable inferences that follow, could have found the elements of [the crime] proven beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . In conducting our review, we are mindful that the finding of facts, the gauging of witness credibility and the choosing among competing inferences are functions within the exclusive province of the jury, and, therefore, we must afford those determinations great deference." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Sanchez, 84 Conn.App. 583, 587-88, 854 A.2d 778, cert. denied, 271 Conn. 929, 859 A.2d 585 (2004); see also State v. Chace, 43 Conn.App. 205, 207-208, 682 A.2d 143 (1996). "Our review is a fact based inquiry limited to determining whether the inferences drawn by the jury are so unreasonable as to be unjustifiable." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Fabricatore, 89 Conn.App. 729, 733, 875 A.2d 48, cert. granted on other grounds, 275 Conn. 902, 882 A.2d 678 (2005).

We reiterate that "[s]elf-defense is raised by way of justification, and when such defense is asserted the state shall have the burden of disproving such defense beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . Whether the defense of the justified use of . . . force, properly raised at trial, has been disproved by the state is a question of fact for the jury, to be determined from all the evidence in the case and the reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence. . . . As long as the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to allow the jury reasonably to conclude that the state had met its burden of persuasion, the verdict will be sustained." (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Smith, supra, 73 Conn.App. at 183-84, 807 A.2d 500; State v....

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11 cases
  • State v. Singleton
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Connecticut
    • July 28, 2009
    ...to grab the victim's wrists, and, at some point, the knife went into the victim's body, ending the struggle."6 State v. Singleton, 97 Conn.App. 679, 680-82, 905 A.2d 725 (2006). Both parties requested jury instructions on self-defense. In the state's request to charge, it proposed instructi......
  • State v. Ebron
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Connecticut
    • July 28, 2009
    ...there. But sure the individual factual differences we're going to have to iron out, yeah. "[Defense Counsel]: I did — I believe it was the Singleton case [State v. Singleton, 97 Conn.App. 679, 905 A.2d 725, cert. granted, 280 Conn. 949, 912 A.2d 484 (2006)] that was also involved over there......
  • State v. Pauling
    • United States
    • Appellate Court of Connecticut
    • July 17, 2007
    ...a self-defense claim: it must disprove the claim beyond a reasonable doubt." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Singleton, 97 Conn.App. 679, 683, 905 A.2d 725, cert. granted on other grounds, 280 Conn. 949, 912 A.2d 484 The defendant cites no legal precedent in support of his cont......
  • State v. Lewis, 28791.
    • United States
    • Appellate Court of Connecticut
    • April 21, 2009
    ...Golding analysis of a sufficiency of the evidence claim...." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Singleton, 97 Conn.App. 679, 684 n. 7, 905 A.2d 725, cert. granted on other grounds, 280 Conn. 949, 912 A.2d 484 6. When the prosecutor asked the grades or ages of the......
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