State v. Sisneros

• Decision Date: 10 February 2022
• Docket Number: 20200455-SC
• Citation: 2022 UT 7
• Parties: State of Utah, Petitioner, v. Landon Sisneros, Respondent.
• Court: Utah Supreme Court

2022 UT 7

State of Utah, Petitioner, v. Landon Sisneros, Respondent.

No. 20200455-SC

Supreme Court of Utah

February 10, 2022

Heard October 18, 2021

On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals

Second District, Ogden The Honorable Joseph M. Bean No. 171901921

Sean D. Reyes, Att'y Gen., Lindsey Wheeler, Asst. Solic. Gen Utah Attorney General, Rachel Snow, Weber County Attorney's Office, for petitioner

Emily Adams, Cherise Bacalski, Freya Johnson, Bountiful, for respondent

Justice Himonas authored the opinion of the Court in which Chief Justice Durrant, Justice Pearce, and Justice Petersen joined.

OPINION

Himonas, Justice

INTRODUCTION

¶1 The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects a defendant from being subjected to multiple prosecutions for the same offense. Utah extends this protection even further-protecting, by statute, a defendant from multiple prosecutions for different offenses committed as part of a single criminal episode. See Utah Code §§ 76-1-401 to -403 (Single Criminal Episode Statute); see also State v. Ririe, 2015 UT 37, ¶ 6, 345 P.3d 1261.

¶2 In this case, we are asked to interpret the confines of Utah's Single Criminal Episode Statute as they relate to the multiple prosecutions of defendant Landon Sisneros for the robbery and theft of a used car. Sisneros argues that the State violated the Single Criminal Episode Statute by prosecuting him in Weber County for aggravated robbery after he had already been convicted of theft by receiving in Utah County for conduct arising under the same criminal episode. The court of appeals agreed and dismissed the Weber County charge.

¶3 The State now appeals, arguing that Sisneros's offenses were not part of a single criminal episode because they involved different victims, and, in any event, the Single Criminal Episode Statute does not apply because the district court in Utah County did not have jurisdiction to hear both offenses. We reject the State's arguments, and we affirm the court of appeals' decision to dismiss the Weber County charge of aggravated robbery against Sisneros.

¶4 It is difficult to imagine a more obvious single criminal episode than stealing a car and driving away with it. While the offenses for which Sisneros was charged may have involved separate victims, the totality of the circumstances demonstrates that the overarching criminal objective behind Sisneros's conduct was the same: namely, to steal a car. Likewise, even though Sisneros committed the theft offense across multiple jurisdictions, the clear terms of the Single Criminal Episode Statute dictate that the State should have brought the charges in a court with jurisdiction over both offenses. Neither party disputes that the district courts in Weber County had jurisdiction over both offenses in question. Accordingly, we find that the conviction of Sisneros in Utah County for theft by receiving barred the State's subsequent prosecution of Sisneros in Weber County for aggravated robbery.

BACKGROUND

¶5 The following facts are undisputed. On August 11, 2017, Sisneros stole a used car in Weber County. The owner of the car (the Son) had arranged for Sisneros to meet the Son's father (the Father) for a test drive. After the test drive, Sisneros decided to keep the car without paying for it. The Father chased Sisneros and jumped on the hood of the car, yelling at Sisneros not to take the car. Sisneros motioned for the Father to get out of the way, revved the engine, and then hit the Father with the car-bruising the Father's knee. Sisneros then drove the car off to Utah County.

¶6 The next day, the Orem Police Department found the car in Utah County-abandoned, empty, and locked. The Orem Police arrested Sisneros and informed the police in Weber County of the arrest. Sisneros admitted to the Orem Police that he stole the Son's car and that he threw the car's keys out the window near a highway overpass.

¶7 On August 16, 2017, the Utah County Attorney's Office charged Sisneros with theft by receiving stolen property and obstruction of justice. On August 22, 2017, the Weber County Attorney's Office charged Sisneros with aggravated robbery. Sisneros pleaded guilty to the felony theft by receiving and obstruction of justice charges in Utah County's Fourth District Court.

¶8 Nearly one year later, Weber County prosecutors chose to move forward with a second prosecution of Sisneros for aggravated robbery in Weber County's Second District Court. Sisneros moved to dismiss this charge on the ground that it was barred by the Single Criminal Episode Statute. The district court denied Sisneros's motion. After the district court's ruling, Sisneros entered a conditional guilty plea to aggravated robbery, reserving his right to appeal pursuant to rule 11(j) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.

¶9 The court of appeals reversed the district court's denial of Sisneros's motion to dismiss, finding that the Weber County charge of aggravated robbery was, in fact, barred by the Single Criminal Episode Statute. State v. Sisneros, 2020 UT App 60, ¶ 1, 464 P.3d 180. The State appealed, and we granted certiorari to consider the merits of the State's position.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶10 On certiorari, "we review the decision of the court of appeals and not that of the district court." State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ¶ 25, 63 P.3d 650 (citation omitted). We review "the decision of the court of appeals for correctness, giving no deference to its conclusions of law." State v. Marquina, 2020 UT 66, ¶ 24, 478 P.3d 37 (citation omitted).

ANALYSIS

¶11 The Single Criminal Episode Statute bars the State from subjecting a defendant to "separate trials for multiple offenses" that arise "under a single criminal episode" when "[t]he offenses are within the jurisdiction of a single court" and "are known to the prosecuting attorney at the time the defendant is arraigned on the first information or indictment." Utah Code § 76-1-402(2). If a defendant has been prosecuted and convicted "for one or more offenses arising out of a single criminal episode," the State is barred from prosecuting the defendant again "for the same or a different offense arising out of the same criminal episode" when "the subsequent prosecution is for an offense that was or should have been tried under Subsection 76-1-402(2)." Id. § 76-1-403(1).

¶12 In other words, for Sisneros to succeed in his motion to dismiss his criminal charge on the grounds that it is barred by his prior prosecution under the Single Criminal Episode Statute, he must establish:

(1) The prior prosecution and subsequent charge arose under a "single criminal episode," id. § 76-1-401;

(2) The prior charge and subsequent charge were "within the jurisdiction of a single court," id. § 76-1-402(2)(a);

(3) At the time of his arraignment on the prior charge, the prosecuting attorney knew of the other potential charge, id. § 76-1-402(2)(b); and

(4) The prior charge resulted in a conviction, ^[1] id. § 76-1-403(1)(b)(ii).

¶13 The court of appeals dismissed the State's subsequent charge of aggravated robbery against Sisneros based upon findings that all four of these conditions were satisfied. On certiorari, the State challenges the court of appeals' findings on the first two conditions only-namely, whether the two offenses for which Sisneros was charged arose under a "single criminal episode" and whether they were "within the jurisdiction of a single court." As explained further below, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals and find that both offenses arose from a single criminal episode and that both offenses were within the jurisdiction of a single court.

I. BOTH OFFENSES AROSE FROM A SINGLE CRIMINAL EPISODE

¶14 The Single Criminal Episode Statute sets forth a two-prong definition of "single criminal episode." See Utah Code § 76-1-401. First, the offenses must be "closely related in time." Id. Second, the offenses must be "incident to an attempt or an accomplishment of a single criminal objective." Id. We find that both prongs are satisfied.

¶15 On the first prong, there is no question, and the parties do not dispute, that both offenses were "closely related in time." Sisneros intended to deprive the Son of the used car the moment he took it from the Father in Weber County. In so doing, Sisneros committed the theft by receiving offense at the exact same time as the aggravated robbery offenses. See Utah Code § 76-6-408(2) ("A person commits theft if the person receives, retains, or disposes of the property of another knowing that the property is stolen or believing that the property is probably stolen . . . intending to deprive the owner of the property."); id. § 76-6-302(1) ("A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing robbery, he . . . takes or attempts to take an operable motor vehicle.").

¶16 On the second prong, whether Sisneros's theft by receiving and aggravated robbery offenses were both "incident to an attempt or an accomplishment of a single criminal objective" is a question of fact that must be viewed under the totality of the circumstances.^[2] See State v Rushton, 2017 UT 21, ¶¶ 10, 12, 395 P.3d 92; see also State v. Selzer, 2013 UT App 3, ¶ 26, 294 P.3d 617 ("Whether or not there is a single criminal objective depends on the specific facts of the case viewed under . . . the totality of the circumstances." (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). In Rushton, we articulated several non-exhaustive factors our courts have utilized to analyze whether a defendant's conduct was "incident to an attempt or an accomplishment of a single criminal objective." Rushton, 2017 UT 21, ¶¶ 1, 3. In particular, we instructed courts to examine "the...