State v. Slater
| Decision Date | 04 February 2009 |
| Docket Number | A-72 September Term 2007 |
| Citation | 966 A.2d 461,198 N.J. 145 |
| Court | New Jersey Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Tony L. SLATER, Defendant-Appellant. |
Michael J. Williams, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (Anne Milgram, Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney).
Defendant Tony Slater pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine with intent to distribute and sought to withdraw his plea before sentencing. The sole question in this appeal is whether the trial court correctly denied defendant's motion to set aside the plea.
In evaluating motions to withdraw a guilty plea, trial courts should consider the following factors: (1) whether the defendant has asserted a colorable claim of innocence; (2) the nature and strength of defendant's reasons for withdrawal; (3) the existence of a plea bargain; and (4) whether withdrawal would result in unfair prejudice to the State or unfair advantage to the accused. On balancing those factors in the context of defendant's pre-sentence motion to withdraw, we find that defendant has carried his burden and is entitled to withdraw his guilty plea. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Appellate Division, which affirmed the trial court's ruling.
On March 31, 2002, two officers with the Buena Borough Police Department wanted to question Timmy Hass about a series of burglaries. The officers contacted their counterparts at the Millville Police Department, patrolmen Terry Fawcett and David Kahn, for help in locating Hass. In response, Fawcett and Kahn spoke to a Mr. F. Mr. F. told them that Hass and another person, Jeffrey Neider, both white males, might be located in Room 261 at the Millville Motor Inn. Mr. F. also relayed that the two men probably had one-half ounce of cocaine with them in the room. Fawcett and Kahn checked for outstanding warrants and learned of two warrants for Neider's arrest.
The officers proceeded to Room 261 at the Millville Motor Inn and knocked on the door. An African-American male answered; he gave the officers a false name at first and was later identified as defendant Tony Slater. At this point, the officers had no reason to believe that Slater was involved in any wrongdoing.
Kahn asked Slater if the officers could come in out of the rain and talk with him, and Slater invited them in. Fawcett and Kahn entered the motel room and explained they were looking for Hass and Neider. With Slater's permission, they checked the room to see if anyone else was present but did not find anyone. Slater, sitting on a bed, advised he did not know either man. At around the same time, Fawcett saw what appeared to be a small bag of marijuana in a dresser drawer that was open about six inches. After frisking and handcuffing Slater, the officers opened the drawer and, in addition to the marijuana, found approximately fifteen grams of crack cocaine, a box of Phillies Blunt cigars, and a digital scale.
A grand jury indicted Slater on July 31, 2002 and charged him with third-degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance (CDS) (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1)), second-degree possession of CDS with intent to distribute (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(2)), and third-degree possession of CDS with intent to distribute within a school zone (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5, -7).
Slater moved to suppress the evidence and argued that the warrantless search of the motel room was unlawful. After hearing testimony from Officers Fawcett and Kahn at a suppression hearing on September 3, 2004, the trial court denied Slater's motion. The court found that the officers' entry into the motel room was consensual, and that while in the room the officers inadvertently observed contraband in plain view.
Slater and the State reached a plea agreement afterward. Under the agreement, Slater was to plead guilty to second-degree possession with intent to distribute. In exchange, the State agreed to dismiss the remaining two counts and recommend a five-year prison sentence.
Slater pleaded guilty on December 31, 2004. Consistent with Rule 3:9-2, he acknowledged on the record, among other things, that he understood the terms of the plea agreement; waived his right to a trial; had not been forced or threatened to enter the plea; had not been promised anything else regarding the agreement; and was not under the influence of drugs or alcohol. Slater then provided a factual basis for the plea and admitted that at the time of his arrest, he was in possession of cocaine and was "going to sell or share some or a portion of that cocaine." He acknowledged that the quantity of cocaine was slightly less than fifteen grams.
An hour before the plea, Slater had expressed some dissatisfaction with his attorney. In response to questioning by the trial court during the plea hearing, Slater acknowledged that he had discussed and resolved those issues, that his attorney was able to answer his questions, and that he was satisfied with his lawyer's services. In accepting the plea, the court ruled there was a sufficient factual basis for it and found that Slater entered the plea knowingly, voluntarily, and without coercion. The court scheduled sentencing for February 4, 2005.
Twelve days after the plea hearing, on January 12, 2005, Slater filed a pro se motion for withdrawal of the guilty plea. He attached a handwritten letter to a four-page, pre-printed form set of motion papers, in which he requested to withdraw his guilty plea "for the following reasons: I had no control over the drugs that was found in motel room therefore I should not be punished." In addition, he moved pro se to suppress the evidence found in the room.
Slater's handwritten letter was attached to his presentence report, which was dated January 27, 2005. The offense section of the report recounted that Slater reportedly told police the motel room was rented by his brother-in-law, Tyrone Fowler, and that he was just visiting. Defendant's version of events in the presentence report declared that Slater denied culpability for the offense. He stated that his sister's boyfriend had brought him to the motel room "to chill." Slater reported that neither the cocaine nor the marijuana belonged to him and that he did not know that drugs were in the room. The presentence report noted that Slater wanted to retract his plea.
All parties appeared for sentencing on February 4, 2005. The trial court reviewed Slater's handwritten letter at the outset of the proceeding. Slater then told the court:
That wasn't my room. I was visiting. I had no control [over the drugs].... No, it wasn't my motel room. It was LeShaun Washington's.
....
... [My attorney] had me thinking, well, I go to trial I'm going to lose. And I take the plea, I'll be going home, being that I got so much [jail credit] time in. And that's the only reason I did it. `Cause I'm not guilty.
The trial court ruled that "changing your mind" did not provide a sufficient basis to withdraw a guilty plea and denied Slater's motion. As the court went on to deny Slater's renewed, pro se motion to suppress, Slater protested and repeatedly interrupted the proceedings, declaring "I would like to go to trial" and "[t]his is railroading."
The court followed the recommendation in the plea agreement and sentenced Slater to five years in prison. Slater was also ordered to pay various mandatory fines and penalties.
Slater appealed. He challenged the suppression ruling and argued that the trial court erred in denying the motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The Appellate Division rejected both claims. As to the latter issue, the panel agreed that Slater's "change of mind" provided no basis for withdrawal of his guilty plea under State v. Smullen, 118 N.J. 408, 416, 571 A.2d 1305 (1990).
We granted Slater's petition for certification limited to the plea withdrawal issue. 193 N.J. 275, 937 A.2d 977 (2007).
Slater argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his pre-sentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea, and that the Appellate Division erroneously affirmed that decision. He claims he did not know there were drugs in the motel room and was unaware that the room was registered in someone else's name. As a result, he submits that he is innocent of the charges. He contends that he was not advised of this potential defense and would not have pleaded guilty had he known of it. Slater also claims his attorney pressured him to plead guilty. Slater argues that because plea withdrawals should be liberally granted prior to sentencing, it was an abuse of discretion to deny his motion.
The State claims Slater freely chose to enter into a plea agreement and knowingly and voluntarily admitted his guilt in open court. The State argues that defendants have the burden of proving why they should be allowed to withdraw from a properly entered plea, and that Slater has not met that burden. Rather, the State argues that he changed his mind before sentencing. As a result, the State maintains the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to allow Slater to withdraw his plea.
"[A] guilty plea is the final relinquishment of the most cherished right—to be presumed innocent of crime until a jury of one's peers has determined guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Smullen, supra, 118 N.J. at 414, 571 A.2d 1305. Defendants who plead guilty also waive other guarantees like the right against self-incrimination and the right to confront one's accusers.
Because of the overriding importance of those protections, the court rules are designed to ensure that pleas are supported by a factual basis and are entered voluntarily and knowingly, that is with a full understanding of the charge and the consequences of the plea.
Rule 3:9-2 governs the taking of pleas and...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. S.J.C.
...adopt the less stringent standard for assessing prejudice in the context of motions to withdraw guilty pleas under State v. Slater, 198 N.J. 145, 161, 966 A.2d 461 (2009) (recognizing "[c]ertain facts readily demonstrate prejudice, such as the loss of or inability to locate a needed witness......
-
State v. Ramirez
...872 (2011) (prescribing multiple non-codified factors and procedures to guide eyewitness identification testimony); State v. Slater, 198 N.J. 145, 157-62, 966 A.2d 461 (2009) (prescribing four factors to guide the permissible withdrawal of guilty pleas).5 We recognize that Rule 3:13-3(e)(2)......
-
State v. Bell
...not disclosed on the record, and with an understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea.[ 198 N.J. 145, 155, 966 A.2d 461 (2009) (emphasis added) (quoting R. 3:9-2 ).]At the plea hearing conducted before the trial judge on August 10, 2018, the prosecutor placed o......
-
Smith v. Johnson
...be 'satisfied from the lips of the defendant that he committed the acts which constitute the crime.'" Id. at 196 (quoting State v. Slater, 198 N.J. 145, 155 (2009))."Even if a defendant wished to plead guilty to a crime he or she did not commit, he or she may not do so. No court may accept ......
-
Deal or no deal? Remedying ineffective assistance of counsel during plea bargaining.
...v. Taccetta, 975 A.2d 928 (N.J. 2009). (82.) Id. at 929. (83.) Id. at 935. (84.) Id. at 936. (85.) Id. at 935 (quoting State v. Slater, 966 A.2d 461, 467 (N.J. (86.) See, e.g., United States ex rel. Caruso v. Zelinsky, 689 F.2d 435, 438 (3d Cir. 1982); State v. Kraus, 397 N.W.2d 671, 674 (I......