State v. Skipper

• Decision Date: 29 June 2005
• Docket Number: No. 2004-KA-2137.,2004-KA-2137.
• Citation: 906 So.2d 399
• Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. Glenn D. SKIPPER.
• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

906 So.2d 399

STATE of Louisiana v. Glenn D. SKIPPER.

No. 2004-KA-2137.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

June 29, 2005.

Hon. Charles C. Foti, Jr., Attorney General, Hon. Eddie J. Jordan, Jr., District Attorney, Michael Gerard Morales, Assistant District Attorney, Counsel for Appellant.

Charles Gary Wainwright, New Orleans, LA, Counsel for Appellee.

TRAYLOR, J.

The state directly appeals a ruling of the trial court granting the defendant's motion to quash the bill of information charging the defendant with being a second felony drug offender and declaring unconstitutional La. R.S. 40:982. Because we find that the statute provides for the sentence enhancement of recidivist drug offenders and not for a separate substantive element which must be placed in the indictment of the present offense, we affirm the granting of the motion to quash and reverse the trial court's determination of the statute's unconstitutionality.

FACTS

On April 16, 2004, the state filed a bill of information charging the defendant, Glenn D. Skipper, with possession of between 28 and 200 grams of crack cocaine, in violation of La. R.S. 40:967. Skipper pleaded not guilty to this charge. On June 21, 2004, the state amended the bill of information to additionally charge the defendant under La. R.S. 40:982, alleging that he had been previously convicted of the same offense, possession of between 28 and 200 grams of crack cocaine, in Case Number 355-081, Division "C" of the Criminal District Court for the Parish of Orleans. On June 29, 2004, the defendant filed a motion to quash the amended bill of information and to declare unconstitutional La. R.S. 40:982. Skipper asserted that, by placing the fact of his prior conviction in the bill of information, reading that charge to the jury and presenting evidence of that prior conviction to the jury at the trial of the instant offense, the state would violate his federal and state constitutional rights in several respects.¹

After a hearing held July 16, 2004, the trial court granted the defendant's motion, quashing the amended bill of information and declaring La. R.S. 40:982 unconstitutional as a violation of an accused's rights against self-incrimination and to a fair trial. Specifically, the trial judge held:

... So, we have somebody that's charged with 28 to 200 grams of cocaine in the Bill of Information and you tell the jury before you try this factual question that he's previously been convicted of 28 to 200 grams, which seems to be violative of the Fifth Amendment Rights. I think the defendant's entitled to be able to come sit down there and let's try the facts in this case. And I think that this thing is unconstitutional, that it does give away the Fifth Amendment Right claim that the defendant has, and I'm going to quash the bill of Information on that basis and let's see what the appellate courts do. But I'm quashing it, I'm quashing the statute on its enhancement provision.

...

I'm not saying double jeopardy. I'm saying it's that you're placing this man, you're making him give up his Fifth Amendment Rights and I just think, basically, Sixth Amendment Fair Trial, I don't think that can ever be a fair trial. In my opinion, how can you have a fair trial when you tell the jury, Hey, he's going to trial on 28 to 200 grams? And guess what, he was convicted of 28 to 200 grams sometime ago. How is that a fair trial?

I'm quashing the statute.²

The state objected to both of the trial court's rulings and perfected a direct appeal to this Court pursuant to La. Const. art. 5, § 5(D).³ Specifically, the state seeks review of the trial court's granting of the motion to quash and the declaration of the statute's unconstitutionality.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

Legislation is the solemn expression of the legislative will; therefore, the interpretation of a statute involves primarily the search for the legislature's intent. La.Code Civ. art. 2; Denham Springs Economic Development Dist. v. All Taxpayers, Property Owners, et. al., XXXX-XXXX p. 6 (La.2/4/05), 894 So.2d 325, 330. Statutes are generally presumed to be constitutional, and any doubt is to be resolved in the statute's favor. State v. Palermo, 2000-2488, 2000-2499 p. 5 (La.5/31/02), 818 So.2d 745, 748. The party challenging the constitutionality of a statute bears a heavy burden in proving that statute to be unconstitutional. Id.

The interpretation of a statute begins with the language of the statute itself. Denham Springs, XXXX-XXXX p. 6, 894 So.2d at 330. "Louisiana criminal statutes must be `given a genuine construction, according to the fair import of their words, taken in their usual sense, in connection with the context, and with reference to the purpose of the provision.'" Palermo, 2000-2488, 2000-2499 p. 5, 818 So.2d at 749, citing La. R.S. 14:3. When a law is clear and unambiguous and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, the law shall be applied as written, and no further interpretation may be made in search of the legislature's intent. La.Code Civ. art. 9; Denham Springs, XXXX-XXXX p. 6-7, 894 So.2d at 330. Detillier v. Kenner Regional Medical Center, XXXX-XXXX p. 4 (La.7/6/04), 877 So.2d 100, 103. When the language of the law is susceptible of different meanings, however, it must be interpreted as having the meaning that best conforms to the purpose of the law, and the meaning of ambiguous words must be sought by examining the context in which they occur and the text of the law as a whole. La.Code Civ. arts. 10 and 12; Detillier, XXXX-XXXX p. 4, 877 So.2d at 103.

La. R.S. 40:982 provides:

A. Any person convicted of any offense under this part, if the offense is a second or subsequent offense, shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment that is twice that otherwise authorized or to payment of a fine that is twice that otherwise authorized, or both. If the conviction is for an offense punishable under R.S. 40:966(B), R.S. 40:967(B), R.S. 40:968(B) or R.S. 40:969(B), and if it is the offender's second or subsequent offense, the court may impose in addition to any term of imprisonment and fine, twice the special parole term otherwise authorized.

B. For purposes of this section, an offense shall be considered a second or subsequent offense, if, prior to the commission of such offense, the offender had at any time been convicted of any violation of this state, the United States, any other state of or any foreign country, relating to the unlawful use, possession, production, manufacturing, distribution, or dispensation of any narcotic drug, marijuana, depressant, stimulant, or hallucinogenic drug.

The language of the statute is clear. La. R.S. 40:982 grants to the state the right to seek an enhanced sentence when a person is convicted of a drug-related offense if, prior to the commission of the present conviction, the offender had been convicted of any other drug-related offense. What is left unexplained by the language of the statute is the manner in which the state implements that right. This unanswered question frames the issue now before us.

The state contends that the defendant's prior conviction must be placed in the bill of information charging the second or subsequent drug-related offense and proved as a substantive element of the crime whenever the state intends to invoke the sentencing provisions of La. R.S. 40:982 in the event the defendant is ultimately convicted of the second or subsequent drug-related offense. The defendant responds by claiming that, as a substantive element of the presently-charged offense, the statute violates several of the defendants' constitutional rights, including his rights against self-incrimination and to a fair trial. The defendant additionally argues that the statute provides only for sentence enhancement after conviction of drug-related offenses, similar in effect to the general statute for habitual or multiple offenders, La. R.S. 15:529.1.⁴ Thus, the issue presented here is whether La. R.S. 40:982 creates an additional substantive element to the charged offense, which must be placed in the bill of information, read to the jury, proven at trial, and found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt or whether it is a sentencing enhancement provision, which is the subject of a separate proceeding after conviction which is not presented to the jury before a determination of guilt is made as to the instant offense.

Statutory History

A particularly helpful guide in ascertaining the intent of the legislature is the history of the statute in question and any related legislation. Theriot v. Midland Risk Ins. Co., 1995-2895 p. 4 (La.5/20/97), 694 So.2d 184, 186. La. R.S. 40:982 is found in Part X of Chapter 4 of Title 40 under the heading "Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Law." The initial enactment of this legislation, entitled the "Uniform Narcotic Drug Act," failed to contain a provision for the enhancement of sentences for recidivist offenders. See Acts 1934, 2nd Ex.Sess., No. 14, § 20⁵ and § 25.⁶

Pursuant to the codification of the laws of the State of Louisiana into the Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950, the initial enactment and subsequent amendments of the Uniform Narcotic Drug Law became La. R.S. 40:961-984. Although several amendments were made to the initial enactment, a provision for enhanced sentences for recidivist offenders was not inserted into the law until 1952.⁷ Acts 1952, No. 429, which amended the penalty provisions of the Uniform Narcotic Drug Law, then codified at La. R.S. 40:981 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950, provided in pertinent part:

Persons who are convicted as multiple felonious offenders under the provisions of R.S. 15:529.1 after having been found Guilty as Charged of a violation of this Sub-part shall if Guilty of a second felony be sentenced to imprisonment for a term of not less than fifteen years at hard labor; if Guilty of a third felony to a term of not less than Twenty years at hard labor; and if Guilty of a fourth or subsequent

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