State v. Sinnard

• Docket Number: 123,687
• Decision Date: 16 February 2024
• Citation: 543 P.3d 525
• Parties: STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Joshua F. SINNARD, Appellant.
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

543 P.3d 525

STATE of Kansas, Appellee,

v.Joshua F. SINNARD, Appellant.

No. 123,687

Supreme Court of Kansas.

Oral, Argument Held September 13, 2023.

Opinion Filed February 16, 2024.

Syllabus by the Court

1.Appellate courts review a district court’s decision to grant a continuance under the speedy trial exceptions in K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 22-3402(e) for an abuse of discretion.A district court abuses its discretion if its decision (1) is based on an error of law—if the discretion is guided by an erroneous legal conclusion; (2) is based on an error of fact—if substantial competent evidence does not support a factual finding on which a prerequisite conclusion of law or the exercise of discretion is based; or (3) is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable—if no reasonable person would have taken the view adopted by the trial court.The party claiming error bears the burden to show the district court abused its discretion.

2. K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 22-3402(e)(4) imposes several conditions on the use of the crowded-docket exception to Kansas’ speedy trial statute.First, the district court may order only one continuance based on a crowded docket.Second, the district court must order the continuance within the original speedy trial deadline.Third, the new trial date must be not more than 30 days after the limit otherwise applicable.And fourth, the record must show that other pending cases, rather than secondary matters such as witness availability, prevented the court from setting the trial within the speedy trial deadline.

3.When a defendant argues the district court abused its discretion by making an error of fact because the record does not support the district court’s crowded-docket finding, we review that finding for substantial competent evidence.Substantial competent evidence is such legal and relevant evidence as a reasonable person might regard as sufficient to support a conclusion.An appellate court does not reweigh conflicting evidence, evaluate witness credibility, or determine questions of fact, and the court presumes the district court found all facts necessary to support its judgment.

4. K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 60-456 provides guidelines for the admissibility of lay and expert opinion testimony.The distinction between lay and expert witness testimony is that lay testimony results from a process of reasoning familiar in everyday life, while expert testimony results from a process of reasoning which can be mastered only by specialists in the field.

5. K.S.A. 60-404 directs that a verdict shall not be set aside, or a judgment reversed, based on the erroneous admission of evidence without a timely and specific objection.In other words, the statute is a legislative mandate limiting the authority of Kansas appellate courts to address evidentiary challenges.Thus, much like jurisdictional issues, appellate courts may consider a party’s compliance with K.S.A. 60-404 on their own initiative.

6.Like many evidentiary determinations considered on appeal, an appellate court reviews a trial court’s admission or exclusion of hearsay statements for an abuse of discretion.Hearsay is defined as evidence of a statement which is made other than by a witness while testifying at the hearing, offered to prove the truth of the matter stated.Out-of-court statements that are not offered to prove the truth of the matter stated are not hearsay under K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 60-460.The theory behind the hearsay rule is that when a statement is offered as evidence of the truth of the matter stated, the credibility of the declarant is the basis for its reliability, and the declarant must therefore be subject to cross-examination.

7.A jury instruction that omits an essential element of the crime charged is legally erroneous.

Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in an unpublished opinion filed October 7, 2022.Appeal from Douglas District Court; James R. Mccabria, judge.

Corrine E. Gunning, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and was on the briefs for appellant.

Jon Simpson, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Suzanne Valdez, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were with him on the brief for appellee.

The opinion of the court was delivered by Wall, J.:

In July 2017, Joshua F. Sinnard arranged to have sex with a 17-year-old in exchange for money.The State charged Sinnard with commercial sexual exploitation of a child.Sinnard’s trial began after the speedy trial deadline in K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 22-3402(a).But before that deadline had lapsed, the district court invoked the crowded-docket exception.That exception authorizes the district court to grant a one-time continuance for up to 30 days if the court’s docket cannot accommodate another trial setting within the original speedy trial deadline.Sinnard’s trial began within 30 days of his original speedy trial deadline.

At trial, the investigating detective testified as a lay witness about the contents of Sinnard’s phone records from the day of the incident and explained in general terms how cell phones connect to cell towers.The detective also testified to the contents of Sinnard’s phone records during a two-week period before and after the incident, even though those records had not been admitted into evidence.A jury convicted Sinnard as charged And a panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed.State v. Sinnard, No. 123,687, 2022 WL 5287901(Kan. App.2022)(unpublished opinion).

Sinnard now challenges the Court of Appeals’ judgment ori four grounds.First, he argues the district court erred by invoking the crowded-docket exception.But the district court’s continuance satisfied the statutory conditions for invoking the exception.Substantial competent evidence supports the district court’s crowded-docket finding.And the district court’s decision to continue Sinnard’s trial was not objectively unreasonable.Thus, Sinnard has failed to show that the district court abused its discretion or that the panel erred by affirming that decision.

Second, Sinnard continues to argue that the detective’s lay testimony about how to interpret Sinnard’s cell phone call records from the day of the incident and his general explanation about how cell phones connect to cell towers was inadmissible expert opinion testimony.But Sinnard has failed to preserve his challenge to the detective’s testimony about the contents of Sinnard’s cell phone records.And the detective’s comments about cell phone connectivity were not so specialized as to bring them within the realm of expert opinion testimony.

Sinnard also contends that the detective’s testimony about the contents of Sinnard’s unadmitted phone records before and after the incident was inadmissible hearsay that affected the verdict.Granted, the district court erred by admitting this hearsay testimony, but we agree with the panel’s conclusion that this error was harmless given the abundance of other evidence corroborating the victim’s account of the incident.

Third, Sinnard claims that the jury instruction on commercial sexual exploitation of a child was clearly erroneous.But the elements instruction given to the jury was legally appropriate and included the culpable mental state for that crime.While Sinnard’s proposed instruction was also legally appropriate, the instructions given accurately stated the law and were not reasonably likely to confuse the jury.

Finally, Sinnard argues the panel erred by holding that cumulative error did not deprive him of a fair trial.But having found only one harmless error, Sinnard is not entitled to relief under the cumulative error doctrine.

Thus, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals and affirm Sinnard’s conviction.

Facts and Procedural Background

On July 25, 2017, 17-year-old P.F. went to the Tonganoxie Public Library around noon.While there, she decided that she wanted to go meet a Wend at the Legends Outlet Mall in Kansas City.She asked her mom, M.F., if she could go, but M.F. said no. P.F. then started looking for other ways to get there.

P.F. saw a Snapchat from a user named "Wamma Jamma" asking if anyone wanted to make $200.P.F. understood this to mean having sex with someone in exchange for money.P.F. responded to Wamma Jamma’s message.P.F. then received a message on Snapchat from another user named "Blu."Blu told P.F. his name was Josh, and he would pick her up at the Tonganoxie Public Library.Police later determined that the Snapchat account using the name "Blu" was associated with Sinnard’s phone number and e-mail address.And at trial, P.F. identified Sinnard as the man who picked her up at the library.

When P.F. got into Sinnard’s car, they had a short conversation.They agreed Sinnard would take P.F. to his apartment in Lawrence to have sex and then he would drive her to the Legends and pay her on the way there.They left the library around 12:30 p.m. P.F. testified they took the "back way" to Lawrence "on [highways] 24 40" though she could not remember the exact route.During the drive, Sinnard told P.F. he worked at a car dealership.

P.F. was not familiar with Lawrence, so she could not exactly recall the location of Sinnard’s apartment.But she remembered going down an "older" one-way street with a lot of stoplights and a lot of trees on both sides.When they arrived at Sinnard’s apartment, they again discussed what would happen before going in—they would have sex, and then Sinnard would drive P.F. to the Legends and pay her on the way there.

Sinnard and P.F. spent no more than 30 minutes at Sinnard’s apartment.They had sex in Sinnard’s bedroom.He then drove P.F. to the Legends, traveling on I-70.On the way, he gave P.F. $200 in $20 bills.

At the Legends, P.F. met up with her friend and they spent the afternoon and evening there.Using the $200 she had just received, P.F. bought some items from Victoria’s Secret and some food.A friend of her friend then gave her a ride back to Tonganoxie in exchange for the rest of P.F.’s cash.

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