State v. Smalley
| Decision Date | 26 February 2019 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 46382 |
| Citation | 435 P.3d 1100,164 Idaho 780 |
| Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE of Idaho Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Phillip R. SMALLEY, Defendant-Appellant. |
Erik D. Fredericksen, Idaho State Public Defender, Boise, attorney for Appellant. Erik R. Lehtinen argued.
Hon. Lawrence Wasden, Idaho Attorney General, Boise, attorney for Respondent. Kenneth K. Jorgensen argued.
Following a jury trial, Phillip Smalley was convicted of two counts of sexual abuse of a vulnerable adult and one count of sexual penetration by a foreign object. On appeal, Smalley asserted two claims of error. First, he alleged there was insufficient evidence to sustain his convictions for sexual abuse of a vulnerable adult because to qualify as a "vulnerable adult," the victim must have mental deficits, not just physical infirmity. Second, he argued that the trial court erred in admitting the victim’s preliminary hearing video deposition instead of live in-court testimony, because she was not "unavailable" as required by the Idaho Rules of Evidence. The Court of Appeals upheld Smalley’s convictions. This Court granted his petition for review of the trial court’s decision and we affirm the district court.
Phillip Smalley was employed at an assisted living facility and worked alone as the overnight caregiver. The victim, F.B., was a 102-year-old patient at the facility. F.B. was mentally alert, but she could not walk, roll-over in bed, or stand, and required assistance for all activities of daily living. She could communicate, but needed special aids to hear and spoke in a very soft voice. Because of severe rheumatoid arthritis, F.B.’s hands were deformed, so although she could feed herself, she required a large-handled spoon and finely chopped or pureed food due to difficulty swallowing. F.B. was incontinent and required the use of adult diapers or briefs.
After F.B. alleged that she had been sexually assaulted overnight, she was transported by ambulance to the hospital for a sexual assault examination. During the examination, F.B. mentioned to the nurse that a similar sexual assault had occurred a couple of weeks before. The State charged Smalley, who was F.B.’s caretaker during the shifts in question, with two counts of sexual abuse of a vulnerable adult and one count of sexual penetration by a foreign object. It alleged that Smalley committed the sexual assault of a vulnerable adult by engaging in manual-genital contact with F.B., a vulnerable adult, and by forcibly causing the penetration of F.B.’s genital and/or anal opening against her will.
The State moved to take F.B.’s testimony for the preliminary hearing by video deposition because she was "physically unable to attend court proceedings, including the preliminary hearing" due to her advanced age and bed-ridden status in a hospice facility. The magistrate court granted the motion and the victim’s video testimony was taken at the assisted living facility with Smalley and his counsel in attendance. The video testimony was admitted at the preliminary hearing. The State then moved to admit the deposition video and transcript in lieu of live testimony at the trial. After a hearing on the motion, the trial court found F.B. was unavailable to testify and portions of her deposition video and transcripts were admitted at the trial, despite Smalley’s objections that the video constituted hearsay according to the Idaho Rules of Evidence and violated his rights under the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause.
Smalley was convicted by a jury of two counts of sexual abuse of a vulnerable adult and one count of forcible sexual penetration by a foreign object. The Court of Appeals upheld his convictions and this Court granted Smalley’s petition for review.
1. Was F.B. a "vulnerable adult" under Idaho Code section 18-1505(4)(e) ?
2. Did the trial court err in admitting F.B.’s deposition in lieu of her live testimony in violation of the Confrontation Clause and the Idaho Rules of Evidence?
"In cases that come before this Court on a petition for review of a Court of Appeals decision, this Court gives serious consideration to the views of the Court of Appeals, but directly reviews the decision of the lower court." State v. James , 148 Idaho 574, 576, 225 P.3d 1169, 1171 (2010) (quoting State v. Oliver , 144 Idaho 722, 724, 170 P.3d 387, 389 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted) ).
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law this Court reviews de novo. Hayes v. City of Plummer , 159 Idaho 168, 170, 357 P.3d 1276, 1278 (2015).
The determination of whether a witness is unavailable is mainly an evidentiary question. See State v. Anderson , 162 Idaho 610, 617, 402 P.3d 1063, 1070 (2017). When reviewing the trial court’s evidentiary rulings, this Court applies an abuse of discretion standard. Dulaney v. St. Alphonsus Reg’l Med. Ctr. , 137 Idaho 160, 163–64, 45 P.3d 816, 819–20 (2002). The four-prong standard for discretionary review includes whether: (1) the trial court correctly perceived the issue as discretionary; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason. Lunneborg v. My Fun Life , 163 Idaho 856, 867, 421 P.3d 187, 198 (2018).
Constitutional questions, which can also arise in cases of unavailable witnesses, are reviewed de novo. State v. Dunlap , 155 Idaho 345, 377, 313 P.3d 1, 33 (2013).
One of the elements the State needs to prove in charges of sexual abuse of a vulnerable adult, is that the victim is a vulnerable adult under Idaho Code section 18-1505(4)(e). This subsection defines a vulnerable adult as:
A person eighteen (18) years of age or older who is unable to protect himself from abuse, neglect or exploitation due to physical or mental impairment which affects the person’s judgment or behavior to the extent that he lacks sufficient understanding or capacity to make or communicate or implement decisions regarding his person, funds, property or resources.
Smalley argues that the State failed to meet its burden of proving that F.B. was a vulnerable adult as defined and as such, there was insufficient evidence to sustain his convictions on the two counts of sexual abuse of a vulnerable adult. Specifically, Smalley asserts that the question of whether someone qualifies as a vulnerable adult turns not on their physical abilities, but on their mental capacity. He maintains that the plain language of Idaho Code section 18-1505(4)(e) demonstrates that a person is a vulnerable adult when she is mentally unable to protect herself. He parses the statute’s language, contending that one is a "vulnerable adult" when she "lacks sufficient understanding or capacity to make or communicate or implement decisions ..." I.C. § 18-1505(4)(e) (emphasis added).
158 Idaho 199, 345 P.3d 989 (2015) (emphasis in original). Smalley argues that this holding makes clear that the definition of "vulnerable adult" is couched in terms of mental fitness or capacity, not physical capabilities.
The State argues that the statute is plain and governs Smalley’s conduct here. Deconstructing the statute into its relevant words, the State points out that the statute classifies a vulnerable adult as one who is "unable to protect [her]self from abuse ... due to physical ... impairment which affects the person’s ... behavior to the extent that [s]he lacks sufficient ... capacity to ... implement decisions regarding [her] person ...." I.C. § 18-1505(4)(e). The State contends that it correctly proceeded under the statute since F.B. met this definition, as she was unable to protect herself from abuse because of her inability to implement decisions about her own body. Evidence that F.B. could not even implement decisions such as taking a shower, getting into her own wheelchair, sitting up, or rolling over in bed demonstrates her lack of sufficient capacity to implement decisions regarding her person.
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law this Court reviews de novo. State v. Anderson , 145 Idaho 99, 103, 175 P.3d 788, 792 (2008). "The objective of statutory interpretation is to derive the intent of the legislative body that adopted the act." State v. Schulz , 151 Idaho 863, 866, 264 P.3d 970, 973 (2011) (quoting Farber v. Idaho State Ins. Fund , 147 Idaho 307, 310, 208 P.3d 289, 292 (2009) ). Interpretation of a statute must begin by analyzing its literal language. Schulz , 151 Idaho at 866, 264 P.3d at 973. Provisions should not be read in isolation, but rather within the context of the entire document. Id. Thus, the statute must be considered as a whole, with words being given their plain, usual, and ordinary meanings. Id. The Court must give effect to all the words in the statute so that none will be void or superfluous. Id. If the language of a statute is unambiguous, the intent of the legislative body as reflected by the statute’s plain language must be given effect, and the Court need not consider rules of statutory construction. Id.
Smalley’s analysis of the statute is erroneous under its plain language. The statute’s language provides that one can be a vulnerable...
To continue reading
Request your trial