State v. Skunkcap
| Decision Date | 14 June 2013 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 38249,Docket No. 34747,Docket No. 34746,2013 Opinion No. 37 |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
| Parties | STATE OF IDAHO, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. JAMES LEROY SKUNKCAP, Defendant-Appellant. |
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk
Appeal from the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Bannock County. Hon. Peter D. McDermott, District Judge.
Judgment of conviction and enhanced unified sentence of twelve years with five years determinate for eluding a police officer, affirmed; judgment of conviction and consecutive enhanced unified sentence of eighteen years with eight years determinate for grand theft, affirmed; judgment of conviction and sentence for three months for misdemeanor assault, affirmed; judgment of conviction for misdemeanor malicious injury to property, vacated.
Sara B. Thomas, State Appellate Public Defender; Sarah E. Tompkins, Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.
James Leroy Skunkcap appeals from the district court's judgments of conviction and sentences.
Officers observed a man, later identified as Skunkcap, and a woman leave a home (that was under surveillance) in a vehicle reported as stolen. The officers attempted to stop the vehicle. Skunkcap attempted to flee and only stopped after colliding with two police vehicles. In a separate matter, Skunkcap was charged with stealing two saddles out of a horse trailer belonging to a western store. These events resulted in three criminal trials. The first trial,Docket No. 34746, resulted from Skunkcap's collision with the police vehicles. A jury convicted Skunkcap of felony eluding a police officer, Idaho Code § 49-1404(1), (2)(b); malicious injury to property, I.C. § 18-7001; and misdemeanor simple assault, I.C. § 18-902. Following the trial, Skunkcap entered a guilty plea to being a persistent violator. The second trial, Docket No. 34747, involved the theft of two horse saddles and resulted in a jury convicting Skunkcap of grand theft, I.C. §§ 18-2403(1), 18-2407(1). Skunkcap again entered a guilty plea for being a persistent violator.
The district court imposed a unified term of eighteen years with eight years determinate for the felony eluding a police officer conviction, including the persistent violator enhancement. The court imposed a term of six months for misdemeanor malicious injury to property and three months for misdemeanor assault. Skunkcap also received a unified sentence of eighteen years with eight years determinate for his conviction of grand theft with the persistent violator enhancement, to run consecutive to his eluding sentence. Subsequently, Skunkcap sought to withdraw his first guilty plea to being a persistent violator in Docket No. 34746. The district court allowed the guilty plea to be withdrawn and Skunkcap went to trial a third time, Docket No. 38249, where a jury found him to be a persistent violator. The district court then entered a seven-year indeterminate term enhancement to his five-year determinate sentence for the eluding a police officer conviction. Skunkcap filed an Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion and the district court granted the motion in part. Skunkcap timely appeals.
On appeal, Skunkcap raises several issues relative to the separate cases. As to the matter involving collision with the police vehicles, Docket No. 34746, Skunkcap claims that: (1) the district court failed to properly respond to a question from the jury; (2) the jury instructions regarding eluding a police officer and assault were improper; and (3) the prosecutor committed misconduct. As to the matter involving the saddles, Docket No. 34747, Skunkcap contends that: (1) the district court failed to adequately inquire as to a conflict of interest; and (2) the prosecutor committed misconduct. As to the matter involving enhancement, Docket No. 38249, Skunkcap asserts that: (1) the district court imposed an illegal sentence; and (2) the district court failed to adequately inquire as to a conflict of interest.
Skunkcap claims the district court erred by failing to properly instruct the jury in response to the jury's question regarding application of the definition of "malicious." The decision whether or not to give further instructions in response to questions from a jury is at the district court's discretion. I.C.R. 30(c). Therefore, this Court reviews such a decision under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 282, 77 P.3d 956, 971 (2003). The Court exercises free review over a district court's determination as to whether jury instructions contain a defect, ambiguity, or gap with respect to its statements on the law. Id. See also State v. Pinkney, 115 Idaho 1152, 1154, 772 P.2d 1246, 1248 (Ct. App. 1989). In Pinkney, this Court outlined a district court's responsibility when responding to jurors' questions:
In general, it is within the trial court's discretion to determine whether, and the manner in which, to respond to a question posed by the jury during deliberations. I.C.R. 30[(c)]. See also Dawson v. Olson, 97 Idaho 274, 543 P.2d 499 (1975). This grant of discretion is premised on the assumption that the instructions as given are clear, direct and proper statements of the law. Dawson v. Olson, supra. Consequently, if a jury expresses doubt or confusion on a point of law correctly and adequately covered in a given instruction, the trial court in its discretion may explain the given instruction or further instruct the jury but it is under no duty to do so. However, if a jury makes explicit its difficulties with a point of law pertinent to the case, thereby revealing a defect, ambiguity or gap in the instructions, then the trial court has the duty to give such additional instructions on the law as are reasonably necessary to alleviate the jury's doubt or confusion. Dawson v. Olson, supra. See also I.C. §§ 19-2132(a) and 19-2204 ().
Pinkney, 115 Idaho at 1154, 772 P.2d at 1248.
In the instant case, the district court provided the jury with an instruction containing the elements of malicious injury to property. The court also provided the jury with an instruction that "[t]he word 'maliciously' means the desire to annoy or injure another or the intent to do a wrongful act." During deliberations, the jury sent the court the following questions, seeking to clarify that instruction:
At trial, the State presented the testimony of Detective Collins. He testified that officers had been watching a mobile home where they believed an individual, other than Skunkcap, may be. A vehicle that was parked outside was reported as stolen. Later, Skunkcap and a woman left in the vehicle with Skunkcap driving. Skunkcap pulled onto the road and was traveling at a low rate of speed along the shoulder of the road in the wrong lane of travel. At this point, other officers in the area were alerted and began to move. Detective Collins pulled his unmarked truck onto the road to block the opposite lane of travel. A marked police truck approached and activated its overhead lights. Skunkcap then executed a U-turn and began traveling at 20 to 25 miles per hour toward Collins' vehicle. Skunkcap struck the front bumper of Collins' vehicle. Skunkcap put his vehicle in reverse, striking another officer's vehicle within a few feet and then again went forward, striking Collins' vehicle a second time from within a few feet.
After receiving the note from the jury, the district court conducted a hearing to discuss the issue raised by the jury and the responses suggested. In regard to the definition of "maliciously," the State argued that the court should refer to the definition given. Skunkcap first asserted that the jury was concerned with applying the term "maliciously" to the circumstances of the multiple collisions that occurred. Although the State asserted that the sequence of events should not be considered separately, but as one continuous act, Skunkcap argued that the court should instruct the jury that they could analyze application of the term "maliciously" separately as to each collision.1 In addition, Skunkcap argued, "With regard to the unintentional conduct or damages, I would argue that it is not malicious if it's unintended conduct and, therefore, that they should be instructed that unless the damage was intended, it wouldn't be malicious."
As to the definition of "maliciously," the court referred the jury to the given instruction. However, the court went on to explain that the jury could separately apply that term to the individual collisions and that if they found none of the collisions were done maliciously they should respond as not guilty but, on the other hand, if they found any but not all collisions to have been done maliciously, to have the foreperson write on the verdict which of the collisions satisfied that requirement. The jury ultimately found Skunkcap guilty of only the secondcollision with Collins' vehicle. Upon motion by Skunkcap, the district court reduced the conviction to a misdemeanor, finding that the State had failed to prove the requisite $1000 damage caused by the second collision.
On appeal, Skunkcap argues that the district court's response failed to provide the jury with an "adequate and legally correct response to the jurors' question regarding the mens rea for malicious injury to property." Skunkcap claims that the district court should have instructed the jury...
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