State v. Smeal
| Decision Date | 20 April 2022 |
| Docket Number | WASCD-CR-19-221 |
| Parties | STATE OF MAINE, v. Wayne Smeal, Defendant. |
| Court | Maine Superior Court |
ORDER ON MOTION TO SUPPRESS
Defendant has moved to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a warrant authorizing the search of a vacant lot he owns in Steuben. An evidentiary hearing was held on March 15, 2021 and September 27, 2021, All briefing is now complete, and the court has considered the evidence and arguments presented by the parties. A decision is in order.
Police received information about Defendanf s possible involvement in drug trafficking from at least two citizen informants, the first of whom contacted police on May 26, 2019, The first citizen believed Defendant was hiding drugs in a camper trailer parked on property across from Farritf s Auto Body in Steuben and conveyed that information to an officer.
The second citizen informant, later identified as Michael Hubisz reached out to law enforcement on June 3, 2019. Hubisz explained he learned from a third-party source that Defendant had been visiting the land across from Parritt's Auto Body. Hubisz and the third-party then traveled to the property where they located a plastic container burled in the soil. They proceeded to photograph the container and rebury it, after which Hubisz shared his photograph with an officer. Police believed the photograph depicted a container of heroin.
An investigating agent, Agent Day, then applied for a warrant to search the property. The search warrant affidavit described various features of the property, provided directions to the land with reference to Parritt's Auto Body, and cited the book and page number of a deed recorded in Washington County. A different deed—which apparently described a parcel adjacent to Defendant's property—was mistakenly attached to the affidavit.
As Agent Day attempted to secure a search warrant; two other agents conducted surveillance in the area surrounding Defendant's parcel of land. These agents witnessed Defendant park at Parritf s Auto Body, cross the road, and return to his car. Defendant was then detained and handcuffed, after which the agents observed a baggie of brown powder fall from Defendant's pantleg. The resultant search of Defendant's person yielded a .357 Magnum revolver.
Agent Day eventually arrived with a signed search warrant, and a search of Defendant's property commenced. The unmarked land was described as a "vacant lot" with tall grass, woods, and an overgrown driveway. A trailer frame—which lacked any habitable space—was situated on the property and appeared to have been burned at some point in the past Police observed no other physical structures.
During the search, one agent noticed "a tiny bit of blue poking up" from beneath the ground. She dug away the surrounding dirt and discovered a container with several baggies of suspected heroin inside.
Defendant challenges the lawfulness of the warrant authorizing the search of his vacant lot, arguing it was unsupported by probable cause and failed to describe the searchable area with particularity. The State counters that no warrant was needed in the first place because the "open fields" doctrine justified a warrantless search.
The "special protection accorded by the Fourth Amendment to the people in their persons, houses, papers, and effects is not extended to the open fields." Olive)- v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 176 (1984) (internal quotation marks omitted). "An 'open field' is that area outside the curtilage," State v. Pease, 520 A.2d 698, 699 (Me. 1987). Individuals have "no legitimate expectation that open fields will remain free from warrantless intrusion by government officers," Oliver, 466 U.S. at 181, Accordingly, officers may "enter and search a[n open] field without a warrant" Id., at 173. Moreover "[e]vidence found lying in 'open fields'... is not considered to be the product of a search of a house for constitutional purposes and may be seized without a warrant," State v. Pelletier, 673 A.2d 1327 1329 (Me. 1996) ().
In this case, Defendant's vacant, wooded lot fits within the definition of an "open field." Only an overgrown driveway and burned trailer frame existed on site. There were no signs of habitation and the land was not posted against trespassers. The court therefore concludes Defendant's uninhabited land was an "area outside the curtilage" to which no reasonable expectation of privacy...
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