State v. Smith
| Decision Date | 31 January 2020 |
| Docket Number | 115,322,Nos. 115,321,s. 115 |
| Citation | 456 P.3d 1004 |
| Parties | STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Wesley A. SMITH Jr., Appellant. |
| Court | Kansas Supreme Court |
Patrick H. Dunn, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and was on the briefs for appellant.
Boyd K. Isherwood, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Marc Bennett, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were with him on the brief for appellee.
Wesley Smith pleaded guilty to refusing to submit to a test to determine the presence of alcohol or drugs and driving while a habitual violator. In a second case based on separate events, Smith again pleaded guilty to refusing to submit to a test to determine the presence of alcohol or drugs and driving under the influence. In a consolidated direct appeal to the Court of Appeals, Smith challenged his convictions, arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction to render them. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. We affirm.
In May 2014, in case 14CR1298 and in connection with events that occurred in September 2013, the State charged Smith with refusing to submit to a test to determine the presence of alcohol or drugs in violation of K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 8-1025, driving while a habitual violator, and failing to signal while turning. Smith filed a motion to dismiss the charge of refusal to submit to an alcohol or drug test, arguing that the statute criminalizing such conduct was unconstitutional. The district court denied the motion. Smith pleaded guilty to refusing to submit to an alcohol or drug test and driving while a habitual violator and, in exchange, the State dismissed the charge for failing to signal while turning. The district court sentenced Smith to 12 months of jail time for the refusal to submit to testing conviction and a concurrent 12 months of jail time for the habitual violator conviction, to be followed by 12 months of postrelease supervision. The court also imposed a $2,500 fine for the refusal to submit to testing conviction and a $500 fine for the habitual violator conviction.
In January 2015, in case 15CR218 and in connection with events that occurred in April 2014, the State charged Smith with refusing to submit to a test to determine the presence of alcohol or drugs in violation of K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 8-1025, driving while a habitual violator, and driving on the left half of the roadway. Smith again filed a motion to dismiss the charge of refusal to submit to an alcohol or drug test, arguing that the statute criminalizing such conduct was unconstitutional. The district court denied the motion. Smith pleaded guilty to refusing to submit to an alcohol or drug test and driving under the influence and, in exchange, the State dismissed the remaining charges. The district judge sentenced Smith to 12 months in jail for each conviction and ordered the sentences to run concurrently. The district court also imposed a $2,500 fine for each conviction and ordered one year of postrelease supervision.
In November 2015, Smith appealed his convictions for refusing to submit to testing in both cases. The Court of Appeals allowed a late appeal of his first case and consolidated the two appeals into one.
On February 26, 2016, we issued an opinion in State v. Ryce , 303 Kan. 899, 368 P.3d 342 (2016), aff'd on reh'g 306 Kan. 682, 396 P.3d 711 (2017). There, we held that K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 8-1025 —the statute that criminalized refusing to submit to testing for alcohol or drugs—was facially unconstitutional. 303 Kan. at 963, 368 P.3d 342. When Smith filed his appellate brief, he relied on Ryce to argue that the court should vacate his convictions.
The State moved for involuntary dismissal of Smith's appeal, arguing that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to consider a direct appeal from a guilty plea. Smith responded in opposition. Both parties submitted briefs.
After considering the parties' briefs, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal in an unpublished opinion, holding that it lacked jurisdiction to consider a direct appeal from a guilty plea. State v. Smith , No. 115321, 2018 WL 559804 (Kan. App. 2018). We granted Smith's petition for review.
The Court of Appeals dismissed Smith's appeal without considering the merits of his claim—that his convictions should be vacated based on the holding in Ryce —after concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal. Smith argues the panel had jurisdiction to review his claim.
This court reviews questions of subject matter jurisdiction de novo. Hill v. State , 310 Kan. 490, 498, 448 P.3d 457 (2019). To the extent this question requires the interpretation of statutes, we apply a de novo analysis to that interpretation. State v. LaPointe , 309 Kan. 299, 312, 434 P.3d 850 (2019).
" ‘Subject matter jurisdiction is the power of the court to hear and decide a particular type of action.’ " State v. Dunn , 304 Kan. 773, 784, 375 P.3d 332 (2016) (quoting State v. Matzke , 236 Kan. 833, 835, 696 P.2d 396 [1985] ). The Kansas Constitution bestows subject matter jurisdiction upon Kansas courts. Dunn , 304 Kan. at 811, 375 P.3d 332.
The Kansas Constitution provides that "[t]he judicial power of this state shall be vested exclusively in one court of justice, which shall be divided into one supreme court, district courts, and such other courts as are provided by law." Kan. Const. art. 3, § 1. Pursuant to this provision, the Kansas Legislature created the Court of Appeals and bestowed power upon it "over appeals in civil and criminal cases ... as may be prescribed by law." K.S.A. 20-3001. As a result of these constitutional and statutory provisions, the Kansas Court of Appeals "may exercise jurisdiction only under circumstances allowed by statute." Flores Rentals v. Flores , 283 Kan. 476, 481, 153 P.3d 523 (2007).
K.S.A. 22-3601 provides that "[a]ny appeal permitted to be taken from a district court's final judgment in a criminal case shall be taken to the court of appeals, except in those cases reviewable by law in the district court or in which a direct appeal to the supreme court is required." K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 22-3601(a). Thus, the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review criminal appeals that are "permitted to be taken from a district court's final judgment." K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 22-3601(a).
K.S.A. 22-3602 discusses what appeals are "permitted." It provides that "[n]o appeal shall be taken by the defendant from a judgment of conviction before a district judge upon a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, except that jurisdictional or other grounds going to the legality of the proceedings may be raised by the defendant as provided in K.S.A. 60-1507, and amendments thereto." K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 22-3602(a).
This court has held that under this statute, the Court of Appeals is without jurisdiction to consider the direct appeal of a conviction when a defendant pleaded guilty. State v. Hall , 292 Kan. 862, 866, 257 P.3d 263 (2011). In this case, the Court of Appeals relied on this statutory scheme and the cases from this court to dismiss Smith's appeal for a lack of jurisdiction. Smith , 2018 WL 559804, at *3.
Smith avers that the Court of Appeals erred when it came to this conclusion because he is arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction to convict him of a crime under an unconstitutional statute and K.S.A. 22-3602(a) explicitly allows for appeals based on jurisdictional grounds. He rests this contention on the language in the statute providing that "except that jurisdictional or other grounds going to the legality of the proceedings may be raised by the defendant." K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 22-3602(a).
Smith ignores the end of that sentence, which is "as provided in K.S.A. 60-1507 and amendments thereto." K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 22-3602(a). Thus, the full language of the statute prohibits appeals from a conviction after a guilty plea but still allows a defendant to challenge convictions based on jurisdiction or the legality of the proceedings "as provided in K.S.A. 60-1507." The ignored language creates some ambiguity that we must address.
The intent of the Legislature governs our interpretation of a statute. We give common language its ordinary meaning and turn to canons of construction and legislative history only when the language is ambiguous. Midwest Crane & Rigging, LLC v. Kansas Corporation Comm'n , 306 Kan. 845, 850, 397 P.3d 1205 (2017).
The language in K.S.A. 22-3602 is unclear. It prohibits jurisdiction in the Court of Appeals over an appeal from a guilty plea "except that jurisdictional or other grounds going to the legality of the proceedings may be raised ... as provided in K.S.A. 60-1507." (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 22-3602(a). The use of the word "except" suggests that the Court of Appeals lacks jurisdiction to review a direct appeal from a guilty plea in every situation other than those described in the language following the word "except." See Webster's New World College Dictionary 505 (5th ed. 2014) (defining "except" as "to take out"). At first blush, the language following the word "except" seems to bestow jurisdiction in the Court of Appeals to review claims based on "jurisdictional or other grounds going to the legality of the proceedings ...." But the sentence continues, indicating that a defendant can raise those claims "as provided in K.S.A. 60-1507." (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 22-3602(a). This additional language creates confusion because K.S.A. 60-1507 allows "[a] prisoner in custody ... claiming the right to be released" to "move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence," thus directing the defendant to file a motion in district court. K.S.A. 60-1507(a).
We see two ways to read K.S.A. 22-3602. First, it may be interpreted to create appellate jurisdiction over appeals from guilty or nolo contendere pleas as long as a defendant is challenging...
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