State v. Smallwood

Decision Date15 April 1999
Docket NumberNo. C3-97-1636,C3-97-1636
Citation594 N.W.2d 144
PartiesSTATE of Minnesota, petitioner, Appellant, v. Curtis Marcell SMALLWOOD, Respondent.
CourtMinnesota Supreme Court

Syllabus by the Court

1. Prosecutor who told jury of defendant's offer to a police officer to plead guilty in exchange for a guidelines sentence did not commit misconduct when the defendant's motion to suppress his entire statement was based solely on the grounds of a Scales violation and denied by both the omnibus court and the trial court, and the admissibility of such offers to police officers was not well-settled under Minnesota law.

2. When a defendant exhibited an expectation to negotiate a plea bargain with a police officer and the defendant's expectation is reasonable under the circumstances, the defendant's offer to plead guilty was inadmissible pursuant to Minn. R. Evid. 410.

3. When the evidence of a defendant's guilt was "surely unattributable" to the jury being told in opening statements of the defendant's offer to plead guilty in exchange for a guidelines sentence, the error complained of was harmless.

4. Police officer did not commit misconduct warranting a new trial by his answers on cross-examination which may have implied that defendant had made another 5. Despite the inability of victim to identify defendant, continued detention of the defendant by police was lawful given the circumstances surrounding the defendant's arrest.

statement which the state and defendant had agreed was inadmissible.

6. Defendant's consent to a search of his car is voluntary when the evidence demonstrates that the defendant's consent was obtained and when the record does not support the defendant's claims that the search was coercive and that his intoxication impaired his ability to consent.

7. Trial court properly looked to the facts underlying defendant's earlier Maryland conviction to determine if the earlier conviction met the requirements of Minnesota's dangerous offender statute, Minn.Stat. § 609.152 (1998).

8. Trial court's imposition of 20-year sentence under dangerous offender statute did not unfairly exaggerate defendant's criminal record and the seriousness of the crime of conviction in light of trial court's findings, among others, that defendant's criminal conduct constituted a "pattern of increasing dangerousness."

Michael A. Hatch, Minnesota Attorney General, St. Paul, James C. Backstrom, Dakota County Attorney, Phillip D. Prokopowicz, Statia D. Hendrix, Assistant County Attorneys, Hastings, for appellant.

John M. Stuart, Minnesota State Public Defender, Steven P. Russett, Assistant State Public Defender, Minneapolis, for respondent.

Heard, considered and decided by the court en banc.

OPINION

RUSSELL A. ANDERSON, Justice.

In this case we are confronted with numerous issues surrounding the arrest and trial of respondent, Curtis Marcell Smallwood, who was found guilty by a Dakota County jury of first-degree burglary pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 609.582, subd. 1(a) (1998) and sentenced as a dangerous offender to 240 months (20 years) confinement. Smallwood's conviction was reversed and a new trial ordered by the court of appeals on the grounds that the prosecutor committed misconduct in his opening statement when he told the jury that Smallwood had offered to plead guilty to a police officer in exchange for a guidelines sentence. State v. Smallwood, No. C3-97-1636, 1998 WL 404860 (Minn.App. July 21, 1998). We granted the state's petition for further review and now reverse the court of appeals.

At about 4 a.m. on October 31, 1996, L.M. was asleep in her second-floor bedroom in Rosemount, Minnesota, when she was awakened by a shirtless man standing over her, adjusting the button on his pants and rubbing her thigh. L.M. protested and the man threatened, "I'll cut you." L.M. screamed for her daughter and the man fled down the stairs and out the door. L.M. immediately called 911.

Responding within two minutes of L.M.'s 911 call, Rosemount police officer John Sommers arrived in L.M.'s neighborhood. Sommers saw a car heading in a direction away from L.M.'s house. The car did not have its headlights on. Sommers observed that the driver matched the general description of a black male that L.M. had given to the dispatcher. Sommers turned on his lights and siren and stopped Smallwood's car. A second police officer, Grant Thorstad, arrived and then left to talk to L.M.

While Thorstad was at L.M.'s residence, Sommers told Smallwood that he was investigating a burglary and the suspect was a black male. Sommers observed that Smallwood was "very excited" and perhaps under the influence of drugs or alcohol. Sommers then placed Smallwood in the back seat of his squad car and told him that he was not under arrest but was being detained.

Thorstad returned to Smallwood's car with L.M. Thorstad asked L.M. if she could identify Smallwood as the man who assaulted her, but she was unable to make an identification, explaining that it was dark in her bedroom and that she has poor eyesight. L.M. told the police that she thought Smallwood was heavier and older than the man who had assaulted her.

Thorstad then sought Smallwood's permission to search his car. At the omnibus hearing, Thorstad testified that Smallwood said, "yeah, go ahead." Smallwood told the officers he was worried they would find evidence of an open bottle in the car, but the police told Smallwood not to worry about an open bottle charge. The search continued, and Thorstad found $79 in cash and a bank deposit slip. The victim had reported that $79 was missing, and the officers verified that the deposit slip had L.M.'s name, address, and account number on it. The police arrested Smallwood for burglary and gave him his Miranda warnings. 1

Sommers drove Smallwood to the Dakota County jail; on the way, Smallwood talked to Sommers about making a deal. The officer testified about the conversation at the omnibus hearing:

He had stated that he wanted to talk to somebody about making a deal, about getting out of the situation. He said he knew people, or had information about people involved in drugs or narcotics. I explained to him that I was not a person that could do anything, I was doing my job in regards to the burglary call. But he brought that up several times and I explained that I couldn't talk to him about that. It wasn't my position.

At the jail, Sommers asked Smallwood if he wanted to give a statement. Smallwood said he did not want to talk to Sommers if Sommers was not in a position to make a deal. Later, Smallwood gave a tape-recorded statement to investigator Mark Robideau. During this statement Smallwood said he was high on cocaine and alcohol at the time of his arrest. Smallwood admitted he was looking for an unlocked door--in fact admitted trying to get into several houses--in L.M.'s neighborhood because he needed money to buy drugs. Smallwood also acknowledged that if L.M.'s money was found in his car, it made sense that he might have taken it.

During the questioning, Smallwood twice asked Robideau to turn off the tape recorder. Robideau complied and testified at the omnibus hearing that Smallwood wanted to "plead guilty and accept sentencing with the Sentencing Guidelines and that he wanted me to go back and talk with the county attorney and make that proposal." Robideau testified that he told Smallwood "I couldn't make any deals at that time nor could I make deals at any time, that I would at least talk to the county attorney about that request."

The next day, November 1, 1996, Robideau returned and talked with Smallwood. Robideau was unaware that a lawyer had been appointed for Smallwood. Robideau told Smallwood about his conversation with the county attorney, telling Smallwood the county attorney was "being a jerk." Robideau then engaged Smallwood in a series of leading questions, asking:

And you told me yesterday that you would be willing to plead guilty at first appearance, am I right?

Uh huh.

Okay. And you've said that you'd be willing to do that if they followed the sentencing guidelines.

Uh huh. * * * What'd he say?

And you'd still be willing to do that?

Yeah.

Okay. Why, why would you be willing to do that? I mean what's in it for you?

To get it over with. Huh uh. Do you think I'm gonna beat it if I had a chance to beat it? I don't either, so, that's why.

Smallwood eventually agreed to plead guilty to first-degree burglary with an agreement that he could withdraw his plea if the court imposed a sentence greater than 10 years. The court indicated its intention to impose a 20-year sentence, and Smallwood withdrew his guilty plea.

Prior to trial, Smallwood sought to suppress the evidence seized from his car, claiming he did not give consent to the search. He also sought to have his statements suppressed because Robideau turned off the tape recorder during his questioning of Smallwood, arguably in violation of State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587 (Minn.1994) (requiring that all custodial interrogations shall be electronically recorded where feasible). Smallwood did not testify at the omnibus hearing, and the omnibus court denied Smallwood's motions. Smallwood was permitted to reopen these issues before the trial court. The state agreed that the statement given by Smallwood on November 1, 1996, was inadmissible because counsel had been appointed to represent Smallwood and Smallwood's counsel was not aware of the interview. Before the trial judge, Smallwood testified in support of his motions, again arguing that his October 31 statement should be suppressed because of a Scales violation. The trial court denied Smallwood's motions.

During opening statements, the prosecutor told the jury: "You're going to hear from Investigator Robideau the defendant at one point in time even admitted that he wanted to plead guilty to this particular offense and receive an appropriate sentence." When the prosecutor made the remark to the jury, Smallwood's counsel did not object, but...

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