State v. Smallwood
| Decision Date | 30 September 1975 |
| Citation | 346 A.2d 164 |
| Parties | STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff below, Appellant, v. John SMALLWOOD, Defendant below, Appellee. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Delaware |
Upon appeal from Superior Court. Reversed.
Bernard J. Gartland and James S. Green, Deputy Attys. Gen., Wilmington, for plaintiff below, appellant.
Thomas J. Healy, Jr., of Metten, Healy & Collins, Wilmington, for defendant below, appellee.
Before HERRMANN, Chief Justice, and DUFFY and McNEILLY, Justices.
The determinative question in this appeal involves the construction of a robbery statute.
In a jury trial defendant was convicted of robbery in the first degree, 11 Del.C. § 832(2), under circumstances which, for present purposes, are not in dispute. Thereafter the Trial Judge, Sua sponte, reduced the conviction to robbery in the second degree, 11 Del.C. § 831, because the victims did not actually see a weapon in the possession of defendant or a co-participant. During the robbery one of the participants had placed a hand in his jacket pocket and pointed it in the direction of one of the victims in such a manner as to appear that the robber possessed a weapon. No weapon was recovered nor did the victims at any time actually see what was in the pocket.
These facts, brief as they are, summarize all that need be said about the crime and we now turn to the statutes.
11 Del.C. § 832(2) (as amended 1974) provides:
'A person is guilty of robbery in the first degree when he commits the crime of robbery in the second degree and when, in the course of the commission of the crime or of immediate flight therefrom, he or another participant in the crime:
(2) Displays what appears to be a deadly weapon; . . ..'
As the facts of the case suggest, the critical inquiry is how the word 'displays' should be defined. The Trial Court held that it should be given a commonly accepted meaning appropriate to fulfill the purpose of the law. That, of course, is required under 11 Del.C. § 221(c). 1 The Court then went on and held that by such test 'display' means to 'spread before the view' or 'exhibit to the sight or mind.' Webster's New International Dictionary Merriam (1964). Applying that definition the Court concluded that a person who displays what appears to be a deadly weapon may be convicted of robbery in the first degree even though the apparent weapon is not immediately recovered and the State is unable to prove that it is 'deadly.' We agree with that conclusion but, in our view, the Court gave too narrow a reading to the key word because it implicitly concluded that, absent an exhibition of the weapon to the sight, a robbery is second degree only. 'Display' must be given a broader meaning as suggested by the history of the statute, as well as the dictionary definition which includes also an 'exhibition to the . . . mind.'
Prior to 1974, § 832(2) provided that one who committed robbery 'armed with a deadly weapon' was guilty of robbery in the first degree. See 59 Del.L., ch. 547. The focus of the statute was on the fact of defendant's condition: was he actually 'armed'? did he have a 'weapon'? was it 'deadly'? In other words, conviction required proof that a defendant was in fact armed with a deadly weapon during the commission of a robbery. A victim's reaction to the confrontation was not significant. Not so, however, under the 1974 amendment.
As we read the statute, the law now considers what takes place from the victim's point of view. Thus, there may be a conviction of robbery in the first degree if a defendant 'displays' what 'appears' to be a deadly weapon. Legislative use of the quoted words is significant because they clearly imply an inquiry into the victim's reaction and not into whether an assailant was in fact armed. Compare Annot., 61 A.L.R.2d 998 (1958). It is in this context that the term 'displays' must be considered. As the opinion below and the discussion here indicate, the word is ambiguous and, therefore, construction is required.
As indicated above, the Trial Court limited its meaning to that which is exhibited before the sight or view of a victim and, since nothing had been shown in the robbery, the Court held that it was second degree only. We think, however, that 'display' includes not only the notion of spreading before view or exhibiting to the sight, but also that which is manifested to any of a victim's senses. Webster's New International Dictionary, supra, also defines 'display' as 'an exhibiting or showing of something: an unfolding or opening out to view: exhibition, manifestation . . ..' And 'manifest,' according to the same dictionary, means capable of being readily and instantly perceived by the senses and esp. by the sight . . . capable of being easily understood or recognized at once by the mind . . ..' Thus a weapon may be...
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... ... The lewd nature of the conduct itself, if open and notorious, was the main characteristic of the offense. When state legislatures began codifying various subsets of this common law crime, they did not abandon its "open and notorious" characteristic. The history of ... " Id. (quoting State v. Smallwood, 346 A.2d 164, 167 (Del.1975)). "Thus a weapon may be manifested to a victim even though he may not see it" because the ability to otherwise discern ... ...
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A divided court in more ways than one: the Supreme Court of Delaware and its distinctive model for judicial efficacy, 1997-2003.
...will never be enough to constitute a "display." Id. (120) Id. at 879 (Berger, J., dissenting). (121) Id. (citing State v. Smallwood, 346 A.2d 164, 166 (Del. (122) Id. at 880 (Berger, J., dissenting). (123) Id. at 881 (Berger, J., dissenting). (124) See Dorsey v. State, 761 A.2d 807, 821 (De......