State v. Skinner.

• Citation: 132 Conn. 163,43 A.2d 76
• Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut
• Decision Date: 01 June 1945
• Parties: STATE v. SKINNER.

132 Conn. 163

43 A.2d 76

STATE

v.SKINNER.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

June 1, 1945.

Earl W. Skinner was convicted under an information of the crime of incest and he appeals.

Error and new trial ordered.

BROWN and JENNINGS, JJ., dissenting.

Thomas J. Birmingham and James F. Kennedy, both of Hartford, for appellant.

John P. Hodgson, Asst. State's Atty., of Hartford, Hugh M. Alcorn, Jr., State's Atty, and Charles S. House, Asst. State's Atty., both of Hartford, for appellee.

Before MALTBIE, C. J., and ELLS and DICKENSON, JJ.

ELLIS, Judge.

The defendant, Earl Skinner, and his half sister Mildred were tried and convicted upon an information charging them with incest, in violation of General Statutes, § 6229. Earl Skinner has appealed.

The statute provides as follows: ‘Every man and woman who shall marry or carnally know each other, being within any of the degrees of kindred specified in section 5148, shall be imprisoned * * *.’ Among the degrees of kindred specified in the latter section is that of brother and sister. The defendant claims that the relationship of half sister does not come within the prohibition. It is admitted in his brief that all the cases which the defendant's counsel have found are to the contrary, and that public policy would indicate that relationship of the half blood should be included in the prohibition of the incest statute. Among the cases which directly hold that, as used in statutes punishing incest, the word ‘brother’ includes a brother of the half blood, and the word ‘sister’ includes a sister of the half blood, are the following: State v. Wyman, 59 Vt. 527, 8 A. 900, 59 Am.Rep. 753; Shelly v. State, 95 Tenn. 152, 31 S.W. 492, 49 Am.St.Rep. 926; Burdue v. Commonwealth, 144 Ky. 428, 432, 138 S.W. 296. See also 5 Words and Phrases, Perm. Ed., p. 845; 31 C.J. 377; 27 Am.Jur. 289. In the leading case of State v. Wyman, supra, 59 Vt. 529, 8 A. 900, 59 Am.Rep. 753, decided in 1887, the court said: ‘* * * the generally understood significance of the word ‘brother,’ as used in the common affairs of life, and as defined by the lexicographers of recognized authority, should be adopted in the construction of the statute.' Cases decided subsequent to this decision have, so far as we have been able to ascertain, reached a like result. In view of the purpose of the statute now under consideration, its language, and the soundness of the decisions we have cited, we held that the word sister, as used in the statute, applies to and includes a half sister.

The defendant claims that the trial court erred in finding upon all the evidence that he was guilty of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. The state was required to prove both the fact that the crime had been committed and the defendant's agency therein. It offered evidence from which the court found that the defendant, after his arrest, voluntarily confessed to a police officer that he had had sexual intercourse with his sister upon three occasions. In his testimony at the trial, however, the defendant denied that he had had relations with her. The utility of such an extrajudicial confession is fully discussed in State v. LaLouche, 116 Conn. 691, at page 693, 166 A. 252, where we said that the corpus delicti-the fact that the specific crime charged has been committed by some one-cannot be established by the extrajudicial confession of the defendant unsupported by corroborative evidence; that, although the confession is evidence tending to prove both the fact that the crime was committed and the defendant's agency therein, it is not sufficient of itself to prove the former, and, without evidence aliunde of facts also tending to prove the corpus delicti, it is not enough to warrant a conviction; and that there must be such extrinsic corroborative evidence as will, when taken in connection with the confession, establish the corpus delicti in the mind of the trier beyond a reasonable doubt. We went on to say, 116 Conn. at page 695, 166 A. at page 253: ‘The independent evidence must tend to establish that the crime charged has been committed and must be material and substantial, but need not be such as would establish the corpus delicti beyond a reasonable doubt apart from the confession.’ The defendant's claim is that the state did not produce ‘material and substantial’ evidence that the crime of incest had been committed.

The finding serves the purpose of showing the conclusions reached by the trial court upon conflicting testimony which, if reasonably reached, must be accepted....